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SUMMARY 
In apartheid-era South Africa protests were a mechanism through which the 
dispossessed and marginalised could challenge their exclusion. These 
characteristically confrontational and violent protests influenced the framework 
adopted to regulate demonstrations during the democratic transition and in the new 
constitutional dispensation, namely the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 
(“Gatherings Act”). In the new constitutional dispensation the right to assemble and 
demonstrate is guaranteed in section 17 of the Constitution.   
South Africa has been labelled the “protest capital of the world”. Protests are a 
regular occurrence and are a vital part of democratic participation and dissent. This is 
because the people, on whose will government is based, need an avenue outside of 
existing institutions to form and express their views and show their dissent. The 
question arises as to how certain types of dissent fit within different conceptions of 
democracy. This thesis attempts to determine whether and to what extent different 
understandings of democracy allow us to make sense of the nature and importance of 
protest action. 
The thesis examines the regulatory framework of the Gatherings Act, with reference 
to its implementation by the executive and state administration. It also examines case 
law in which section 17 of the Constitution has been interpreted. It argues that some 
of the provisions of the Gatherings Act, the implementation of the Act by the executive, 
and some court judgments reveal an impoverished understanding of democracy and 
unduly limit the rights of the citizenry to participate and dissent.  
The thesis examines various conceptions of democracy. It argues that, while the 
institutional models of representative, participatory and deliberative democracy may 
help to illuminate certain aspects of freedom of assembly, they do not adequately 
address the inherent tensions in democracy which are illustrated in contentious and 
disruptive protests. Representative models of democracy tend to offer a restrictive 
view which assumes that the will of the people is identical to the decisions of 
representatives, and minimises the role of participation beyond and between elections. 
Participatory and deliberative models of democracy attempt to eliminate tensions and 
conflict by creating a platform for a possible rational consensus. These models place 
a great deal of reliance on the power of representatives to establish spaces for 
democratic interaction.  
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Disruptive protests are extra-institutional forms of democratic participation. This 
type of extra-institutional politics can be linked to the model of agonistic pluralism. 
Rather than attempting to eliminate and exclude conflict from democratic thought, it 
recognises that these conflicts are fundamental to democracy. The thesis argues that 
this model could help enable an understanding of protest action which recognises the 
centrality of protests to democracy and transformation under the South African 
Constitution. 
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OPSOMMING 
Tydens die apartsheidsera in Suid-Afrika was protesaksie 'n meganisme waardeur 
diegene wat deur apartheid benadeel en gemarginaliseer is, hul uitsluiting kon uitdaag. 
Hierdie konfronterende en gewelddadige proteste het ‘n invloed gehad op die 
raamwerk wat aanvaar is om betogings tydens die demokratiese oorgang en in die 
nuwe grondwetlike bedeling te reguleer, naamlik die Wet op die Regulering van 
Byeenkomste 205 van 1993 ("Byeenkomstewet"). In die nuwe grondwetlike bedeling 
word die reg om te vergader en te betoog in artikel 17 van die Grondwet gewaarborg.  
Suid-Afrika word gebrandmerk as die "protes hoofstad van die wêreld”. Protes is ‘n 
gereelde verskynsel en is 'n noodsaaklike deel van demokratiese deelname en 
meningsverskil. Dit is omdat die burgers, op wie se wil die regering gebaseer is, 'n 
meganisme buite die bestaande instellings benodig om hul standpunte te lug en om 
uitdrukking te gee aan hul meningsverskille. Die vraag ontstaan hoe sekere tipes 
protes binne verskillende opvattings van demokrasie inpas. Hierdie tesis poog om te 
bepaal of, en in watter mate verskillende begrippe van demokrasie ons toelaat om sin 
te maak van die aard en belangrikheid van protesaksie. 
Die tesis ondersoek die regulerende raamwerk van die Byeenkomstewet, met 
verwysing na die implementering van die Wet deur die uitvoerende gesag en 
staatsadministrasie. Dit ondersoek ook regspraak waarin artikel 17 van die Grondwet 
uitgelê word. Die tesis voer aan dat sommige van die bepalings van die 
Byeenkomstewet, die implementering van die Wet deur die uitvoerende gesag, en 
sommige van die hofuitsprake op ŉ verarmde opvatting van demokrasie berus en die 
regte van burgers om deel te neem en te verskil, te veel beperk.  
Die tesis ondersoek verskillende opvattings van demokrasie. Dit argumenteer dat, 
alhoewel die institusionele modelle van verteenwoordigende, deelnemende en 
oorlegplegende (deliberatiewe) demokrasie kan help om sekere aspekte van vryheid 
van vergadering te belig, dit nie die inherente spanning van demokrasie, wat deur 
ontwrigtende en omstrede proteste geïllustreer word, voldoende aanspreek nie. 
Verteenwoordigende modelle van demokrasie bied 'n beperkende siening wat 
aanvaar dat die wil van die mense identies is aan die besluite van die 
verteenwoordigers, en wat die rol van deelname na en tussen verkiesings verminder. 
Deelnemende en deliberatiewe modelle van demokrasie poog om spanning en konflik 
uit te skakel deur 'n platform te skep vir 'n moontlike rasionele konsensus. Hierdie 
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modelle maak grootliks staat op die mag van verteenwoordigers om hierdie ruimtes te 
vestig. 
Ontwrigtende proteste is buite-institusionele vorme van demokratiese deelname. 
Hierdie tipe buite-institusionele politiek kan gekoppel word aan die model van 
agonistiese pluralisme. In plaas daarvan om konflik uit demokratiese denke uit te 
skakel, erken dit dat hierdie konflikte fundamenteel is vir demokrasie. Die tesis voer 
aan dat hierdie model ’n begrip van protesaksie kan daarstel, wat beklemtoon dat 
protes sentraal staan tot demokrasie en transformasie ingevolge die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Grondwet. 
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Chapter 1 
1 Introduction 
1 1 Research problem and background to the research 
The right to assemble, demonstrate, petition and picket is guaranteed in section 17 
of the Constitution.1 It is commonly accepted that this right, together with related rights 
like freedom of expression and freedom of association, is fundamental to democracy.2 
This is because the people, on whose will government is based, need an avenue 
outside of existing institutions and electoral processes to form and express their views, 
show their solidarity and register their dissent. In turn, the interpretation of this right is 
closely bound up with understandings of democracy. Section 17, like all other 
provisions in the Bill of Rights, must be interpreted in view of the values that underlie 
an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.3 The 
interpretation given to freedom of assembly and the importance attached to it therefore 
depend to a significant extent on how we understand the open and democratic society 
envisaged by the Constitution. 
Of course, democracy is a contested concept which is given a variety of very 
different interpretations in constitutional and political thought. Some of these 
disagreements about the meaning of democracy are brought to the fore by disputes 
about the meaning and importance of freedom of assembly in a democratic society. 
Because freedom of assembly involves forms of democratic action which take place 
outside existing democratic institutions, it raises difficult questions about the 
relationship between the people and their democratic representatives, and between 
institutional and extra-institutional politics. For example, certain understandings of 
democracy assume that, in a democracy that is based on regular elections, universal 
adult suffrage and multiparty representation, there is less need for protest action as a 
form of extra-institutional participation.4 That is not to say that, on this view, protest 
                                            
1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter “the Constitution”). 
2 South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 1999 4 SA 469 (CC) paras 7-8. The court 
highlighted the importance of freedom of expression but also included freedom of assembly and other 
expressive related rights within this explanation.  
3 S 39(1) of the Constitution. 
4 J Brown South Africa’s Insurgent Citizens (2015) 36-46. Brown elaborates on this assumption by 
challenging the myth of democratic transition and the optimism within the representative institutional 
system during the early years of the post-apartheid dispensation. See also J Duncan Protest Nation: 
the right to protest in South Africa (2016) 1. 
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action must be banned. However, it is seen as the exception rather than the norm, and 
it is stressed that such action must take place strictly within the constraints imposed 
by law. By contrast, other understandings of democracy take a far more positive view 
of freedom of assembly, and highlight its capacity to hold representatives to account, 
give a voice to the powerless, expose distortions in the representative system, or serve 
as a form of direct democracy.   
These are not simply academic debates, at least not in a country like South Africa 
which is characterised by huge inequality and a very high number of protests. Many 
of those who participate in protest action arguably view it as a vital democratic right 
which, in the words of Mogoeng CJ, “will, in many cases, be the only mechanism 
available to them to express their legitimate concerns”.5 On the other hand, the State 
often takes a much more restrictive view of the importance of the right to dissent within 
a democracy. This is evident from the ways in which some local authorities have 
exercised their discretion in terms of the Regulation of Gatherings Act, and the manner 
in which protest action is handled by the police and private security.6 These actors 
have attempted to deter protest action based on a generalised “threat” of unrest, 
violence or damage. In some cases, the police have supressed gatherings because 
they had the potential to be non-peaceful and sought to criminalise protest action.7  As 
will be shown in chapter three, State actors tend to adopt a narrow understanding of 
freedom of assembly and the weight that should be given to it in a constitutional 
democracy.  
Against these restrictive views, this thesis argues for a more robust understanding 
of the role of freedom of assembly in South Africa’s democracy. Protest action not only 
                                            
5 South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas 2013 1 SA 83 (CC) para 61 (hereafter 
SATAWU). On a purely technical note, there is an inconsistency in the spelling of “Garvas” as it differs 
in the different reported judgments of the High Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional 
Court. While the reported judgments of the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court of Appeal refer to 
“Garvas”, the High Court judgment refers to “Garvis”. This thesis will follow and cite in the manner in 
which these judgments are reported irrespective of these inconsistencies.   
6 See chapter 3.  
7 See chapter 3. For extensive reports on the criminalisation of protest and the violent repression by 
police, see D McKinley & A Veriava Arresting dissent: State repression and post-Apartheid social 
movements (2005) and M Memeza A critical review of the implementation of the Regulation of 
Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 – A local government and civil sociality perspective (2006). 
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played an important role in bringing about the end of apartheid,8 but continues to 
provide ordinary people with opportunities to challenge laws and policies and to agitate 
for change. It provides spaces of antagonism, conflict and disagreement that are vital, 
in the words of Klare, to “transforming [South Africa’s] political and social institutions 
and power relationships in a democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction”.9 As 
highlighted by Liebenberg: 
"Active debate and contestation concerning the nature of social change, and the political 
and legal reforms necessary for achieving it, should not be viewed as antithetical to 
transformation, but rather as integral to its achievement."10  
 
Against this background, this thesis examines the extent to which different 
conceptions of democracy allow us to come to terms with freedom of assembly’s 
importance as a fundamental right, and to interpret it in a transformative manner. The 
Constitutional Court has described South Africa’s democracy as one which is 
representative at its core and has participatory elements.11 The African Charter on 
Democracy, Election and Governance, which is binding on South Africa, similarly 
emphasises a system of government which is representative12 and contains 
participatory elements.13 In academic literature, mention is also made of a third form 
of democracy, in addition to representative and participatory democracy, namely direct 
democracy.14 In addition to participatory democracy, the South African Constitution is 
also said to support a form of deliberative democracy.15 Against this background, this 
                                            
8 See chapter 2. 
9 K Klare “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 146 150. 
10 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 29 
(emphasis added). 
11 Doctors for life International v Speaker of the National Assembly & Others 2006 6 SA 416 (CC) paras 
111,115 and 116 (hereafter “Doctors for life”); Matatiele Municipality & Others v President of the 
Republic of South Africa & Others (No 2) 2007 6 SA 477 (CC) para 57 (hereafter Matatiele 2).  
12 Article 2(3) and 3(3) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, 30 January 
2007. 
13 Article 3(7) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007). 
14 S Woolman & J Swanepoel “Constitutional History” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional 
Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2008) 2-1-2-5. See further I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights 
Handbook 6 ed (2013) 88-89. 
15 Democratic Alliance & another v Masondo NO & another 2003 2 SA 413 (CC) para 42. See generally 
M Freeman “Deliberative Democracy: A Sympathetic Comment” (2000) 29 Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 371–418.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
4 
 
study will focus primarily on these four forms of democracy, namely representative, 
participatory, deliberative and direct democracy.16 In order to understand where 
freedom of assembly fits within these models it is necessary first to provide a basic 
framework of these institutional models of democracy as expounded in political 
thought and South African jurisprudence. Furthermore, this thesis seeks to critically 
highlight the shortcomings of these models in explaining and providing for a more 
robust and antagonistic form of protest.  
In the South African context, protests are typically characterised as disruptive and 
sometimes destabilising. These institutionalised models as mentioned above may not 
adequately address the inherent tensions in democracy which are illustrated by these 
more contentious and disruptive forms of protest. These protests can be described as 
extra-institutional forms of democratic participation. This type of extra-institutional 
politics can be linked to the model of agonistic pluralism as advocated by Chantal 
Mouffe.17 This thesis seeks to investigate this model of democracy and determine how 
this model may assist in understanding more contentious forms of protest.  This is 
because agonistic pluralism does not attempt to eliminate or minimise conflict or 
dissent, but recognises it as inherent in democratic politics.18  
  
1 2 Research aims  
The research aims of this thesis are:  
 To place freedom of assembly and protest action in South Africa within a historical 
and societal context.  
 To discuss the ambit and limits of freedom of assembly with reference to the 
constitutional and legislative framework. 
 To examine the meaning of representative and participatory democracy, with 
reference to the Constitution, case law and academic literature, and to examine 
whether the Constitution makes provision for direct democracy. 
 To examine the relationship between freedom of assembly and different forms of 
democracy. This will include an analysis of whether and to what extent freedom of 
                                            
16 This is not to suggest that these are the only forms of democracy. For a helpful analysis of a variety 
of models or forms of democracy, see generally D Held Models of democracy 3rd ed (2006). 
17C Mouffe The Democratic Paradox (2005) 98-107.  
18 Mouffe The Democratic Paradox 100. 
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assembly must be seen to i) support representative democracy, deliberative and 
participatory democracy, or ii) institute a form of dissent and protest which 
challenges these institutional forms of democracy.  
 To examine whether and to what extent ideas of agonistic pluralism and disruptive 
democracy can provide the basis for a nuanced understanding of protest action.  
 
1 3  Methodology 
The thesis comprises three dimensions: first, an analysis of the right to freedom of 
assembly; second, a consideration of the meaning of democracy under the 
Constitution; and third, an examination of the relationship between freedom of 
assembly and democracy. 
The study of freedom of assembly will rely on the following methods: Firstly, it will 
provide a historical contextualisation of freedom of assembly within South Africa 
through the use of secondary sources such as research projects, government 
reports19 and historical studies.  Secondly, it will analyse the scope and content of 
freedom of assembly, as well as the permissibility of limitations of this right, with 
reference to the Constitution, the Regulation of Gatherings Act20 and relevant case 
law. In addition to these primary sources, secondary sources such as books and 
journal articles will also be used to help provide a critical analysis of legislation and 
case law. The legal and policy framework relating to the powers of government (the 
executive) with regards to protest action will also be evaluated in order to determine 
the limits of the right and supposed limits of executive power.  
The study of the constitutional value of democracy will draw on the following 
methods and sources: Firstly, a brief description will be given of different meanings 
and models of democracy. This part of the study will rely mainly on secondary and 
tertiary sources from political sciences and sociology. Secondly, democracy will be 
examined from a legal and constitutional perspective. The manner in which the courts 
have expounded the meaning of democracy in case law will be analysed. In addition, 
various legal academic contributions will be drawn upon.  
                                            
19 Such as the Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation 
(The Goldstone Commission). The Goldstone Commission was appointed to investigate the political 
violence between 1991 and 1994. 
20 The Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993. 
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The study of the relationship between freedom of assembly and democracy will 
draw on political-theoretical texts, case law, commentaries by constitutional law 
academics and comparative constitutional law. It will be asked whether and to what 
extent different models of democracy – such as representative, participatory, 
deliberative and direct democracy, as well as agonistic pluralism – can provide an 
explanatory framework for understanding freedom of assembly. Reference will 
occasionally be made to foreign law. For instance, the link made in German law 
between associative rights (such as freedom of assembly) and direct democracy will 
be considered.21  
 
1 4 Outline of chapters  
1 4 1 Chapter 2: Social context and history 
This chapter will attempt to contextualise the right to freedom of assembly by 
providing a historical overview of the development of the legal framework which 
regulates freedom of assembly, and by examining historical trends relating to protest 
action in South Africa. It will also examine claims about the disaffection on the part of 
“the people” with the politics of the ballot (also referred to as “the crisis of 
representative democracy”) and the increase of social protests.  
 
1 4 2 Chapter 3: Freedom of assembly: the constitutional and legislative framework  
This chapter will examine the nature and scope of the right, in view of the values 
underlying it and other supporting provisions in the Bill of Rights. It will also examine 
and evaluate limitations of this right in terms of the Regulation of Gatherings Act. 
Finally, it will analyse and critique South African case law on freedom of assembly, 
particularly the SATAWU case. The chapter will also briefly analyse the recent High 
Court case of S v Mlungwana.22  
 
                                            
21 O Salat The Right to Freedom of Assembly: A Comparative Study (2015) 48. See further U Preuß 
“Associative Rights (The Right to the Freedoms of Petition, Assembly, and Association)” in M Rosenfeld 
& A Sajo (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (2012) 948 951-952.  
22 2018 1 SACR 538 (WCC). 
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1 4 3 Chapter 4: Freedom of assembly: direct and representative democracy 
This chapter will draw on democratic political theory to provide a basic overview of 
two different understandings of democracy that often inform the interpretation of 
freedom of assembly. These are representative and direct democracy. The chapter 
will specifically discuss the link between freedom of assembly and these forms of 
democracy, with reference to academic literature. It will also evaluate the assumption 
that freedom of assembly is a form of direct democracy. 
 
1 4 4 Chapter 5: Freedom of assembly: Participatory, deliberative and agonistic 
democracy 
This chapter will examine possible links between freedom of assembly and 
participatory and deliberative conceptions of democracy. It will ask whether freedom 
of assembly can be seen as supportive of representative and deliberative institutions 
or as a vehicle for challenging these institutionalised forms of democracy. The chapter 
will also consider an alternative model for understanding democracy which may allow 
for the type of dissent expressed through demonstrations and assemblies. It will ask 
whether and how agonistic pluralism may allow for a form of extra-institutional politics 
that supports democratic values.  This chapter will focus on how a vision of democracy 
as disruptive and agonistic could facilitate a more adequate understanding of the 
democratic possibilities inherent in the “politics of the street” and the “rebellion of the 
poor”.  
 
1 4 5 Chapter 6: Conclusion 
The closing chapter will summarise the research presented in the previous chapters 
and seek to draw the different strands of the argument together.  
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Chapter 2 
2 Social context and history 
2 1 Introduction 
In order to understand the nature and importance of freedom of assembly, it is 
essential to examine this right in a historical and social context. The chapter 
commences with a historical analysis of protest action in South Africa. It discusses 
protest action during apartheid and in the anti-apartheid struggle. This provides a 
useful point of departure for understanding the importance of protest action in 
situations where people do not have the vote, and for gaining a sense of how the 
dissent culture inherited from the past influences current trends and spaces of 
contestation in South Africa. The chapter then examines how the characteristically 
confrontational and violent protests of the apartheid era influenced the framework that 
was adopted to regulate demonstrations during the democratic transition and in the 
new constitutional dispensation.  
The end of apartheid brought political participation through the vote, which raised 
the expectation that there would be a drastic decrease in protest action. However, 
twenty years into democracy, South Africa is still characterised by a very high 
incidence of protests. The chapter asks whether the intensity and frequency of protests 
are evidence of a disaffection on the part of “the people” with institutionalised politics. 
It also aims to contextualise protest action in the new constitutional dispensation 
through an analysis of the substantial increase in protest action at local and national 
levels. General trends are identified, and the Marikana protests are looked at 
specifically. The chapter also briefly discusses the increase in the use of protests by 
political parties and social movements against the background of understandings of 
South Africa as a dominant party democracy.  
 
2 2 South Africa: the protest capital of the world 
During South Africa’s apartheid and colonial past, protests had been used as a tool 
to challenge an unjust system and provide a “voice to the voiceless”.1 With the advent 
of constitutional democracy, this type of dissent would seem to be less necessary in 
                                            
1 South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas 2013 1 SA 83 (CC) paras 61 and 62 
(hereafter SATAWU). 
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view of the universality of the vote2 and institutionalised forms of public participation 
for the citizenry.3 In the view of many, the advent of constitutional democracy should 
have resulted in a shift from popular mobilisation and protests to a politics that is 
centred on representative institutions.4  
The assumption that the shift from apartheid to a constitutional democracy, where 
all citizens have the right to vote, would result in a decrease in protest action has been 
proven wrong. In fact, the last decade has witnessed a substantial increase in public 
protest action.5 This has led to South Africa being labelled as the “protest capital of 
the world”.6 The reasons for this increase in protest action are numerous, and include 
a lack of faith in the current system to provide a wide range of services for citizens and 
to aptly provide for true meaningful participation in decision making.7 Even though the 
end of apartheid has brought with it large scale positive changes through a democratic 
government for the people, South Africa remains a vastly unequal society. The 
increase of protests in the current South African context indicates that, although 
provision has been made for various spaces for citizen participation, people still see 
protests as an important vehicle for political expression and participation.  
                                            
2 S 19 of the Constitution. 
3 H Botha “Fundamental rights and democratic contestation: reflections on freedom of assembly in an 
unequal society” (2017) 21 Law, Democracy and Development 221 222. 
4 3-4. 
5 C Mbazira “Service delivery protests, struggle for rights and the failure of local democracy in South 
Africa and Uganda: Parallels and divergences” (2013) 29 SAJHR 251 266. See further an analysis of 
the statistics indicating the increase in protest action in M Marks & D Bruce “Groundhog Day? Public 
order policing twenty years into democracy” (2014) 27 SACJ 347-376. In addition see P Alexander 
“Protests and Police Statistics: Some Commentary” South African Research Chair in Social Change, 
University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg (2012) and R Berkhout & J Handmaker “Introduction to 
Mobilising Social Justice: critical discussion on the potential for civic action and structural change” in J 
Handmaker & R Berkhout (eds) Mobilising Social Justice in South Africa: Perspectives from 
Researchers and Practitioners (2010) 1 3. See further MC Dawson “Resistance and Repression: 
policing protest in post-apartheid South Africa” in J Handmaker & R Berkhout (eds) Mobilising Social 
Justice in South Africa: Perspectives from Researchers and Practitioners (2010) 106 111 and P 
Alexander “Rebellion of the poor: South Africa’s service delivery protests-a preliminary analysis” (2010) 
37 Review of African Political Economy 25 27. 
6 P Alexander  “A massive rebellion of the poor” (13-04-2012) The Mail and Guardian 
https://mg.co.za/article/2012-04-13-a-massive-rebellion-of-the-poor (accessed 04-05-2017);  
7 Dawson “Resistance and Repression” in Mobilising Social Justice in South Africa 128; Mbazira (2013) 
SAJHR 265.  
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Freedom of assembly and demonstration is seen as a hallmark of democracy. The 
use of protest action can play a positive role in promoting an active citizenry and a 
participatory form of government. However, the label of “the protest capital of the 
world” is generally not seen as something positive. This label has been linked to the 
idea of the “rebellion of the poor”.8  Many protests have highlighted failures in local 
government. These protests are not only indicative of inefficiencies in the provision of 
socio-economic services, but also indicate possible failures in the functioning of the 
institutions which embody forms of participatory and representative democracy.9  
 
2 3 The history of assembly and demonstration in South Africa 
2 3 1 Apartheid 
In 1948, the National Party Government came into power and adopted its policy of 
apartheid.10 Apartheid – as an institutionalised policy for racial separation – created a 
country where a large part of the disenfranchised black population11 was excluded 
from the political process.12 Apartheid South Africa was described by Dugard as a 
“pigmentocracy in which all political power is vested in a white oligarchy, which in turn 
is controlled by an Afrikaner elite”.13 But political exclusion was not the only violation 
of basic human rights. The civil rights of black people were also systematically 
infringed, and they had very limited opportunities in the socio-economic sphere. The 
apartheid government used its vast political power to consolidate economic and social 
                                            
8 Alexander (2010) Review of African Political Economy 27. 
9 For a full analysis of representative democracy see chapter 4 and for a full analysis of participatory 
democracy see chapter 5. 
10 The best translation for Apartheid would be “separate-ness” and it refers to a policy of racial 
separation.  
11 The term “black” refers to all peoples of South Africa other than those who are categorised as the 
“white” group. 
12 Parliament did establish a representative body for certain portions of the black population. The 
Tricameral Parliament established in terms of the Tricameral Constitution of 1983 created three houses 
of Parliament: The House of Delegates (for Indians), the House of Representatives (for Coloureds) and 
the House of Assembly (for Whites). This parliament was largely inadequate and a charade. The 
political power remained vested in the House of Assembly. For more on the Tricameral Parliament see 
J Dugard “Racism and Repression in South Africa: The Two Faces of Apartheid” (1989) 2 Harvard 
Human Rights Law Journal 97-98 
13 J Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (1978) 7.  
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power within a white elite.14 There was therefore a close link between the exclusion of 
the black population from the political process and socio-economic discrimination 
against them. 
The exclusion of the majority of the population from the right to vote greatly 
enhanced the importance of protest action as a means for black people to make their 
voices heard. In Western democratic thought, “ultimately, the basic means of protest… 
is the ballot box”,15 which means that dissent is institutionalised through the democratic 
right to vote. However, since this type of protest was not available to black South 
Africans, who did not have the right to vote, protest action outside of state institutions 
was the only participatory opportunity for them to dissent.  Interestingly, the apartheid 
government declared in 1968: 
“It is no offence in South Africa to oppose the policy of separate development. It is opposed 
by the opposition party in the South African Parliament itself. Daily, a large section of the 
South African Press vigorously criticises the policy, as well as their Government actions… 
No action can be taken under the South African Government as long as their opposition is 
conducted in a constitutional manner.”16 (emphasis added.) 
  
This statement, which seemed to proclaim the right of the citizens to dissent, was 
illusory. Firstly, black South Africans were not involved in the political process and 
therefore would not be able to dissent in those institutional spaces. Institutionalised 
dissent was only possible for groups who were white. Additionally, these groups 
expressed dissent in a manner which would not disturb the status quo created through 
apartheid.17 Secondly, those who opposed the system of apartheid and aimed to 
disturb the status quo – by asserting black citizenship and arguing for the inclusion of 
the black population in the political process – were limited to forms of opposition that 
could be labelled “constitutional”.  Therefore, the right to dissent was protected if the 
content and type of dissent did not threaten the apartheid state. Under a system of 
parliamentary sovereignty, the State could determine the bounds within which protest 
was permissible. The legislative limits on protest action were so severe that the 
freedom to protest and dissent could be said to have been an illusion.   
                                            
14 D McKinley & A Veriava Arresting dissent: State repression and post-apartheid social movements 
(2005) 15-19.  
15 A Fortas Concerning dissent and civil disobedience (1969) 19. 
16 Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of South Africa South Africa and the rule of law (1968). 
17 Dugard Human Rights 149. 
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The extra-institutional nature of protest action during the apartheid era was 
necessary because there was no space for political participation through the ballot 
box. Protest was a vital part of a democratic culture in order to create a democracy. It 
was seen as a mechanism for the people to have their voices heard. However, the 
insistence that protests had to occur in a “constitutional manner”, and the severe 
restrictions placed on extra-institutional political activities in terms of legislation, made 
dissent extremely difficult for the anti-apartheid struggle.   
 
2 3 2 The apartheid regulatory framework 
The apartheid government was committed to stifling dissent through the enactment 
of repressive laws. These laws severely restricted freedom of expression, association, 
assembly and demonstration, in order to silence opposition to apartheid. This section 
will not provide an exhaustive discussion of the repressive regulatory framework but 
will rather provide a brief overview of some of the most important legislation, in order 
to highlight the suppressive nature of the restrictions on protest action.  
A central feature of this regulatory framework was that demonstrations on public 
property mostly required permission from the local authority.18 Demonstrations and 
gatherings were viewed as a privilege and not a right. Even when such permission 
was granted by the local authority, the State introduced a variety of repressive laws 
which allowed a magistrate and the Minister of Justice to prohibit certain organisations, 
individuals and groups from gathering or demonstrating.  
The series of repressive laws regarding assembly began with the promulgation of 
the Suppression of Communism Act (“SCA”).19 The SCA declared the Communist 
Party to be an unlawful organisation and criminalised all proponents of communism.20 
This Act also allowed the Minister of Justice to declare other organisations unlawful.21 
Section 9 of the SCA allowed the Minister of Justice to prohibit a gathering “whenever 
in the opinion of the Minister there is reason to believe that the achievement of any of 
                                            
18 Dugard Human Rights 187. The by-laws of most cities required permission from local authorities for 
gatherings and demonstration on public property. S 15 of the General Law Further Amendment Act 92 
of 1970 required that assemblies receive both the local authority’s consent and the approval of a 
magistrate in the district in which the assembly was to take place.  
19 Act 44 of 1950.  
20 See also Public Safety Act 3 of 1953.  
21 S 2(2) of the SCA.  
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the objects of communism would be furthered”. Although the Act focussed on 
communism, the definition of communism22 was broad enough to allow the Minister to 
restrict and prohibit any gatherings of organisations which were not necessarily 
banned at that stage.23 The SCA was based on the idea that communism posed a 
threat to State security.24 The SCA was the first in an extensive sequence of security 
promulgations which were mostly aimed at quieting dissent and political opposition 
through the limitation of free speech and assembly.  
The Criminal Law Amendment Act (“CLA”)25 was promulgated in reaction to the 
defiance campaign which was launched in 1952. The defiance campaign was 
organised as a passive resistance movement in order to protest against discriminatory 
legislation (such as the pass laws). This protest was organised by way of a deliberate 
violation of minor apartheid laws. Parliament in response enacted the CLA which 
criminalised this type of political protest.26 The CLA had detrimental effects for political 
protest. While the violation of minor laws or by-laws may have had the penalty of a 
minor fine, the CLA provided for a much harsher sentence (imprisonment between 3-
5 years) if such violation was an intentional violation in support of a campaign/cause.27 
One of the most repressive legislative instruments promulgated under the pretence 
of “security” was the Public Safety Act (“PSA”).28 The PSA provided the State 
President with the power to declare by proclamation in the Government Gazette that 
a state of emergency exists within the Republic or within specified areas within the 
                                            
22 S1(1) of the SCA.  
23 Such as the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress. The Minister of Justice was 
given broader and similar powers to disband other organisation in terms of the Unlawful Organisations 
Act 34 of 1960. This Act was primarily introduced to outlaw the African National Congress and the Pan 
African Congress.  
24 MF Ackermann Die reg insake openbare orde en staatsveiligheid (1984) 44-48.  
25 Act 8 of 1953.  
26 Section 1 of the CLA made it an offence to violate any law “by way of protest against a law or in 
support of any campaign against any law, in support of any campaign for the repeal or modification of 
any law or the variation or limitation of the application or administration of any law”. 
27 See further the discussion of the CLA in A Mathews Law, Order and Liberty in South Africa (1971) 
184-191.  
28 Act 3 of 1953. 
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Republic.29 The State President and the Minister of Justice30 were able to make 
repressive regulations in terms of the PSA. The PSA was enacted in 1953. Although 
a state of emergency was not declared in that year, the threat of a state of emergency 
in terms of the PSA, along with the State’s use of the CLA, ensured that the defiance 
campaign of 1952 effectively ended. However, a state of emergency was declared in 
reaction to the Sharpeville massacre of 1960.31 The State used these powers to enact 
regulations which placed blanket prohibitions on gatherings and meetings for 
prolonged periods of time from 1960 onwards.32 During the 1980’s the declaration of 
a state of emergency was a regular occurrence. The Minister of Justice would highlight 
specific black areas and areas where there were regular anti-apartheid protests and 
then make regulations which would ban gatherings and meetings.33   
The Riotous Assemblies Act34 dealt specifically with gatherings and assemblies 
which were of a political nature.35 Section 2(1) of this Act provided a magistrate with 
the power to prohibit public gatherings in public spaces or the attendance thereof when 
he or she had “reason to apprehend that the public peace would be seriously 
endangered by the assembly”. Additionally, section 3 of the Act provided the Minister 
of Justice with the power to prohibit a gathering where the Minister had reason to 
                                            
29 S 2(1) of the Public Safety Act. This section provided the State President with discretionary powers 
where he determined that in his opinion there was a serious threat to the safety of the public and the 
maintenance of public order and the ordinary law of the land was inadequate to enable the Government 
to control the situation.  
30 S 4 of the Public Safety Act.  
31 See discussion below under part 2 2 4. 
32 The apartheid state used the regulations to ban groups and protest actions for months at a time 
during periods of popular resistance to the apartheid government. See  Dugard Human Rights 110-111. 
See also Mathews Law, Order and Liberty 221-225. 
33 Dugard Human Rights 110-111. See also Mathews Law, Order and Liberty 221-225 and C Bundy 
“Street Sociology and Pavement Politics: Aspects of Youth and Student Resistance in Cape Town” 
(1987) 13 Journal of Southern African Studies 303 330. See also J Stemmet “‘In case of emergency’. 
South African states of emergency, CA. 1985-1988” (2015) 40 JCH 59-76. 
34 Act 17 of 1956.  
35 The purpose of the Act was to “consolidate the laws relating to riotous assemblies and the prohibition 
of the engendering of feelings of hostility between the European and non-European inhabitants of the 
Union and matters incidental thereto, and the laws relating to certain offences”. Prior to this Act there 
was legislation which specifically limited the meetings and gatherings of “Bantu’s/Natives” through the 
Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945. This Act provided wide powers over “the conduct, 
control, supervision and restriction of meetings or assemblies of Bantu”. 
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believe that the gathering would cause “feelings of hostility” between European and 
non-European inhabitants. These powers were broad enough for the State to 
intervene and prohibit many gatherings/meetings. Because apartheid by its very 
essence instituted racial discrimination, any anti-apartheid struggle or protest would 
often cause “feelings of hostility” between races. The Riotous Assemblies Act only 
applied to “public gatherings”, which was defined with reference to a “public place” and 
to “twelve or more persons”. Prohibitions of gatherings could be avoided by meeting 
in a private place or if a meeting did not exceed 11 persons at a time. The State 
responded to this gap through the promulgation of the Gatherings and Demonstrations 
Act36 and the Riotous Assemblies Amendment Act.37 The Amendment Act removed 
all references to “public” gatherings. The Amendment Act also gave wide powers to 
the police with regard to unlawful meetings.38 
Undoubtedly, one of the most comprehensive repressive legislative instruments 
used by the Government was the Internal Security Act (“ISA”),39 which repealed the 
SCA. Large sections of the original SCA were retained in the ISA. The ISA also 
repealed various sections of the Riotous Assemblies Act, but those repealed sections 
were then included in the ISA.40 The Minister used the provisions for banning protest 
action specifically during the 1970’s and 1980’s, when the anti-apartheid struggle used 
protests as a tool to voice their opposition and to make South Africa ungovernable.41 
 
                                            
36 Act 52 of 1973. This Act prohibited demonstrations and open air gatherings of any number within the 
precincts of Parliament.  
37 Act 30 of 1974. 
38 S 7 of the Amendment Act provided the police with extensive powers of dispersing unlawful meetings 
through the use of force. An order to disperse only needed to be given once in each official language 
(Afrikaans and English), and an explicit warning prior to the use of force was no longer required.  See 
the discussion in Ackermann Die reg insake 159-160. 
39 Act 79 of 1976 and Act 74 of 1982.  
40 S 46(1) of the ISA provided the same power to a Magistrate with regard to prohibiting a gathering on 
the basis of a disturbance to the “public peace” as contained in s 2(1) of the Riotous Assemblies Act. 
However, the ISA expanded on “any particular gathering in any public space” by referring to any 
“particular gathering or any gathering of a particular nature, class or kind at a particular place or in a 
particular area or wheresoever in his district”.    
41McKinley & Veriava Arresting dissent 5-7. 
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2 3 3 The liberation and anti-apartheid struggle42 
The anti-apartheid struggle had to navigate its opposition and defiance in full 
cognizance of the regulatory framework as discussed above. In many respects the 
promulgation of these repressive laws was a direct response to the liberation 
struggle.43 Protests in the form of gatherings, meetings and demonstrations were of 
vital importance for the liberation struggle. In reaction to the repressive State and the 
exclusion from the political processes, protests were a hallmark of democratic 
participation in an undemocratic state.44 The unlawful demonstrations and gatherings 
were an act of defiance in order to participate.  
Organisations that were prominent in the anti-apartheid and liberation struggle 
included the African National Congress (“ANC”), Pan African Congress (“PAC”), South 
African Communist Party (“SACP”), United Democratic Front (“UDF”) and various 
other social and revolutionary movements. These liberation movements organised 
various campaigns and protests. The Sharpeville massacre of 1960 and the Soweto 
uprising of 1976 were two of the most significant moments in the history of protest 
politics in South Africa. 
The Sharpeville massacre occurred on 21 March 1960. A protest was initially 
planned as part of a defiance campaign organised by the ANC.45 A massive 
                                            
42 It is important to note that although the terms “anti-apartheid struggle” and “liberation struggle” are 
sometimes used interchangeably, they are not necessarily the same. The anti-apartheid struggle was 
directed towards the racialized laws of the apartheid government which disenfranchised the majority of 
black South Africans. These laws sustained deep political, social and economic inequalities. The anti-
apartheid struggle was focussed on liberation from apartheid. The liberation struggle however 
encapsulated a larger ideal of freedom. It was not necessarily only directed against the apartheid 
government, but was framed by its insistence on the political, economic and social freedom of the 
oppressed. Therefore, the anti-apartheid struggle can be placed under the banner of the liberation 
struggle, however the liberation struggle is not only focussed on political freedom by means of inclusion 
in the political process. To equate anti-apartheid with liberation creates a false impression that through 
the end of apartheid there would be liberation from oppression.  
43 See discussion of the “defiance campaign” under part 2 2 3 above. 
44 The liberation struggle was not only directed against political oppression, but also challenged 
capitalism. Many of those who formed part of the liberation struggle sought a complete change in 
economic and labour policy through a possible restructuring of the State. See the discussion in McKinley 
& Veriava Arresting dissent 5-12 and see in general D T McKinley The ANC and the liberation struggle: 
a critical political biography (1997). 
45 Dugard Human Rights 214. 
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demonstration would take place on 31 March 1960.46 The Pan African Congress 
(“PAC”) however planned an earlier demonstration for 21 March 1960 in order to pre-
empt the ANC.47 The demonstration was specifically directed against the pass laws. 
The participants planned not to carry their passbooks and then to surrender 
themselves to the police as a collective. They would ask for no bail, and raise no 
defence at their trials.48 An estimated 7000 black people marched to the police station 
in the early morning on 21 March 1960.49 The participants in the march were 
unarmed.50 The police and military response was immediate. They first attempted to 
use fighter planes to intimidate the crowd to disperse.51 Subsequently police 
reinforcements arrived with armoured cars.52 As tension increased, a scuffle ensued 
between a few protestors and police reacted with gun shots.53 The crowd fled, but the 
police continued to shoot at the fleeing protestors. The shooting had been deliberate. 
The Sharpeville massacre resulted in 69 dead and 186 wounded.54 This act of 
defiance and the violent reaction by the police was a defining moment in the South 
African dissent politics of the time. The massacre gave rise to further demonstrations 
and protests in various places in South Africa.55 The State reacted swiftly to this period 
of unrest through the banning of the ANC and PAC.56 Additionally the State declared 
                                            
46 C Nicholson “Nothing Really Gets Better: Reflections on 25 years between Sharpeville and 
Uitenhage” (1986) 8 Human Rights Quarterly 511-512. 
47 S Woolman & J Swanepoel “Constitutional history” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional 
Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2008) 2-1-2-21. 
48 Nicholson “Nothing Really Gets Better” Human Rights Quarterly 512  
49 512. 
50 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report Volume III Chapter 6 (1998) 535 and 
537. 
51 Woolman & Swanepoel “Constitutional history” in CLOSA 2-21. 
52 Nicholson “Nothing Really Gets Better” (1986) Human Rights Quarterly 512. 
53 Truth and Reconciliation Commission Volume III Chapter 6 (1998) 535. 
54 Truth and Reconciliation Commission Volume III Chapter 6 (1998) 4. 
55 Truth and Reconciliation Commission Volume III Chapter 6 (1998) 397. For example, when the news 
of the Sharpeville massacre reached Cape Town, a crowd of 5–10 000 people assembled in Langa on 
21 March 1960 in defiance of a country-wide ban on public meetings and gatherings of more than 10 
persons. At least three people were killed during this demonstration. There was continued disruption 
and dissent during 1960-1962. See further Nicholson “Nothing Really Gets Better” Human Rights 
Quarterly 515. 
56 515. 
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a state of emergency in terms of the PSA which allowed the State President and 
Minister of Justice to prohibit a variety of meetings and gatherings.57 
The Soweto uprisings of 1976 were sparked by a language policy related to the use 
of language in black schools. In 1975, the Bantu Education Department issued a 
directive in the Transvaal that Afrikaans was to be used on an equal basis with English 
as a medium of instruction in secondary schools.58 By January 1976, the State decided 
to make Afrikaans the primary medium of instruction in black schools in Transvaal.59 
This policy resulted in discontent among black youth who already were dissatisfied 
with the Bantu Education system.60 Unlike the Sharpeville massacre, these protests 
and demonstrations were not primarily organised by a political movement or 
organisation such as the PAC or the ANC, but by a student movement focused on 
their right to education. Following a series of boycotts, protests and demonstrations 
during the months leading up to June,61 a protest was organised for 16 June 1976. On 
this day approximately 10 000 students were involved in the protest.62 The intention of 
the organisers and leaders of this demonstration was that the participants would 
remain peaceful.63 However, the intimidation tactics of the police resulted in 
altercations between protestors and the police. In reaction, smaller groups of students 
started throwing stones. The reaction of the police to the largely peaceful 
demonstration and certain minor provocations was to open fire on the students.64 
Chaos ensued and 11 people were killed65 and many injured. Resistance expanded 
throughout the country and continued for several months. There were 575 official 
deaths, including 390 in the Transvaal and 137 in the Western Cape.66 Over 2 000 
                                            
57 Dugard Human Rights 110. 
58 Truth and Reconciliation Commission Volume III Chapter 6 (1998) 557. 
59 J Brown The Road to Soweto (2016) 155.  
60 Truth and Reconciliation Commission Volume III Chapter 6 (1998) 557. 
61 Brown The Road to Soweto 155-162. See further Truth and Reconciliation Commission Volume III 
Chapter 6 (1998) 557-558. 
62Truth and Reconciliation Commission Volume III Chapter 6 (1998) 18. 
63 Brown The Road to Soweto 163.  
64 For a full account of events see further Truth and Reconciliation Commission Volume III Chapter 6 
(1998) 557-570. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission specifically found that “the march of students 
was peaceful until violent police intervention to stop the march created a situation where unarmed and 
peaceful students themselves retaliated with violence”. 
65Brown The Road to Soweto 170. 
66 Truth and Reconciliation Commission Volume III Chapter 6 (1998) 18. 
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people were injured.67 The Soweto uprising of 1976 resulted in an upsurge of popular 
protest in the country and generated the beginnings of a vocal and determined youth. 
The eruption of popular protest and demonstration was the trigger for the liberation 
struggle for a new generation in the 1980’s. Although these protests were caused by 
frustrations relating to education,68 they also stemmed from the absence of an 
institutional platform where those who were affected by the National Party’s decision 
on the language policy could voice their opinions.  
Both the Sharpeville massacre and the Soweto uprisings triggered violent 
responses from the State. The defiant character of these protests became a hallmark 
of dissent culture in South Africa. Protests became an important political vehicle for 
resisting the State and creating alternative democratic spaces. Many of the protests 
during apartheid could be characterised as a challenge to the very legitimacy of the 
apartheid state and political order. These protests can be viewed as an assertion of 
the “people’s power” in opposition to the State, through insurrectional movements 
aimed at creating something new.69 
 
2 3 4 The Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and 
Intimidation (“The Goldstone Commission”) 
When negotiations had already commenced for a democratic transition from 
apartheid to a new constitutional era, the repressive violence of the state and 
revolutionary violence of the liberation struggle had almost reached a point where 
South Africa was ungovernable. President FW de Klerk appointed a Commission led 
by Judge Richard Goldstone to investigate political violence and intimidation during 
the transitional period.70 One of the main undertakings of this Commission was to 
appoint a multinational advisory panel in order to determine a new approach to 
assemblies and demonstrations in South Africa.71 This panel was fundamental for the 
                                            
67 18. 
68 This fight for the right to education can be put under the banner of the larger liberation struggle. 
69 Botha (2017) Law, Democracy and Development 225-226; H Botha “Instituting public freedom or 
extinguishing constituent power? Reflections on South Africa’s Constitution-making experiment” (2010) 
26 SAJHR 67-72. 
70 M Memeza “A critical review of the implementation of the Regulation of Gatherings Act” (2006) Report 
by Freedom of Expression Institute 12. 
71 Heymann (ed.) Towards Peaceful Protest in South Africa (1993) vii. 
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establishment of a new regulatory process for demonstrations and provided the basis 
for a new legislative framework.  
The point of departure that the panel took was that the right to freedom of assembly 
and demonstration is a universally recognised right necessary for democratic 
participation.72 Judge Richard Goldstone stated that “the right to public demonstration 
is the only peaceful means which disenfranchised South Africans possess in order to 
make a powerful political statement”.73 The panel used a comparative model in order 
to inform their report on assembly.74 It referred to expertise from various perspectives 
regarding protest action in different countries in order to inform the manner in which 
demonstrations should be regulated in South Africa. However, the panel also 
recognised the specific South African context,75 including the fact that protests were 
historically linked to a rebellion against the state and the discriminatory status quo. 
There was a distrust and antagonism towards the State, particularly the police.76 In 
addition, the violence that occurred at the time the panel was compiling this regulatory 
framework influenced the manner in which the panel viewed the idea that freedom of 
assembly can only be protected if it is non-violent and unarmed. Therefore, there was 
a commitment to put a framework in place to deter any forms of violence. Emphasis 
was placed on ensuring that all role players would interact on an equal basis through 
negotiation.77 
The panel recognised that three main parties should hold the responsibility to 
ensure the proper exercise of the right to demonstrate.78 These parties are those 
organising demonstrations, the local/state authorities and the police. This is often 
referred to as the triumvirate.79 The panel placed great emphasis on the consultative 
                                            
72 1. 
73 vii. 
74 Specifically, the Panel referred to the United States of America, Israel, Belgium, Netherlands, 
Germany and Northern Ireland. The Panel comprised of members from diverse backgrounds, 
professions and specialities. See Appendix A of P Heymann (ed.) Towards Peaceful Protest in South 
Africa (1993).  
75 Heymann (ed.) Towards Peaceful Protest in South Africa (1993) 2 and 48. 
76 3. 
77 14. 
78 ix. 
79 Memeza “A critical review” Freedom of Expression Institute 12. 
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process between these parties.80 This process was pre-emptive in nature to prevent 
any type of dissent which could lead to violent altercations between protesters and 
bystanders. Consultation and negotiation were to ensure that animosity between the 
police and protesters could be controlled and violence could be prevented. The panel 
intended to ensure that although the local authorities would have the power to place 
conditions on organised demonstrations (or prevent demonstrations in extreme 
cases), this should not be confused with the power of granting permission/authorising. 
The organisers of protests should always have recourse to the courts through prompt 
judicial review to reinforce their right to demonstrate.81 
The panel rejected the idea that assembly is a privilege which can only be exercised 
when permission has been granted by local authorities.82 Instead, it favoured a shift 
towards a “notice only” system.83 It thus emphasised the existence of a right to protest 
which does not depend on the discretion of the State. This was an important shift, as 
under the previous system, the State had the power to decide whether people had the 
right to protest or not. Although the panel recognised the importance of consultation,84 
its recommendations placed the power with the people (the citizenry). 
The panel was aware that its report was drawn up within the context of an 
undemocratic state where the majority of South Africans did not have the right to vote. 
It therefore stated that “in making our recommendations we have assumed that they 
are recommendations for a South Africa that will truly be democratic”.85 The panel 
recognised that the new regulatory framework it proposed was transitory. The panel 
was established in the context of a fragile State and an uncertain future with regards 
to the structure of the new democratic state. It therefore was focussed on ensuring 
that the transition towards the first democratic elections would be stable. The 
recommendations of the Multinational Panel were then used by the Goldstone 
Commission to draft the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993.  
 
                                            
80 See Part II of Heymann (ed.) Towards Peaceful Protest in South Africa (1993). 
81 13 and 59. 
82 10. 
83 10. 
84 10.  
85 2. 
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 2 3 5  The Regulation of Gatherings Act  
The Regulation of Gatherings Act was given Presidential assent on 14 January 
1994 and came into operation on 15 November 1996. It was therefore adopted by 
Parliament and assented to by the President before the first democratic elections of 
27 April 1994, and prior to the commencement of the Interim Constitution86 and the 
final Constitution.87 The Regulation of Gatherings Act was therefore not 
constitutionally-compelled legislation.88  
This raises the question whether the Act gives adequate protection to the right to 
freedom of assembly in terms of the Constitution. It must also be borne in mind that 
the intent of the panel and commission, who were instrumental in the promulgation of 
the Act, was that the Act would be transitory.89 The panel recognised that the context 
of South Africa was changing and that the legislature may have to address problems 
associated with the Act in the new constitutional framework. But these problems were 
seen to be less urgent within the context of the introduction of the right to vote and 
participate in the new democracy. Additionally, the Act was seen as ground-breaking, 
as it repealed a series of draconian laws which had enabled the Apartheid State to 
create such a repressive regime.90 The Multinational Panel had created a framework 
which required a significant departure from the past understanding of freedom of 
assembly. This achievement was so noteworthy that it is understandable that the new 
democratically elected Parliament did not consider a review or amendment of the Act 
as necessary.  
In the new constitutional democracy, every adult citizen had the right to vote91 and 
to participate in political activities.92 Protest action, as it had occurred in the past, was 
perceived as no longer as important as it had been. The anti-apartheid struggle 
                                            
86 Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. 
87 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the Constitution). 
88 Memeza “A critical review” Freedom of Expression Institute 12. See also Freedom of Expression 
Institute (FXI) The right to protest: A handbook for protestors and police (2007) 5.  
89 12. 
90 The Gatherings and Demonstrations in the Vicinity of Parliament Act 52 of 1973 (as amended in 
1992); s 46(1) and (2), 47, 48, 49, 51, 53, 57 and 62 of the Demonstrations in or near Court Building 
Prohibition Act 71 of 1982; the Gatherings and Demonstrations at or near Union Buildings Act 103 of 
1992. The passing of the RGA also saw the repeal of section 46(1) of the Internal Security Act of 1982. 
91 S 19 of the Constitution. 
92  Botha (2017) Law, Democracy and Development 223- 224. 
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assumed that, once political power was attained through the vote, the socio-economic 
liberation of the majority black population would follow.93 Thus, now that apartheid was 
over, protest would not be necessary because the representatives at local and national 
level would ensure the social and economic liberation of the electorate.  
 
2 4 Constitutional democracy  
2 4 1 Section 19 and “the will of the people” 
South Africa’s democracy must be understood with reference to the preamble to 
the Constitution, which begins with the words, “We, the people”. In another reference 
to the people, the preamble states that “We therefore, through our freely elected 
representatives, adopt this Constitution”. Despite the introduction of representatives 
into our democracy, the people remain central. This is not to deny that there is a 
definite connection between the will of the people and the elected representatives. In 
contrast to the apartheid past, “the people” are no longer seen in opposition to the 
State, but are viewed as the source from which the State derives its authority.94 Central 
to this relationship is section 19 of the Constitution.  
Section 19(3) of the Constitution guarantees the right to vote to all adult citizens. It 
thus provides South Africans with representation at the local, provincial and national 
levels. In the historical context of an apartheid state with a disenfranchised majority 
and a Parliament which only represented white interests, this is a fundamental 
achievement. As the Constitutional Court stated, the universality of the vote is “a 
badge of dignity” which “says that all people count”.95 As discussed above, in Western 
democratic thought the main form of participation and protest is through the ballot.96 
Consequently, all citizens should have the ability to express their dissent and hold 
political powers accountable through their vote.  
 
                                            
93 See discussion in part 2 2 3 above, specifically footnotes 43 and 45. See also McKinley & Veriava 
Arresting dissent 5. The ANC, in its leading role, emphasised that the anti-apartheid struggle was more 
important than the struggle for economic and social freedom. Specifically, the rhetoric created was that 
the fight against apartheid would be prioritised over the fight against capitalism. The ANC had to 
convince the majority of South Africans that, once they were in possession of political power, the ANC 
would set about dealing with the economic demands/needs of that majority. 
94 Botha (2017) Law, Democracy and Development 223-224. 
95 August v Electoral Commission 1999 3 SA 1 (CC) para 17. 
96 See discussion under part 2 2 1 above. 
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2 4 2 Voter participation and a crisis of democracy  
Despite the importance of the vote, statistics indicate a drop in voter turnout in 
national and local elections.97 In the 1994 national elections, voter turnout was 
approximately 86 percent while in the 2014 national elections it was estimated at 57,1 
percent.98 Different explanations have been offered for the decrease in voter turnout.99 
One is that adult citizens have become politically apathetic. However, this seems 
unlikely given the high incidence of protests in South Africa.100 The decrease in voter 
turnout is more striking when it is juxtaposed to the increase in protest action.101 This 
type of political disaffection is described by Christi van der Westhuizen as “institutional 
disaffection” rather than “political disengagement”.102 Citizens distrust representative 
institutions, but that is not to say that they have withdrawn from politics. On the 
contrary, they seek to hold representatives accountable through protests.103  The lower 
voter turnout is thus based on choice rather than apathy. Those who choose not to 
vote do not necessarily abstain from participating in the democracy. This suggests that 
the vote is by no means the only mechanism through which citizens participate in 
South Africa’s democracy. 
In the new constitutional dispensation, the trends in protest action have been an 
important indicator of the state of democracy. The early years of South Africa’s 
democracy, which comprised a transition period from the old regime to the new one, 
was not characterised by a high incidence of protest action. However, from the second 
decade of the constitutional democracy (namely from 2004), there has been a 
                                            
97 The voter turnout calculation is based on the eligible voters of voting age population (“VAP”) at each 
election.  
98 See C Schulz-Herzenberg “Trends in electoral participation,1994-2014” in C Schulz-Herzenberg & R 
Southall (eds) Election 2014 South Africa: the campaign, results & future prospects (2014) 25. 
99 See the discussion of various explanations for declining voter participation in Schulz-Herzenberg 
“Trends in electoral participation, 1994-2014” in Election 2014 South Africa: the campaign, results & 
future prospects 32-39. 
100 See discussion under part 2 4 4. 
101 See discussion under part 2 3 4. 
102 C Van der Westhuizen “Democratising South Africa: towards a ‘conflictual consensus’” in H Botha, 
N Schaks & D Steiger (eds) Das Ende des repräsentativen Staates? Demokratie am Scheideweg/The 
End of the Representative State? Democracy at the Crossroads (2016) 75 84. 
103 86. 
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substantial increase in protest action.104 Initially, it appeared that these protests were 
largely directed at municipalities. Local government has been the sphere of 
government against which most South Africans have directed their frustrations. These 
frustrations are mostly explained on the basis of the failure of these institutions to 
provide services and therefore many of these protests have been labelled “service-
delivery protests”. In 1995, the local election voter turnout was approximately 48 
percent,105 while in the recent 2016 elections it was 45%.106 This figure compared to 
the national and provincial election turnout indicates that citizens are prone to prioritize 
national elections over local government elections. This trend is in line with the 
international trend with regard to participation in local elections.107 It is nevertheless 
interesting to compare the low turnout in local government elections with the regularity 
of protests at this level.108 It is difficult to draw definite conclusions, as it is not clear 
how many of the protestors themselves vote. However, local protests appear to 
indicate that the people feel that the representative model within local government has 
failed them. 
 The next section provides a brief discussion of the structure of local government, 
in an attempt to contextualise the protests at local government level. This will be helpful 
in analysing whether the nature of the protests are indicative of a failure of local 
government with regard to service delivery or democratic participation.  
 
2 4 3 A failure of local government 
The new constitutional dispensation brought about a change in local government. 
The “local sphere of government” is defined in chapter seven of the Constitution to 
                                            
104 Although there had been protests before this date during the new constitutional dispensation, 
analysts generally agree that from 2004 onwards the current phenomenon of “service delivery protests” 
began to substantially increase in regularity. See Alexander (2010) Review of African Political Economy 
25. 
105 The estimate is based on statistical information as found in C Schulz-Herzenberg “A silent revolution: 
South African voters,1994-2006” in S Buhnlungu, J Daniel, R Southall & J Lutchman (eds) State of the 
Nation South Africa 2007 (2007) 136.  
106 This estimate is based on information as provided by the Independent Electoral Commission. See 
Independent Electoral Commission Local Government Election 2016: Voter Turnout Report (2016) 1 
and Independent Electoral Commission Registration Statistics as at 01 Jun 2016 (2016). 
107 A Buthelezi and B Dollery “An exploratory analysis of local government failure in South Africa” (2004) 
28 Studies in Economics and Econometrics 91 96. 
108See the discussion under part 2 3 4 above. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
26 
 
consist of municipalities. Significantly, South Africa moved towards a decentralised 
system of local government through “developmental local government”.109 This system 
of local government has specific constitutional objectives.110 The Constitution outlines 
the roles of the different spheres of government in schedules 4 and 5. It is important 
to understand these responsibilities because this is the basis on which budgets are 
set up, resources are assigned, and obligations understood, especially within the 
context of the realisation of the socio-economic rights enshrined in the Constitution. 
Local government is largely a space for meeting citizens’ daily economic and social 
needs.111  Section 157(1)(a) of the Constitution specifically provides that one of the 
objects of local government is to provide “services to communities”. Schedule 4 and 5 
place services (such as electricity, water, sanitation etc.) under the control of local 
government. The Municipal Systems Act 32 of 200 elaborates on these and is most 
relevant to municipalities in relation to service delivery.112 The dissatisfaction with local 
government therefore has largely been framed as “service-delivery” protests where 
citizens direct their service frustrations towards the local municipality.  
The Constitution provides local government with a wide range of responsibilities 
regarding participation and accountability. Decentralisation is based on the principle 
that the local spheres are closer to the citizens and therefore can fulfil and understand 
the needs of their communities.113 The concepts of decentralisation and development, 
as the basis for local government, also indicate that local government is the space 
where citizens can participate in democracy. The Constitution provides that the objects 
                                            
109 J De Visser Developmental Local Government: A Case-study of South Africa (2005) 4. 
110 Section 157(1) of the Constitution defines the objects of local government as:  
to provide democratic and accountable government for local communities; 
to ensure provision of services to communities in a suitable manner; 
to promote social and economic development;  
to promote a safe and healthy environment; and  
to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in matters of local 
government. 
111 For a full discussion on the different basic services generally understood to be within the ambit of 
municipalities see J Dugard “Urban Basic Services: Rights, Reality and Resistance” in M Langford, 
Cousins, J Dugard & T Madlingozi (eds) Socio-Economic rights in South Africa: Symbols or Substance? 
(2013) 278-282.  
112 See generally the objectives of the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. See also sections 5, 6 and 
73.  
113 Mbazira (2013) 29 SAJHR 253. 
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of local government are to “provide democratic and accountable government” and “to 
encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in matters 
of local government”.114 It is where representative government115 can be brought 
closer to citizens.  
There are a variety of reasons which resulted in local government largely failing the 
objects set out in the Constitution and legislation.116 The majority of protests seem to 
have arisen because of poor municipal services or a lack of municipal services.117 It 
therefore appears as if there is an inherent link between the scale of protests and the 
failure of municipalities to provide adequate services.118 Citizens target their service 
delivery frustrations towards their municipalities as local government has specific 
constitutional and legislative obligations in this regard. However, not everyone agrees 
that protests at local level arise first and foremost from “service-delivery” issues.119 
Buccus argues that the challenge possibly results from “a crisis of local democracy 
rather than what has often been referred to as a crisis of service delivery”.120    
The protests are about more than only service delivery. Local government has also 
failed to establish an adequate space for accountable, responsive and democratic 
government. Many protests have started specifically because municipalities did not 
                                            
114 Section 157(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution.  
115 For a full analysis of representative democracy see chapter 4.  
116 See Dugard “Urban Basic Services: Rights, Reality and Resistance” in Socio-Economic rights in 
South Africa: Symbols or Substance? (2013) 275-277 and 282-285. See also D Atkinson “Taking to the 
streets: has developmental local government failed in South Africa?” in S Buhnlungu, J Daniel, R 
Southall & J Lutchman (eds) State of the Nation South Africa 2007 (2007) 60-74. See further the brief 
discussion in Mbazira (2013) SAJHR 264-265. 
117 S Booysen “With the ballot and the brick: the politics of attaining service delivery” (2007) 7 Progress 
in Development Studies 21–32. See further Dugard “Urban Basic Services: Rights, Reality and 
Resistance” in Socio-Economic rights in South Africa: Symbols or Substance? (2013) 275-277 and 282-
285. See also Atkinson “Taking to the streets: has developmental local government failed in South 
Africa?” in State of the Nation South Africa 2007 60-74. 
118 Atkinson “Taking to the streets: has developmental local government failed in South Africa?” in State 
of the Nation South Africa 2007 58-60. 
119 Alexander (2010) Review of African Political Economy 25-26. See also Dugard “Urban Basic 
Services: Rights, Reality and Resistance” in Socio-Economic rights in South Africa: Symbols or 
Substance? (2013) 287-288. 
120 I Buccus “Burning schools point to a disconnect between communities and the State” (27-06-2010) 
The South African Civil Society Information Service <http://sacsis.org.za/site/article/521.1> (accessed 
23-03-2017). 
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consult with the community.121 Various authors argue that protests occur where 
engagement fails.122 Even where protests are centred on service delivery, they are 
typically sparked by the inability of the municipality to interact with and listen to the 
needs of the community and to provide participatory spaces for citizens.123 
Furthermore, protests are sometimes targeted at corruption, nepotism, and 
maladministration by municipal councillors and staff.124 Importantly, these protests are 
based on the assumption that representatives are failing, and do not necessarily imply 
that the system of local government is illegitimate. Protesters have mostly used the 
institutional spaces within local government first before engaging in protests.125 This 
shows that although there may be a failure of local government, this failure may be a 
failure of the representatives rather than the failure of the representative model of local 
government. The “crisis of local democracy” may therefore be a case of institutional 
disaffection rather than a complete rejection of representative democracy. From this 
perspective, local protests are seen as an avenue for political participation within the 
representative model of government rather than as something opposed to it.126  
 
                                            
121 Booysen (2007) Progress in Development Studies 23-24. See also Atkinson “Taking to the streets: 
has developmental local government failed in South Africa?” in State of the Nation South Africa 2007 
(2007) 60-65. 
122 Booysen (2007) 7 Progress in Development Studies 21-27. Booysen states that protestors use local 
protests as part of their political repertoire. Protests are seen as an addition to the vote and the 
institutional modes of democratic participation. Protests, from this perspective, are seen as a way to 
supplement local government democracy. See also Atkinson “Taking to the streets: has developmental 
local government failed in South Africa?” in State of the Nation South Africa 2007 (2007) 70-72. 
Atkinson’s detailed analysis indicates that where there is a lack of engagement for a prolonged period, 
this will lead to protest.  
123 Atkinson “Taking to the streets: has developmental local government failed in South Africa?” in State 
of the Nation South Africa 2007 60-65.  
124 66-69. 
125 Van der Westhuizen “Democratising South Africa: towards a ‘conflictual consensus’” in The End of 
the Representative State? Democracy at the Crossroads 75 86. 
126J Brown South Africa’s Insurgent Citizens (2015) 16-20. For a full analysis of protest action as part 
of the institutional model of representative democracy see chapter 4. 
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2 4 4    Protest action in the new constitutional dispensation 
2 4 4 1 Local, provincial or national protests? 
As discussed above, protests have largely been directed towards local government. 
These protests are typically characterised as municipal service delivery protests.127 
Two points must be made in this regard. In the first place, these protests arise from 
frustrations relating both to service delivery and democratic participation. From the 
perspective of the citizens who protest, democratic participation and economic 
liberation are closely linked.128 The institution of representative democracy was 
supposed to bring about socio-economic liberation.129 Its failure to do so is at the same 
time interpreted as a failure in the functioning of democratic institutions. Secondly, the 
similar nature of complaints and frustrations throughout the country indicate that, 
although protests are targeted at local municipalities, the protests are not simply a 
local problem.  Recent trends in protest action indicate that the issues underlying these 
protests are not essentially failure at a local level, but indicate a national and provincial 
crisis. In many cases, citizens have directed their national complaints towards the 
government which is situated closest to them, namely local government.130 Most 
statistics regarding the trend in protest action have been framed in terms of local 
community protests” or “civic protests”.131 These statistics recognise that although 
many protests have been directed at a local level they are many times sparked by 
provincial or national level decisions.132 The macro-economic policy decisions made 
                                            
127 Interestingly these protests seem to heighten during periods closer to elections. However, there 
seems to be no direct relation between protest action and election periods. DM Powell, M O’Donovan 
& J de Visser “Civic protests barometer 2007-2014” Dullah Omar Institute (2015)10. 
128 L Stewart “Rights discourse and practices, everyday violence and social protests: Who counts as 
subject and whose lives are real in the neo-colonial South African nation state?” (2014) 18 Law, 
Democracy and Development 1 4-5. 
129 See discussion in part 2 2 3 below and specifically footnotes 43, 45 and 97.  
130 Booysen (2007) Progress in Development Studies 23. 
131 Powell, O’Donovan & de Visser “Civic protests barometer 2007-2014” (2015). This project 
specifically defines civic protest as “organised protest action within a local area which directly targets 
municipal government or targets municipal government as a proxy to express grievances against the 
state more widely”. 
132 S Booysen “Beyond the ballot and the brick: continuous dual repertoires in the politics of attaining 
service delivery in South Africa” in A McLennan & B Munslow (eds) The politics of service delivery 
(2009) 128–129. See also Atkinson “Taking to the streets: has developmental local government failed 
in South Africa?” in State of the Nation South Africa 2007 70-72. 
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by the national government influence the decisions made on a local scale,133 while the 
local sphere of government takes a large brunt of the critique. 
The trends in protest action indicate that while protest is framed largely as local 
municipal protests, the protests often reflect frustrations with national and provincial 
government. There are inherent problems with local government, but the current 
trends in protest action indicate how different communities mobilise and unify in order 
to connect problems in different municipalities and lay them at the door of the provincial 
and national government. 
 
2 4 4 2 Trends in protest action and an element of “violence” 
The increase in protest action directed towards government can be highlighted from 
2004 onwards.134 Various reports and projects have attempted to analyse protest 
action throughout South Africa. These reports rely on several sources of data and 
specifications, which do not necessarily produce exact numerical results or provide 
similar deductions on the nature of these protests.  However, the numerical results 
produced are similar in many respects. The statistics indicate that there have been 
various fluctuations in the number of protests over different years. In 2009 there was 
an increase in protest action in comparison with the 2007/2008 period.135 However, 
from 2010-2013 there was a steady decrease in the number of protests.136 From 2014 
onwards there was once again a spike in protests.137 Recent statistics indicate that 
there has been a decrease in the number of local protests. These statistics also 
indicate that when there has been a decrease in the frequency of different protests, 
                                            
133 McKinley & Veriava Arresting dissent (2005) 24-42. In this analysis, the cost recovery system of the 
local government sphere is unpacked. This policy was a result of the macro-economic plan of national 
government. The cost recovery plan was facilitated by a substantial decrease in national government 
subsidies to local municipalities. This forced local government to “turn towards commercialisation and 
privatisation of basic services as a means of generating the revenue no longer provided by the national 
state”. 
134 For a full analysis of different protest action from 2004-2005 see Atkinson “Taking to the streets: has 
developmental local government failed in South Africa?” in State of the Nation South Africa 2007 60-
74. See further Booysen (2007) Progress in Development Studies 21-27. 
135 DM Powell, M O’Donovan & J de Visser “Civic protests barometer 2007-2014” Dullah Omar 
Institute (2015) 
5. 
136 5.  
137 5. 
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the protests tend to last longer and are not necessarily localised but spread to other 
surrounding communities.138 The statistics do not provide an indication of the duration 
and extent of individual protest movements which last a longer period of time (possibly 
for days at a time) but are still quantified as one protest incidence.139 Some of these 
statistics also do not consider all types of protest movements, such as “civil 
disobedience campaigns”.140 Most statistics do not distinguish between incidences of 
protest action which are spontaneous and those which are organised by a social 
movement or forms part of a disobedience campaign.141 
Although there have been fluctuations in protests, the amount of protests, 
specifically from 2004 onwards, is quite high, and it seems apt to describe South Africa 
as a “country of protest”.142 These protests take a variety of forms, including “mass 
meetings, drafting of memoranda, petitions, toyi-toying, processions, stay-aways, 
election boycotts, blockading of roads, construction of barricades, burning of tyres, 
looting, destruction of buildings, chasing unpopular individuals out of townships, 
confrontations with the police, and forced resignations of elected ofﬁcials”.143 Not all 
                                            
138 TC Chigwata, M O'Donovan & DM Powell “Civic Protests and Local Government in South Africa, 
Working Paper Series No. 2, The Civic Protests Barometer 2007 – 2016” Dullah Omar Institute (2017) 
3 and 6. This project notes that although “civic protests are decreasing many of them are covering wide 
areas and lasting a long time”. For example, where a local community has a protest this sometimes 
results in a provincial crisis over time where various communities participate. For an example and full 
analysis of how protests in 2004 spread from one community to different communities, see Atkinson 
“Taking to the streets: has developmental local government failed in South Africa?” in State of the Nation 
South Africa 2007 54-58. 
139 TC Chigwata, M O'Donovan & DM Powell “Civic Protests and Local Government in South Africa, 
Working Paper Series No. 2, The Civic Protests Barometer 2007 – 2016” Dullah Omar Institute (2017) 
5 -6. 
140 5. This project refers to civil disobedience campaigns resulting in protest action that arise out of 
“grievances that are widely felt but which may not be specific to the area where the protest occurs”. 
Such protest action would be linked to social movements and larger organised campaigns, possibly 
beyond a local level.  
141 T Madlingozi “Post-Apartheid Social Movements and Legal Mobilisation” in M Langford M, Cousins, 
Dugard J & Madlingozi T (eds) Socio-Economic rights in South Africa: Symbols or Substance? (2013) 
93. In post-apartheid South Africa, there has been an increase in different social movement 
organisations and these are “made up collective marginalised actors who develop a collective identity; 
put forward change-orientated goals; who possess some degree of organisation; and who engage in 
sustained, albeit episodic, extra institutional collective action”.  
142 Brown South Africa’s Insurgent Citizens 13-14.  
143 Alexander (2010) 37 Review of African Political Economy 26. 
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of these types of protest fit within the activities protected by section 17 of the 
Constitution.144 Various statistics regarding protest action indicate that there has been 
an increase in elements of violence in these protests. Although the use of violence 
places protests beyond the scope of constitutional protection in terms of section 17, it 
is nevertheless an important part of the social context of protests in South Africa.  
Firstly, there is no evidence to indicate that protests in South Africa are inherently 
violent.145 Furthermore, it must be noted that the violence of these protests is not 
always initiated by protestors, but is sometimes triggered by state repression and 
police violence.146 Statistics which indicate an increase in violence include various 
definitions of what violence entails. In certain cases, violence is taken to include 
“potential violence” or a “threat of violence”, or protests which are “unauthorised”.147 
These statistics also do not distinguish between isolated acts of violence by individuals 
and cases where a large part of the collective participated in violent behaviour. 
Notwithstanding these qualifications, there has been an increase in destabilising 
tactics used in protest action which lead to violence and damage to property. These 
acts of violence include intimidation, looting, arson, damage to property and personal 
attacks.148 Violence as an element of these protests shows the frustrations of the 
citizenry. These acts of violence seem to be aimed at destabilisation and disruption.149 
                                            
144 Section 17 of the Constitution requires that freedom of assembly be exercised “peacefully and 
unarmed”. For an analysis of section 17 and the element of peaceful see chapter 3. 
145 While statistics indicate that there has been an increase in violent protests, the data used is based 
on information made available by the state and by the media coverage of these protests. Regarding 
media coverage, the media tends to mainly focus on violent protests which are newsworthy. This 
creates an impression that most protests are violent. See J Duncan Protest Nation: the right to protest 
in South Africa (2016) 145-162 and 183. 
146 See chapter 3 for a discussion of the State’s reaction and repression with regard to freedom of 
assembly and the Regulation of Gatherings Act.  
147 See Brown South Africa’s Insurgent Citizens 14-15. See also TC Chigwata, M O'Donovan & DM 
Powell “Civic Protests and Local Government in South Africa, Working Paper Series No. 2, The Civic 
Protests Barometer 2007 – 2016” Dullah Omar Institute (2017) 13.  
148 TC Chigwata, M O'Donovan & DM Powell “Civic Protests and Local Government in South Africa, 
Working Paper Series No. 2, The Civic Protests Barometer 2007 – 2016” Dullah Omar Institute (2017) 
13.  
149 J Duncan Protest Nation: the right to protest in South Africa (2016) 23. Duncan distinguishes 
between disruptive protests and protests which are violent. However, based on the inconsistencies in 
data and media reports, the motives behind these protests are not always clear. It is difficult to separate 
the violence from the motive of protests regarding service delivery, political participation or party 
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The violence and intimidation may indicate the extent to which certain citizens will go 
to influence the decisions and policies of their representatives.150  
The increase in protest action and the element of violence in these protests indicate 
a frustration with conventional means of participatory and representative democracy. 
On the one hand, many protests can be said to fit within conventional understandings 
of institutional democracy, to the extent that they are aimed at strengthening 
communication between representatives and the citizenry.151On the other hand, these 
protests constitute a type of democratic participation that is separate from, and 
sometimes challenges, conventional modes of democratic decision making and 
participation. The nature of these protests seems to be destabilising. Although authors 
argue that protests arise where other modes of participation fail,152 the violent and 
destabilising nature of the protests suggests that they are not necessarily always 
aimed at securing participation and consultation. In some cases, the protesters 
apparently do not want to be heard, but want to decide. This is not a form of 
representation, participation or deliberation153 but rather a form of direct involvement 
and decision making.154  
 
2 4 4 3 The Marikana protests 
As discussed above, the majority of protests within South Africa tend to be 
characterised as local service delivery protests. However, this framework does not 
account for the full range of protest action. Two noteworthy incidences which do not fit 
                                            
protests which possibly are aimed at disruption but turn violent. It is clear however that there may be a 
link between the aim of disruption and protests which turn violent. See Brown South Africa’s Insurgent 
Citizens 14-15. 
150 This is because they view protests as an avenue to hold representatives accountable to their 
obligations. Protesters use protests as a means to get the attention of their elected in order to ensure 
that they respond. The perception of protesters is that violence is a means to force the hand of politicians 
and that the more violent protests are, the more news coverage and the more responsive 
representatives and politicians become. Violent protests have a snowball effect which, from the 
perspective of the protesters, brings about change. See Booysen (2007) Progress in Development 
Studies 24-25. 
151 Stewart (2014) Law, Democracy and Development 6-8. 
152 Booysen (2007) Progress in Development Studies 21-27. See also footnote 130.  
153 For a full analysis of institutional models of democracy see chapter 4 and chapter 5.  
154 For a full analysis of direct democracy see chapter 4, and for a further analysis of extra-institutional 
models of democracy see chapter 5.  
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into the local protest framework, are the Marikana protests and #FeesMustFall 
movement.155 The focus here will be on the Marikana protests. The Marikana protests 
of 2012 were a notable moment of post-apartheid South African protest politics and 
the use of state violence to repress dissent. Alexander provides the following summary 
of the events in Marikana which led to the death of many workers: 
 
“On 16 August 2012 the South African police massacred 34 strikers participating in a 
peaceful gathering on public land outside the small town of Marikana. The workers’ demand 
was simple. They wanted their employer, Lonmin, to listen to their case for a decent wage. 
But this threatened a system of labour relations that had boosted profits for Lonmin, and 
had protected the privileges of the dominant union, the National Union of Mineworkers 
(NUM). It was decided to deploy ‘maximum force’ against the workers.”156 
 
The strikes and protests arose from wage negotiations and demands for a fair wage. 
They therefore concerned both section 23 of the Constitution, which deals with labour 
relations, and section 17.157 While labour relations between Lonmin and its workers 
involved a private dispute between employer and employees, the relationship between 
participants in the wage negotiations was more complex than that. The strike was 
predominantly about wage negotiations, but at times concerned representation and 
participation within these negotiations. It could be argued that the nature of these 
protests were not only directed at private parties (Lonmin), but also targeted the public 
sphere because of the complex relationship between Lonmin and different state 
                                            
155 The FMF movement consisted of a diverse group of students across South Africa who protested in 
2015, calling for no increment of fees in 2016 as well as free tertiary education. See generally Centre 
for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation #Hashtag: An analysis of the #FeesMustFall Movement at 
South African universities (2016). See further SABC “Students divided over Fees Must Fall outcome” 
(24-10-2015) SABC <http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/06d982004a5172109061db6d39fe9e0c/Students-
divided-over-Fees-must-fall-outcome-20151024> (Accessed 20-10-2017) and G Nicholson “Student 
Protest: Only the start of a greater pain” (28-09-2017) The Daily Maverick 
<https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-09-28-student-protests-only-the-start-of-greater-
pain/#.WSHEJ2iGPIU> (Accessed 26-10-2017). 
156 P Alexander “The massacre: A narrative account based on workers’ testimonies” in P Alexander, T 
Lekgowa, B Mmope, L Sinwelland & B Xezwi (eds) Marikana: A View from the Mountain and a Case to 
Answer (2012) 25. For a further analysis of the details of Marikana, see R de Villiers (ed) We are going 
to kill each other today: The Marikana Story (2013). 
157 For a discussion about the relationship between s 23 and 17 of the Constitution see chapter 3.  
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actors. Firstly, although Lonmin is a private party, the powers that controlled Lonmin 
had close links to the state and the ruling party.158 Secondly, the political relationship 
between the National Union of Mineworkers (“NUM”) and the State indicates that the 
decisions of the representatives of workers in the NUM were largely based on political 
power and alliances.159 Thirdly, the violent and abrupt reaction by the police is an 
instance of state repression160 and situates the police as protectors of private interests 
(including the private interests of state actors).161  
At times, the Marikana protests took the form of democratic participation outside 
the existing institutional modes of union representation and collective bargaining. The 
protests and mass meetings of mineworkers were not always only about contesting 
the decisions of the NUM or participating in a deliberative process of decision 
making.162 The mineworkers challenged the very system which had failed them. It was 
not protest within the institutionalised union discourse, but was external to it. It sought 
to introduce a possible new “direct form of decision making”.163 As one mineworker 
stated “…we needed to inform NUM and tell them that we did not want it to represent 
us, we wanted to represent ourselves”.164 
 
                                            
158 P Alexander “Marikana, turning point in South African history” (2013) 40 Review of African Political 
Economy 605 613. Cyril Ramaphosa, at the time of the protests, was the single largest shareholder of 
Lonmin and a member of the board of directors. He was a member of the ANC’s national executive and 
was a former secretary general of the ANC. He therefore had close links to the state, and the days 
before the strike “he used his influence to ensure the state’s active intervention on the side of Lonmin”.  
159 Alexander (2013) Review of African Political Economy 615. NUM, at the time, was one of the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions’ (“COSATU”) largest unions. The affiliation between COSATU 
(and specifically NUM) and the State was evident in the decisions made by NUM which were largely 
focussed on national politics. Furthermore, Cyril Ramaphosa was the first general secretary of NUM 
and at the time was a member of the ANC’s national executive.   
160 For a further analysis of the police repression of protest action see chapter 3.  
161 Alexander (2013) Review of African Political Economy 613. See also M McClenaghan & D Smith 
“The British mine owners, the police and South Africa's day of blood” (24-11-2013) The Observer 
<https://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/nov/24/lonmin-mine-shooting-police> (accessed 25-05-
2017). 
162 Brown South Africa’s Insurgent Citizens 21. 
163 21.  
164 T Lekgowa, B Mmope, L Sinwell & B Xezwi “Interviews with Mineworkers” in P Alexander, T 
Lekgowa, B Mmope, L Sinwelland & B Xezwi (eds) Marikana: A View from the Mountain and a Case to 
Answer (2012) 130.  
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2 4 4 4 Political parties, social movements and contestation in a dominant party system 
South Africa’s democracy has been characterised as a dominant party 
democracy.165 In the early years of South Africa’s democracy, the ANC’s dominance 
made it difficult for democratic pluralism and party-political competition to take root.166 
Opposition parties had limited support and the ANC increasingly equated itself with 
the people.167 As a result, contestation generally occurred within the party itself and 
its alliance.168 Opposition from outside the ANC came from social movements that 
used assemblies, demonstrations and the courtroom to challenge and hold the ANC 
accountable.169 The growth of social movements and activist organisations in South 
Africa indicate that the plurality of South Africa’s democracy resides not only in party-
political competition but also in spaces of contestation and disruption opened up by 
these groups. 
Even though the ANC was still in a dominant position after the 2014 national and 
provincial elections, things have started to change. The most recent local government 
elections have been indicative of this change as the ANC has lost control over key 
                                            
165 S Choudhry “He had a Mandate: the South African Constitutional Court and the African National 
Congress in a Dominant Party Democracy” (2009) 2 Constitutional Court Review 1. 
166 S Booysen “The will of the parties versus the will of the people? Defections, elections and alliances 
in South Africa” (2006) 12 Party Politics 727. Booysen analyses the period of 2000-2004 in order to 
illustrate the dominance of the majority party, the ANC, and its ability to weaken minority and opposition 
parties through floor crossing and defections to the ANC. The ANC was able to secure its dominance 
beyond two thirds of parliament. See also United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of 
South Africa & Others (African Christian Democratic Party & Others Intervening; Institute for Democracy 
in South Africa as amici curiae) 2003 1 SA 488 (CC). This case dealt with the initial challenge to the 
constitutionality of the constitutional amendment which made floor crossing possible. See further R 
Southall “Opposition in South Africa: Issues and Problems” (2001) 8 Democratization 1-24. 
167 K Motau “ANC is incorruptible as an organisation because the ANC is the people of SA” (03-07- 
2017) <http://ewn.co.za/2017/07/03/anc-is-incorruptible-as-an-organisation-because-the-anc-is-the-
people-of-sa> (accessed 04-08-2017).  
168 R Southall “The ‘dominant party debate’ in South Africa” (2005) 40 Afrika Spectrum 61 74-77; RB 
Mattes “South Africa: Democracy Without the People?” (2002) 13 Journal of Democracy 22 25-28. 
169 Brown South Africa’s Insurgent Citizens 43-45; T Madlingozi “Post-Apartheid Social Movements and 
Legal Mobilisation” in Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: Symbols or Substance? (2013) 92-130. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
37 
 
municipalities.170 Political parties increasingly use demonstrations and protests to 
contest issues, sometimes in ways that are very confrontational.171  
 
2 5 Conclusion  
This chapter provides a social and historical context to protest action in South 
Africa. In doing so, it helps lay the groundwork for subsequent chapters in three 
respects. First of all, the chapter provides a historical overview of the development of 
the legal framework which regulates freedom of assembly in South Africa. It examines 
apartheid-era legislation which was aimed at repressing demonstrations and dissent, 
and places the adoption of the Regulation of Gatherings Act in historical perspective. 
It thus paves the way for the analysis of the constitutional and legal framework relating 
to freedom of assembly in chapter three. 
Secondly, the chapter looks at the history of protest politics in South Africa and the 
dissent culture which has been inherited from the anti-apartheid struggle. The 
grassroots level politics of the street was instrumental in disrupting and destabilising 
the apartheid legal and political order. While 1994 brought with it an institutionalised 
form of democracy based on universal adult suffrage, the current trend in protest 
action indicates that the politics of the street has once again become an important tool 
for change. Grass roots level protests are aimed at ensuring that local government 
fulfil constitutional obligations regarding service delivery and socio-economic 
obligations. The protests are also a mechanism to put pressure on the representative 
institutions of government and to ensure that the voices of the people are heard. By 
placing protests within a historical perspective and by examining some of the 
contemporary trends, the chapter seeks to gain a better understanding of the nature 
and causes of protest action in South Africa. 
                                            
170 See Independent Electoral Commission Local Government Election 2016: Results (2016). See also 
R Munusamy  “LGE2016 Results: ANC takes battering while opposition heads for coalition talks” (05-
07-2016) < https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-08-05-lge2016-results-anc-takes-battering-
while-opposition-heads-for-coalition-talks/#.WhCxSoVOLmQ > (accessed 10-10-2017). 
171See for example G Nicolson “EFF vs. ANC: a march towards violence” (27-08-2014) < 
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-08-27-eff-vs.-anc-a-march-towards-
violence/#.WfHg1miCzIU> (accessed 03-07-2017); P Phakgadi “EFF protesters: Zuma must be 
arrested” (08-08-2017)<http://ewn.co.za/2017/08/08/eff-protesters-zuma-must-be-arrested> (accessed 
24-08-2017). 
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Thirdly, by placing protests within a historical and social context, the chapter raises 
questions about the relationship between the politics of the street and institutionalised 
politics. Can protests after 1994 be viewed as an attempt to hold democratic 
representatives to account and to ensure that the voices of those at the margins of 
society are heard in the democratic process? Or are they aimed at the disruption and 
destabilisation of representative institutions? These questions are important in view of 
the analyses, in chapters four and five, of the capacity of different models of 
democracy to explain the nature, scope and importance of freedom of assembly. They 
are, however, very complex. The chapter argues, with reference to the decrease in 
voter turnout and the increase in protest action, that citizens increasingly are becoming 
disillusioned with the institutional side of democracy. At the same time, many protests 
are directed at representative institutions, particularly at local government level, which 
may suggest that protesters do not altogether reject the legitimacy of these institutions. 
On the other hand, the violent and disruptive nature of many protests seems to indicate 
that protests cannot simply be understood through the lens of institutionalised forms 
of democracy. Protests are spaces of contestation and disruption. Moreover, as the 
discussion of the Marikana protests shows, protests are not only directed at state 
institutions, but at a variety of interests, including political parties, trade unions, 
employers and businesses. 
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Chapter 3 
3 Freedom of Assembly: The Constitutional and Legislative Framework  
 3 1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the nature and scope of the right to freedom of assembly, 
as guaranteed in section 17 of the Constitution, in view of the values underlying it and 
other supporting provisions in the Bill of Rights.  
The chapter then proceeds to examine the legislative framework relating to the 
section 17 right, with particular focus on the regulation of assemblies and 
demonstrations under the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 (“Regulation of 
Gatherings Act”), and limitations of this right in terms of the Act. The provisions of the 
Act dealing with the procedures to be followed in organising demonstrations and 
gatherings, and the role to be played by the police and local authorities, are evaluated. 
Reference is also made to the ways in which the police and local authorities exercise 
their powers in terms of the Act.    
The chapter then turns to an analysis and critique of the leading South African case 
law on freedom of assembly, particularly the judgments of the High Court, Supreme 
Court of Appeal and Constitutional Court in the case involving the South African 
Transport and Allied Workers Union. This chapter provides insights into the 
interpretation given to the right to assemble by the legislature, executive and judiciary, 
and their often restrictive views of the role of this right in our democracy. The recent 
High Court judgment in S v Mlungwana (“Mlungwana”)1 will also be explored, with 
reference to the notice requirements of the Regulation of Gatherings Act and the 
criminal sanctions attached to the violation of these provisions.  
 
3 2 The Constitution and protest action 
Section 17 of the Constitution guarantees the right of every person to assemble, 
demonstrate, picket and petition. The recognition of assembly as a fundamental right 
is in accordance with international and regional instruments such as the African 
Charter on Human Rights2 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
                                            
1 S v Mlungwana and Others 2018 1 SACR 538 (WCC). 
2 Article 11 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into 
force 21 October 1986) 1520 UNTS 217. This article states that “every individual shall have the right to 
assemble freely with others”.  
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Rights.3 Section 17 is also comparable to provisions in the constitutions of other 
countries, such as the United States Constitution4 and the Basic Law of the Federal 
Republic of Germany,5 which similarly recognise freedom of assembly as a 
fundamental right. This highlights the universal importance of this right.  However, the 
inclusion of assembly is not only an imitation of international trends, but is also a 
reflection of the historical importance attached to protest and dissent in South Africa.6   
Section 17 is not the only right contained in the Constitution which protects those 
engaged in protest action and demonstrations. Various other constitutional rights are 
also relevant to assemblies and protests. These include freedom of expression 
(section 16), freedom of association (section 18), political rights (section 19) and rights 
pertaining to labour relations (section 23). However, since section 17 is the primary 
right dealing with assemblies and demonstrations, it will be the main focus of this 
chapter. 
 
3 2 1 Textual analysis of section 17 
Section 17 refers to four different activities. The inclusion of the conjunction “and” 
indicates that each of these activities (namely assembly, demonstration, petition and 
picketing) enjoys separate constitutional protection as a fundamental right.  
It is necessary to firstly analyse “assembly” and “demonstration”. The South African 
Constitution is unique in that both are included. Various jurisdictions only refer to 
“assembly” in their Constitutions.7 There is no definite constitutional or statutory 
                                            
3 Article 21 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered 
into force 3 January 1976) 999 UNTS 171. This article states that “the right of peaceful assembly shall 
be recognized”. 
4 The First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America (15 December 1791) states:  
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” (emphasis added) 
5 Article 8 of the German Basic Law states: 
“(1) All Germans shall have the right to assemble peacefully and unarmed without prior notification 
or permission. 
(2) In the case of outdoor assemblies, this right may be restricted by or pursuant to a law.” 
6 See chapter 2 specifically part 2 3. 
7 Article 8 of the Basic Law of the German Basic Law refers only to assembly and the First Amendment 
of the Constitution of the United States of America only refers to assembly and petitions as indicated in 
footnotes 3 and 4. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms only refers to assembly. The 
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definition which clearly differentiates between assembly and demonstration8 in the 
South African context. Woolman states that demonstrations are “associated with some 
form of support or opposition for a moral or political position”, whereas assemblies are 
“gatherings that may or may not have political content”.9 It is important to note that 
various other jurisdictions consider demonstration as a form of assembly.10 The text 
of section 17 however indicates that the drafters of the Constitution determined that 
demonstration required specific protection. The inclusion of “demonstration” in 
addition to assembly seems to be an intentional attempt by the drafters of the 
Constitution to provide for a broader and more extensive protection for people 
exercising associative rights. 
In including freedom to present petitions, section 17 is similar to the first amendment 
of the United States Constitution which also provides for petitions towards 
Government. Although there is debate whether petitions should be recognised as a 
separate fundamental right that is enforceable against the state,11 its inclusion at the 
very minimum requires the state to take note of such petitions and in certain cases to 
provide a response.12 Picketing is also an interesting inclusion within section 17 as the 
                                            
Canadian Charter makes a distinction between “freedoms” and “rights”, and “freedom of peaceful 
assembly” is included as a fundamental freedom rather than a right.  
8 Demonstrations are defined within the Regulation of Gatherings Act. However, this definition does not 
clearly distinguish between assemblies and demonstrations. See the discussion under part 3 3. 
9 S Woolman “Assembly, Demonstration and Petition” in I Currie & J de Waal (eds) The Bill of Rights 
Handbook 6 ed (2013) 377 386.  
10 O Salat The Right to Freedom of Assembly: A Comparative Study (2015) 5. 
11 Theme Committee 4 “Schematic Report on Freedom of Assembly, Demonstration and Petition” (9 
October 1995). Paragraph 13.2.1 states:  
“Although the right to petition is not guaranteed in international declarations and treaties, and in most 
bills of rights, this fact does not preclude its inclusion in the new Constitution. The FF sees no 
justification in linking the right to petition to the right to assemble and demonstrate, and opposes the 
inclusion of a right to petition because it would create the impression that there is an onus on the 
authorities to give effect to the demands contained in it. Guaranteeing the right to petition in the 
same section as the right to assemble will, however, not exclude any protection with regard to the 
submission of petitions within any other context than that of an assembly or demonstration. The right 
to petition cannot be interpreted to impose a duty on authorities to comply with petitions.” 
12 Woolman “Assembly” in The Bill of Rights Handbook 387. 
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very nature of picketing in South Africa has been linked to labour disputes.13 Its 
inclusion in section 17 seems to indicate that the right to picketing is not only relevant 
within the context of employee-employer relations but can also feature with regard to 
social protests between private parties.14  
Section 17 of the Constitution provides that the assembly must be exercised 
“peacefully and unarmed”.15 Woolman refers to “peacefully and unarmed” as an 
internal modifier of the right in section 17 of the Constitution.16 Any assembly must be 
peaceful and unarmed to enjoy the protection of section 17. The inclusion of the word 
“peaceful” indicates that the section recognises that an assembly can easily become 
“violent”.17 It is difficult to categorically define non-violent or peaceful “protest” without 
reference to the context of each assembly or demonstration. To give peaceful and 
unarmed ordinary fixed meaning without cognisance of the context may create a 
problem,18 since protest action is by its very nature confrontational.19 The meaning 
and interpretation of peaceful and unarmed is a contentious issue. Other jurisdictions 
may provide certain assistance in interpreting “peaceful”. The requirement in the 
German Basic Law that an assembly must be peaceful has been interpreted by the 
German Federal Constitutional Court to mean that there may be no acts or threats of 
physical violence against persons or property.20 In addition, the German jurisprudence 
recognises that the rights of freedom of assembly of the collective should not be limited 
based on individuals partaking in unlawful or violent acts.21  
                                            
13 The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 provides for significant protection for trade unions with respect 
to picketing in s 69 and the Code of Good Practice on Picketing published under GN 765 in GG 18887 
of 15 May 1998. See also the discussion below in part 3 1 2. 
14 S Woolman “Freedom of Assembly” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) in Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2 ed (OS 2007) 43-24. 
15 See 2 4 4 2. 
16 See Woolman “Freedom of Assembly” in CLOSA 43-3.  
17 See Woolman “Freedom of Assembly” in CLOSA 43-19. Woolman argues that section 17 should be 
read to channel the very violence “intrinsic” in assembly and demonstration. Rather than seeking to limit 
and destroy such potential violence, it seeks to direct it in a constitutional manner.  
18 These problems are highlighted in the case of South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v 
Garvas 2013 1 SA 83 (CC). See further the analysis of “peaceful” under part 3 3 1.  
19 Salat The Right to Freedom of Assembly 108.  
20 Brokdorf 69 BVerfGE 315, 360 (1985).  
21 See Woolman “Freedom of Assembly” in CLOSA 43-20.  See also Salat The Right to Freedom of 
Assembly 109. 
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The addition of “unarmed” in the text of section 17 provides particular problems 
within the South African context of protest action. The legislature has enacted certain 
statutes to provide greater clarification regarding the regulation of dangerous weapons 
and the control of firearms.22 Although these statutes have amended certain sections 
of the Regulation of Gatherings Act, the definitions relating to dangerous weapons do 
not necessarily provide clarity regarding “unarmed”. The question is whether being 
“armed” necessarily means possession of a “dangerous weapon”.23 This lack of clarity 
creates a problem with relation to the cultural link between certain traditional 
“weapons” and protest action. Section 30 and 31 of the Constitution provide for the 
protection of language, cultural and religious rights. It could be argued that where 
protesters wear traditional attire or carry traditional weapons, this would be protected 
under section 30 and 31 and therefore would not necessarily be interpreted as “armed” 
for the purposes of section 17. However, this is unclear and although legislation has 
been promulgated in relation to dangerous weapons, there still seems to be a lack of 
clarity.24 
 
3 1 2 Supporting values and related rights in the Constitution 
Section 17 is underpinned by various values and is complemented by a number of 
other rights in the Constitution. Freedom of assembly is seen as central to our 
democracy.25 It is a fundamental right which creates space for dialogue and 
communication,26 and which provides the electorate with an opportunity to voice their 
opinions and a platform for democratic participation.27  
                                            
22 Dangerous Weapons Act 25 of 2013 and the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000. See further the 
discussion below under part 3 2 3.  
23 The Dangerous Weapons Act 25 of 2013 defines a dangerous weapon as "any object, other than a 
firearm, which is likely to cause serious bodily injury if it were used to commit an assault". See further 
the discussion below under part 3 2 3. 
24 Dangerous Weapons Act 25 of 2013 and the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000. See further the 
discussion below under part 3 2 3. See also P du Toit and G Ferreira “The regulation of the possession 
of weapons at gatherings” (2013) 16 PER 361. 
25 South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas 2013 1 SA 83 (CC) para 61. For a full 
analysis of the relation between freedom of assembly and democratic theory see the discussion in 
chapter 4 and 5. 
26 Woolman “Freedom of Assembly” in CLOSA 43-2. 
27 Woolman “Freedom of Assembly” in CLOSA 43-3. See also Salat The Right to Freedom of Assembly 
49. 
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The interpretation of the rights contained in the Bill of Rights should be informed by 
the democratic values of equality, human dignity and freedom.28 Although section 17 
does not use the word “freedom” in relation to assembly, demonstration, picketing and 
petitioning, it is generally accepted that section 17 protects the right of freedom of 
assembly. Evidently, freedom of assembly must have the value of freedom involved in 
its interpretation. In liberal democratic thought, the individual’s liberty is the rationale 
for the protection of freedom of assembly and other freedom based rights such as free 
speech, religion and association.29 Individuals are free to do what is not prohibited by 
law.30 A distinction is often made between positive and negative freedom. Negative 
freedom, which is the type of freedom emphasised in classical liberal thought, is 
defined as freedom to act without interference by other persons or the State.31 This 
understanding of freedom is primarily concerned with the protection of individual 
autonomy from external limits imposed by the State.32 Positive freedom is concerned 
with the individual’s ability to exercise his/her own will and have a platform to pursue 
his/her idea of the “good life”.33 It is said to promote individual self-actualisation and 
self-determination.  
These understandings of the value of freedom are useful in the interpretation of 
freedom of assembly.34 When viewed through the lens of negative freedom, the right 
to assemble or demonstrate is conceived in terms of freedom from external limits 
imposed by the State. When viewed from the perspective of positive freedom, the right 
is understood in terms of the need for a space in which individuals can actualise 
themselves, participate in political life and control the space which surrounds them.   
                                            
28 S 7 and 39(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
29 Liberty and freedom are interrelated and may even be viewed as interchangeable concepts. Ferreira 
v Levin NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) para 52. On the difference between freedom as a right and 
freedom as a “mere” liberty, see Salat The Right to Freedom of Assembly 39 and 53.  
30 Salat The Right to Freedom of Assembly 39. 
31 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) para 52-54.  
32 Para 54. 
33 Para 50. Justice Ackermann states, with reference to Isaiah Berlin, that positive freedom answers the 
question of “What, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, 
or be, this rather than that?”. See further I Berlin Two Concepts of Liberty (1969) 121-122 as quoted by 
Justice Ackermann in Ferreira v Levin NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) para 52. 
34 Salat The Right to Freedom of Assembly 33 and 54.  
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When freedom of assembly is viewed through the lens of freedom and human 
dignity, which is closely associated with freedom,35 the emphasis tends to be on the 
individual and individual personality rights.36 There is, however, a danger in 
overstating the individual dimensions of the right at the expense of its collective 
dimensions.37 Freedom of assembly at its core finds its power not in the voice of the 
individual but in the voice of “the people” as a collective.38 Therefore, while the values 
of human dignity and freedom may at times individualise the right, an associative right 
such as freedom of assembly must be seen in the context of group interaction. 
Freedom of assembly is a right which is exercised together with other people – it 
presupposes a group, a crowd or a mob coming together. Additionally, it is a form of 
collective action through which other rights are vindicated, through which the interests 
of groups or classes of persons are advanced, or through which solidarity with others 
can be expressed.39 
Apart from the idea of individual and collective freedom, freedom is closely 
connected to the revolutionary nature of society and the collective.40 Revolution can 
be said to be the epitome of freedom, where society (or the individual as part of 
society) challenges the status quo and creates something new.41 This may highlight 
                                            
35 Salat The Right to Freedom of Assembly 54. See further Ferreira v Levin NO and Others 1996 1 SA 
984 (CC) para 49.  For a further discussion of dignity as a foundation of the right to freedom see F du 
Bois “Freedom and the Dignity of Citizens” (2008) Acta Juridica 112. Du Bois discusses the reason for 
using dignity as opposed to autonomy as a foundation for freedom.  
36 Salat The Right to Freedom of Assembly 33 and 54.  
37 Ackermann J himself is of the view that a wide definition of freedom need not be premised on the 
idea that the individual exists in isolation from the community. He stated in Ferreira v Levin NO and 
Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) para 52: 
“The fact that the right to freedom must, in my view, be given a broad and generous interpretation 
at the first stage of the enquiry, must therefore not be thought to be premised on a concept of the 
individual as being in heroic and atomistic isolation from the rest of humanity, or the environment, 
for that matter..”  
In addition, human dignity, considered from the view of the dignity of groups, may serve to reinforce 
freedom from the collective perspective. See J Waldron “The Dignity of Groups” (2008) Acta Juridica 
66. 
38 Woolman “Freedom of Assembly” in CLOSA 43-1. 
39 See part 3 5 2 where reference is made to para 92 of S v Mlungwana 2018 1 SACR 538 (WCC). 
40 R Berkowitz “Revolutionary constitutionalism: Some thoughts on Laurie Ackermann’s jurisprudence” 
(2008) Acta Juridica 204 207. 
41 Berkowitz (2008) Acta Juridica 207. 
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the power of the people to challenge and work outside of and untampered by the 
structures of representative and participatory institutions.42 This type of revolutionary 
freedom is quite appropriate to describe the type of freedom which was expressed in 
the challenge (specifically through protest) to the apartheid constitutional order.43 The 
focus was not only on the deprival of the freedom of the individual but also that of the 
collective.  
Equality as a democratic value44 can also help guide the interpretation of political 
rights like freedom of assembly.45 Firstly, political equality is seen as an important 
prerequisite of a democracy.46 Political equality is expressed through the notion “one 
person, one vote”, which is specifically protected under section 1(d) and section 19 
(political rights) of the Constitution. There is a political element to section 17 when 
read with section 19.47 This formal equality however does not provide a basis for 
understanding the inherent political inequalities which exist in South Africa between 
different groups. Section 17, understood through the democratic value of equality, can 
be used to challenge political inequality or the exclusion of the poor and marginalised 
from meaningful political participation.48 The procedural role of the vote and a 
restrictive idea of political equality may minimise the role of political participation and 
political equality in political communities beyond the vote.49 When read through the 
lens of substantive equality, section 17 has the capacity to challenge political and 
                                            
42 Berkowitz (2008) Acta Juridica 211-212. Berkowitz here discusses how representative government 
may stifle public freedom. See also the discussion under chapter 2 and chapter 5.  
43 See chapter 2 part 2 3. 
44 S 7(1) and s 39(1)(a) of the Constitution.  
45 H Botha “Equality, Plurality and Structural Power” (2009) 25 SAJHR 1, 4, 10, 11 and 16.  
46 R Dahl On Democracy (1998) 36. According to Dahl there are certain criteria to determine whether 
there is political equality. These are effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, 
control of the agenda and the inclusion of adults. See also K Malan “Faction rule, (natural) justice and 
democracy” (2006) 21 SA Public Law 142 144-145. 
47 Woolman “Freedom of Assembly” in CLOSA 43-22. Although section 17 may often be used as a 
political right, it should also protect those assemblies which are not political in nature. Section 19 
(political rights) of the Constitution intersects and overlaps with section 17. Section 19(1)(c) provides 
for the right of every citizen to campaign for a political party or cause. Campaigning for a political party 
or cause in this sense may include participating in a demonstration, picket or signing a petition. 
48 Botha (2009) SAJHR 10-16. 
49 Botha (2009) SAJHR 10-16; H Botha “Representing the poor: law, poverty and democracy" (2011) 
Stell LR 521 524-525, 539. 
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social exclusion, by enabling the advocacy of causes that are drowned out through 
institutionalised democratic processes.50 It is also significant that section 17 does not 
distinguish between citizens and non-citizens. Therefore, section 17 allows for those 
who cannot vote to participate in political processes of will formation.  
Beyond the democratic value of equality and the political rights contained in section 
19 of the Constitution, there are also other rights in the Constitution which are 
interrelated with freedom of assembly and may help inform its interpretation. As 
highlighted by the Constitutional Court, section 16-19 of the Bill of Rights are grouped 
together as they collectively are essential to a democracy.51 Therefore, freedom of 
assembly has a close connection with these rights. Firstly, freedom of assembly is 
closely related to freedom of expression as provided for in section 16 of the 
Constitution.52 The differentiation between these rights as two separate fundamental 
rights is an important consideration in South African jurisprudence as freedom of 
assembly is not seen as simply an extension of expression.53 It is a fundamental right 
on its own and there is no hierarchy of rights which supports the idea that expression 
is more important than assembly. In many cases, those exercising the right to 
assemble will attempt to convey a certain idea or message. The content of this idea 
or message is sometimes seen as more important than the act of the demonstration 
itself.54 However, there are various reasons why speech (or the content) should not be 
privileged over the conduct/act of demonstration. To privilege speech over assembly 
would minimise and misunderstand the context and the power of assembly and 
                                            
50 Botha (2009) 25 SAJHR 10-16; H Botha “Rethinking the right to vote” (2015) 26 Stellenbosch Law 
Review 486 508-512. 
51 See Case & Another v Minister of Safety and Security & Others; Curtis v Minister of Safety and 
Security & Others 1996 3 SA 617 (CC) at para 27 where Mokgoro J describes the right to freedom of 
expression (as contained in the Interim Constitution) “as part of a web of mutually supporting rights . . . 
[which] together may be conceived as underpinning an entitlement to participate in an ongoing process 
of communicative interaction that is of both instrumental and intrinsic value” (emphasis added). See 
also S v Mamabolo 2001 3 SA 409 (CC) at para 28 where Kriegler J states: “That freedom to speak 
one’s mind is now an inherent quality of the type of society contemplated by the Constitution as a whole 
and is specifically promoted by the freedoms of conscience, expression, assembly, association and 
political participation protected by sections 15 to 19 of the Bill of Rights.” 
52 South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 1999 4 SA 469 (CC) paras 7-8. 
53 Woolman “Freedom of Assembly” in CLOSA 43-21. 
54 43-21. 
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demonstration.55 Botha makes this point by stating that “a neat separation between 
speech and action is untenable, as action also has expressive value”.56 This is an 
important consideration as conduct in protest action can be symbolic in nature. The 
time, place and manner of protest has expressive value in itself and communicates 
the “content” or message in an act rather than through “pure speech”.57 Another 
important consideration is that the conduct and power of crowds have expressive 
value. Demonstrations and assemblies are an important democratic tool because they 
provide those whose voices are not otherwise heard, an avenue to participate. 
Moreover, they recognise the power of the physical presence of the collective. There 
is an inherent power in the bodies of the collective.58   
Freedom of assembly is also closely connected with section 18 of the Constitution, 
which guarantees freedom of association. There is an overlap between these two 
rights, and it could be said that the very power of assemblies lies in the ability of people 
to associate, communicate and gather together to exercise collective power. Woolman 
makes the point that the thread which links all the justifications for associational 
freedom is social capital. Woolman describes social capital as “... a function of our 
collective effort to build and to fortify the things that matter”.59 He goes on to state that 
“[s]ocial capital emphasises the extent to which our capacity to do anything is 
contingent upon the creation and maintenance of forms of association which provide 
both the tools and the setting for meaningful action”.60 Freedom of association 
therefore provides those who wish to demonstrate with the ability to organise and 
exercise their collective effort to bring about meaningful action. Associational freedom 
makes collective action possible as it transforms individual will and power into 
collective political action.61 As highlighted above, freedom of assembly gains its power 
from a group. Therefore, section 17 would be quite meaningless if people did not have 
                                            
55 H Botha “Fundamental rights and democratic contestation: reflections on freedom of assembly in an 
unequal society” (2017) 21 Law, Democracy and Development 221 15 
56 15. 
57 15. Botha also points out that where there is a privileging of different types of speech over others it 
makes it “more difficult to express certain ideas or to highlight certain injustices”. 
58 16. 
59 S Woolman  “Freedom of Association” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) in Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2 ed (OS 2007) 44-1 44-5. 
60 Woolman “Freedom of Association” in CLOSA 44-1 44-5. 
61 44-6. 
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the associational freedom to transform their individual will and interact with other 
people in a group.  
Section 23 (Labour Relations) of the Constitution contains specific provisions which 
deal with strike action. In South Africa’s context there is an inherent link between 
protest action and labour rights. Many of the strike actions organised in terms of 
section 23 (and the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995) must also comply with the 
Regulation of Gatherings Act. The overlap between the two sections is evident from 
the fact that there was debate surrounding the inclusion of the right to picket within the 
ambit of section 17 and not in section 23.62 Furthermore, the Labour Relations Act 
specifically refers to protest action to promote or defend socio-economic rights.63 
Therefore, the right of workers to protest is specifically dealt with and protected under 
section 23, which is further elaborated through the LRA, which links together the right 
to protest, workers’ rights and socio-economic issues. Additionally, cases dealing with 
labour protests touch upon both sections 17 and 23.64 
 
3 3 The legislative framework: The Regulation of Gatherings Act 
3 3 1 The preamble and section 1 
The preamble to the Regulation of Gatherings Act is an important point of 
departure for the interpretation and understanding of the Act.65 Even though the Act 
predates the final Constitution, the preamble seems to be closely related to the 
wording of section 17. It states: 
“WHEREAS every person has the right to assemble with other persons and to express his 
views on any matter freely in public and to enjoy the protection of the State while doing so; 
                                            
62 Theme Committee 4 “Schematic Report on Freedom of Assembly, Demonstration and Petition” (9 
October 1995). Page 12 of the Report states that: “Picketing in labour disputes is not dealt with in 
section 27 of the Interim Constitution.  If it were not to be included in a new section dealing with labour 
relations, it would be covered by the horizontal application of the proposed right which is a non-
contentious issue”. The committee was thus of the view that it was unnecessary to mention the right to 
picket in section 23 of the Final Constitution, as it would in any event be applicable to the employee-
employer relationship through the horizontal application of section 17. See further Woolman “Freedom 
of Assembly” in CLOSA 43-343-25. 
63 S77 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
64 See the discussion of South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas 2013 1 SA 83 (CC) 
in part 3 3. See also chapter 2 part 2 4 4 3.  
65 See the historical analysis of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 in chapter 2.  
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AND WHEREAS the exercise of such right shall take place peacefully and with due regard 
to the rights of others.”66 
 
The preamble resonates with section 17 to the extent that it includes the words 
“right to assemble” and “peacefully”. It also seems to make an important link between 
assembly and freedom of expression through the inclusion of “express his views”. The 
Act seeks to give effect to the rights of expression and assembly while at the same 
time balancing these rights against the rights of others.  
Nevertheless, the Act possibly presents quite a few difficult constitutional issues.67 
Section 1 of the Act provides for the definitions. A few of these definitions are difficult 
to reconcile with section 17 of the Constitution. Firstly, the Act arbitrarily distinguishes 
between a demonstration and a gathering. A demonstration “includes any 
demonstration by one or more persons, but not more than 15 persons, for or against 
any person, cause, action or failure to take action”.68 Where the number is greater than 
15, it would qualify as a “gathering. A gathering is defined in the Act as: 
 
“any assembly, concourse or procession of more than 15 persons in or on any public road 
as defined in the Road Traffic Act, 1989 (Act 29 of 1989), or any other public place or 
premises wholly or partly open to the air-  
  (a)   at which the principles, policy, actions or failure to act of any government, political 
party or political organization, whether or not that party or organization is registered in terms 
of any applicable law, are discussed, attacked, criticized, promoted or propagated; or 
  (b)   held to form pressure groups, to hand over petitions to any person, or to mobilize or 
demonstrate support for or opposition to the views, principles, policy, actions or omissions 
of any person or body of persons or institution, including any government, administration 
or governmental institution”. 
 
The Act places arduous notification requirements on the organisers of such a 
gathering.69 The distinction between a gathering and demonstration does not rest on 
any clear difference other than the numerical limit.70 The Act does not distinguish 
                                            
66 Preamble to the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993. 
67 See part 3 4 and 3 5.  
68 S 1 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993.  
69 S 2 and 3 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act.  
70 It has been submitted that this numerical distinction is arbitrary. This point was specifically noted in 
the case of S v Mlungwana and Others 2018 1 SACR 538 (WCC) para 79. See also the argument made 
by Counsel M Bishop regarding the arbitrary nature of such a distinction where he contends that there 
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between the type or purpose of a gathering or demonstration.71 The definition of 
gathering is also not clear with regard to what type of assembly is required to conform 
to these severe requirements contained in the Act. The nature of the assemblies 
contemplated in the definition seems to have some sort of political purpose or nature, 
however (b) broadens that purpose beyond only a political purpose. The purpose of 
the Act is to “regulate the holding of public gatherings and demonstrations at certain 
places”. The preamble emphasises that the “exercise of such right shall take place 
peacefully and with due regard to the rights of others” (emphasis added). It would 
therefore seem that the numerical limit and the arduous requirements for the holding 
of gatherings are perceived as necessary to prevent threats to public order.72 
However, in terms of this definition of gathering, certain “pressure groups” who pose 
minimal or no threat would still have to go through the onerous requirements based 
on the perceived threat that all gatherings pose.73 What is evident from the definitions 
of demonstrations and gatherings is that they have practical implications for those 
exercising their section 17 rights, as non-compliance with the Act results in quite 
serious liability and sanctions for offenders.74  
The definition of riot damage also poses problems. Riot damage is defined as:  
 “any loss suffered as a result of any injury to or the death of any person, or any damage 
to or destruction of any property, caused directly or indirectly by, and immediately before, 
during or after, the holding of a gathering.”  
 
This definition is very broad. The inclusion of “any loss”, “any injury”, “any damage” 
and “any property” indicates that there is no limit or qualification to the type of damage 
                                            
is “no magic about the number 16 that suddenly requires police intervention” at paragraph 96 and also 
para 128 of M Bishop “Heads of Argument” in S v Mlungwana and Others 2018 1 SACR 538 (WCC). 
The distinction is made irrational and arbitrary specifically when it is coupled with the arduous 
notification requirements and the possibility of criminal liability (which might ensue in terms of s 12 of 
the RGA).  
71 Woolman “Freedom of Assembly” in CLOSA 43-23. See discussion above under part 3 2 1. 
72 Woolman “Freedom of Assembly” in CLOSA 43-28. See further P Hjul “Restricting freedom of speech 
or regulating gatherings?” (2013) 27 De Jure 456.  
73 Woolman “Freedom of Assembly” in CLOSA 43-23. Woolman, in a footnote, uses the examples of a 
church gathering (convocation) which would possibly have to meet all these requirements. The possible 
threat of criminal sanction (in terms of s 8 and 12) should then lead to the definition of gathering (and 
other provisions) being declared invalid for vagueness.  
74 S 11 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993.  
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or the nature of such damage which qualifies as riot damage. In addition, the definition 
refers to damage caused “directly or indirectly” by the gathering. The context of the 
cause of the damage is not considered at all. It seems that any connection between 
“any loss” experienced by someone and the gathering itself would qualify as riot 
damage. This is quite arduous for organisers of gatherings.75 Consequently, where 
the exercise of section 17 rights is done in a peaceful and unarmed manner, and all 
legislative and regulatory requirements are complied with, any damage which occurs 
will still be classified as riot damage. This definition seems to assume that protests are 
synonymous with riots, irrespective of whether they are peaceful or not. 
 
3 3 2 Section 3, 4, 5 and 6 
Section 3 of the Act sets out the procedures dealing with notifications for gatherings 
while section 4 provides for consultations and negotiations. One of the seemingly 
progressive inclusions in the Act was the requirement for notice of gatherings. This 
inclusion is in line with other jurisdictions.76 The notice requirement was a break from 
the past when organisers had to obtain permission for assemblies.77 However, the 
notice seems to be a burdensome process for the organisers of gatherings which 
places significant limitations on the right to assemble.  In addition, the very detailed 
information required to be included in such a notice places a great burden on 
conveners.78 Many times, these gatherings are not based on membership of a 
group/organization. In these cases, the convener will not necessarily have the 
resources to provide such information as required by section 3.79 It is important to 
                                            
75 See the discussion of South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas 2013 1 SA 83 (CC) 
under part 3 4 and s 11 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act.  
76 Salat The Right to Freedom of Assembly 55. The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany 
article 8 guarantees the right to assemble without permit or notification but paragraph II allows for 
limitations for assemblies under the open sky. There is a requirement for advance notice for outdoor 
assemblies.  
77 See above the discussion of the history of freedom of assembly within South Africa under chapter 2. 
78 Woolman “Freedom of Assembly” in CLOSA 43-8. 
79 Conveners are central to the organization of protest action in this context. This point was specifically 
made in S v Mlungwana 2018 1 SACR 538 (WCC) where the court provided in para 93 that “the role of 
conveners is fundamental to the strength and number of participants to exert influence in pursuance of 
social justice change”. Furthermore the court stated at para 83: 
 “At the heart of any demonstration or gathering is a convener, who after having identified certain 
conduct which requires the members of the community to gather and express their frustration or 
displeasure. In other words, it is difficult to imagine a gathering and or demonstration which did not 
commence with someone convening it.” 
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make brief mention of Mlungwana in the context of notice requirements. The facts and 
details of this case are dealt with in sufficient detail below.80 However, it must be noted 
that in this case the constitutionality of the notification requirements in section 3 of the 
Act was not challenged. Rather section 12(1)(a) of the Act was under constitutional 
scrutiny, namely the criminalisation of the actions of a convener who convenes a 
gathering without giving notice in terms of the Act. In regard to the notice requirements, 
the court specifically provided: 
“It is clear from the wording of s 3 that its primary intent is to ensure that such gatherings 
are managed and occur in an orderly manner, with minimal disruption and that any risk of 
violence and/or unruly behaviour is mitigated to the greatest extent.”81 
 
 Furthermore, the court in this case confirmed that the notice requirement served a 
legitimate purpose.82 This does however not mean that the section 3 notice 
requirement meets the constitutional standard and/or the limitation enquiry in terms of 
section 36 of the Constitution. For example, even if the wording and requirements of 
a notice for gatherings are seen as reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society, the wide discretion afforded to the local authorities (as contained 
in section 5 of the Act) to prohibit such a gathering, may place unreasonable 
restrictions on the right to assemble.83 Therefore although notice may serve a 
legitimate purpose, the practical exercise and wide discretion of the local municipality 
and police serve to undermine the exercise of the right.84   
The Act requires a 7 day or 48 hour notice period to be given to the authorities.  
Once such notice has been given by the convenor, section 4 of the Act requires the 
responsible officer of the local authority to consider whether there needs to be 
consultations, negotiations, amendment of notices, or conditions placed on the 
gathering. If the responsible officer determines that negotiations or meetings are 
unnecessary, the gathering may continue as indicated in the section 3 notice. 
However, if the responsible officer determines otherwise, he or she is required to 
inform the convenor of negotiations to take place. The convenor must be given notice 
of these negotiations within 24 hours of the original notice handed over to the local 
authorities in terms of section 3.  The time period as contained in section 3 and 4 for 
                                            
80 See below at part 3 5 1.  
81 Para 29 of S v Mlungwana 2018 1 SACR 538 (WCC). 
82 Para 55.  
83 See below at part 3 5 1. 
84 See below at part 3 5 1. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
54 
 
the process of organising a gathering is quite arduous on conveners. In practice these 
procedures and requirements – and the ways in which they are implemented – place 
formidable obstacles in the way of protest action and significantly narrow the scope 
for dissent outside the bounds of institutional politics.85 An important element of a 
gathering is the immediate response of communities or organisations to important and 
pressing issues and possible decisions by government.86 Therefore the timing of such 
a gathering is instrumental to the nature of the fundamental right. Although s 12(2) 
does provide for spontaneous assemblies,87 this can be used in very limited 
circumstances and to prove spontaneity a large organisation would require any 
members of such gathering to indicate that the gathering as such could not have been 
planned or prevented (other than in such a spontaneous fashion).88 The notice period 
provides government with enough time to prevent such dialogue or dissent through 
the use of stalling tactics in terms of section 4 and eventually the use of section 5 to 
exercise their discretion to prohibit the gathering. This is an example of how local 
government sometimes abuses the process to withhold “permission”.  
Section 5 provides a local authority with discretionary powers to prohibit a gathering 
based on a perceived threat brought to the attention of the local authority through 
“credible information”. The threat is in relation to “serious disruption of vehicular or 
pedestrian traffic, injury to participants in the gathering or other persons, or extensive 
damage to property, and that the Police and the traffic officers in question will not be 
able to contain this threat”.89 This section is extremely broad. The Act does not provide 
clarity regarding what “credible” information would be. Section 5 does provide that it 
should be “credible information on oath”, but “information on oath” does not 
necessarily make the information credible. The section also does not provide detail 
regarding the nature of the threat. For example, what qualifies as a serious disruption 
                                            
85 S Woolman “My tea party, your mob, our social contract: Freedom of Assembly and the Constitutional 
right to rebellion in Garvis v SATAWU (Minister for Safety & Security, Third Party) 2010 (6) SA 280 
(WCC)” (2011) 27 SAJHR 346 348. 
86 Woolman “Freedom of Assembly” in CLOSA 43-9. 
87 S 12(2) states: “It shall be a defence to a charge of convening a gathering in contravention of 
subsection (1) (a) that the gathering concerned took place spontaneously.” 
88 See also para 84 of S v Mlungwana 2018 1 SACR 538 where the court states:  
“Again, it must be emphasised that even if spontaneity is a defence, it does not exempt an accused 
person from the necessity to prove it. A court may well find that on the facts, no spontaneity was 
established.” 
89 S 5(1) of the Regulation of Gatherings Act.  
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of traffic? Additionally, the section does not stipulate the degree or likelihood of the 
threat occurring beyond the inclusion of the type of threat. This is placed within the 
discretion of the authority. This discretion provides the local authority with the 
opportunity to make very subjective or arbitrary decisions even where there is no threat 
or if the threat is unlikely to occur. This is quite problematic as a gathering may always 
pose some sort of threat, as the very nature of an assembly in certain cases is 
confrontational. The amount of people involved will always pose a “threat” to traffic.  
Section 6 of the Act deals with the review and appeal process. When a condition is 
imposed regarding a gathering (in terms of section 4(4)(b)) or when a gathering is 
prohibited (in terms of section 5(2)), the convener may apply to a magistrate to set 
aside such a condition or prohibition. However, this process must be initiated within 
24 hours of the notice received by the convener from the responsible officer in terms 
of either section 4(5)(a) or section 5(3).  It is quite possible that local authorities abuse 
this timeline in order to ensure that the gathering does not take place. If the 
consultation process as contained in section 4 takes place within the 7-day period 
before such a gathering, but the local authority informs a convener 24 hours before 
the date of the gathering in terms of section 5(3) that the gathering has been 
prohibited, the convener only has 24 hours to apply to a magistrate for the setting 
aside of such prohibition. Even if such prohibition is set aside, the magistrate’s 
decision will be on the date of the planned gathering itself or at a later time.90 
In addition to all the limitations discussed above, the content and context of the 
gathering could create a difficulty for those who wish to exercise their right to 
assemble. An example of such a limitation on a gathering would be where a community 
wishes to protest against police brutality or a municipal council. In such a case, the 
organisers of the protest would be asking for “permission” to assemble from the very 
authorities that they are dissenting against.91  
 
3 3 3 Section 8 and limitations on the conduct of protesters 
The Act also prescribes the conduct of gatherings and demonstrations in section 8. 
This section provides the basis upon which the Act regulates the conduct of those 
                                            
90 Woolman “Freedom of Assembly” in CLOSA 43-8-43-14. Woolman discusses how the local 
authorities use the process in order to prevent gatherings from occurring.  
91 43-8-43-14. 
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exercising their section 17 rights. Section 8 does not seem to be problematic at first 
glance because it determines undesirable conduct, but the negative manner in which 
it is stated creates certain presumptions about the behaviour of crowds.92 Section 8 
regulates the conduct of participants who are exercising their section 17 rights. This is 
an indication of what limitations may be placed on the conduct of participants 
exercising their right to assemble and demonstrate. One would therefore assume that 
the text of section 8 would not only make it clear what conduct is permissible but should 
also provide an indication of how the limitations on conduct should be interpreted and 
how these limitations should operate within the ambit of the powers of the organisers 
of the gathering.  
 Section 8(1), (2) and (9) place positive obligations on the convener; however, the 
positive obligations are in relation to preventing conduct. Section 8(1) provides for the 
appointment of marshals to “control the participants”. Section 8(9) provides that 
“reasonable steps” should be taken by the marshals to prevent certain conduct which 
results in entrances being barred by participants. The premise of these obligations 
appears to be straightforward, but there are no guidelines with regard to what 
“reasonable steps” entail. The section thus indicates what conduct should be 
prohibited but gives no indication of how such conduct should be prohibited, that is, 
how conveners should ensure that the section 17 right is exercised within the limits 
imposed by the Act.93 Section 12(1)(c) provides that it will be a criminal offence if a 
person “contravenes or fails to comply with any provision of section 8 in regard to the 
conduct of a gathering or demonstration”. The Act therefore prescribes the bounds of 
section 17 conduct by imposing limitations rather than allowing for the positive 
exercise of the right. It thus takes a negative view of assemblies, and attempts to limit 
negative conduct before a gathering occurs. This could result in the limitation of 
legitimate conduct in the exercise of section 17 rights. There is a lack of clarity with 
regard to which conduct is within the bounds of sections 17 protection and which 
conduct constitutes a criminal offence.94  
Section 8(4) of the Act is linked to the constitutional requirement in terms of section 
17 that an assembly and demonstration should be “unarmed”. Section 8(4)(a) requires 
                                            
92 Hjul (2013) De Jure 452.  
93 454.  
94 See part 3 5 2 and 3 5 3 where the nature of criminal liability is discussed with specific reference to 
section 12(1)(a) and S v Mlungwana 2018 1 SACR 538 (WCC). 
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that no participant may possess a firearm or anything resembling a firearm. Section 
8(4)(b) is more problematic to interpret in the context of South African protests. It 
requires that a participant may not be in possession of a “dangerous weapon” as 
defined in the Dangerous Weapons Act 15 of 2013. The definition of a dangerous 
weapon in section 1 of the Dangerous Weapons Act is “any object, other than a 
firearm, designed as a weapon and capable of producing death or serious bodily harm, 
if it were used for an unlawful purpose”. This definition is problematic in the context of 
the traditional “weapons” often in possession of protesters during gatherings.95 
Although these traditional weapons are sometimes used for cultural reasons rather 
than with the intent to cause unlawful harm, section 8(4) does not provide for such a 
requirement of intent.96 Therefore, every participant who carries such traditional 
weapons at a gathering would contravene the section and therefore commit a criminal 
offence in terms of section 12 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act.97 What makes this 
criminalisation in terms of section 12 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act more 
problematic is that the Dangerous Weapons Act criminalises the possession of 
dangerous weapons only if the possession of the dangerous weapon raises a 
“reasonable suspicion that the person intends to use the dangerous weapon for an 
unlawful purpose”.98 Therefore it requires a reasonable suspicion that there is intent. 
Section 8(4) of the Regulation of Gatherings Act contains no such requirement.  
The Act does not only regulate the conduct of gatherings and demonstrations but 
also expression and speech. The link between speech and conduct in relation to 
                                            
95 P du Toit and G Ferreira “The Regulation of the possession of weapons at gatherings” (2013) 16 PER 
360.  
96 du Toit and Ferreira  (2013) PER 359. 
97 359-360. It must be noted that the Dangerous Weapons Act provides in section 2 that it does not 
apply to “possession of dangerous weapons during the participation in any religious or cultural 
activities”. This does not mean that the carrying of traditional weapons for the purposes of cultural and 
religious activities is not prohibited in terms of section 12 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act. This is 
because section 8(4) of the Act only refers to the definition of “dangerous weapons” and not the Act as 
a whole (which would then include section 2 of the Dangerous Weapons Act). 
98 Section 3(1) of the Dangerous Weapons Act 15 of 2013. 
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assembly (as discussed above) is dealt with in section 8(5)99 and (6).100 Section 8(5) 
provides for the incitement of hatred and section 8(6) provides for the encouragement 
of violence. These provisions are closely related to the wording of section 16 of the 
Constitution which provides that the protection of free expression does not extend to 
“incitement of imminent violence” and “advocacy of hatred”.  
Section 8(7) provides: “No person shall at any gathering or demonstration wear a 
disguise or mask or any other apparel or item which obscures his facial features and 
prevents his identification”. The purpose of this provision is to ensure that police or 
local authorities are able to identify participants who possibly engage in undesirable 
conduct indicated in section 8. However, this provision creates problems in practice 
as participants in assemblies sometimes fear that police will target participants to 
dissuade protest action and group mobilisation. There have been various alleged 
cases of police targeting and harassing leaders of movements to prevent gatherings 
and assemblies.101 Therefore, although the purpose of section 8(7) seems 
straightforward, the provision is problematic in view of the antagonistic context within 
which the participants of protest action and police interact with each other.102 The Act 
should not be seen in isolation from the way in which the police view gatherings. 
Section 8 proscribes specific instances of undesirable conduct and then also gives a 
wide discretion to police in terms of section 9 with regards to the handling of such 
conduct. 
 
                                            
99 Section 8(5) provides that: “No person present at or participating in a gathering or demonstration shall 
by way of a banner, placard, speech or singing or in any other manner incite hatred of other persons or 
any group of other persons on account of differences in culture, race, sex, language or religion.” 
100 Section 8(6) provides that: “No person present at or participating in a gathering or demonstration 
shall perform any act or utter any words which are calculated or likely to cause or encourage violence 
against any person or group of persons.” 
101 MC Dawson “Resistance and Repression: policing protest in post-apartheid South Africa” in 
Handmaker J & Berkhout R (eds) Mobilising Social Justice in South Africa: Perspectives from 
Researchers and Practitioners (2010) 105,106 & 107. See further D McKinley & A Veriava Arresting 
dissent: State repression and post-apartheid social movements (2005) 43-54. 
102See discussion below under part 3 2 4. 
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3 3 4 Section 9 and the conduct of police 
Police responses to protests often show an overly restrictive understanding of the 
right to assemble.103 Although police action is sometimes necessary, the use of force 
in many instances indicates a fear on the part of the local authorities and police of any 
dissent, even where such dissent may be disruptive, but not violent.104 This is borne 
out by acts of police brutality and interactions between protesters and the police that 
are particularly confrontational.  
Section 9 provides the police with additional powers in the context of gatherings. 
There are various problems with the text of section 9. Section 9(2)(a)-(e) provide a 
wide ambit of what an officer may do if the officer has “reasonable grounds to believe 
that danger to persons and property, as a result of the gathering or demonstration” 
may occur.105 There is no indication of what “reasonable grounds” are or what they 
entail. Police are thus provided with a wide discretion, which may lead to abuse. An 
officer may use force to disperse a crowd (excluding the use of weapons likely to cause 
serious bodily injury or death).106 The force used must however be “necessary and 
proportionate” in the circumstances.107 This still provides a wide discretion to the 
police. The very nature of gatherings is disruptive and sometimes disorganised,108 and 
therefore there may be cases where police in good faith use force, even where such 
force is not necessary.109 Section 9(2)(d) and (e) make provision for the use of force 
in more extreme circumstances. This force is not described as deadly force; however, 
it includes the use of firearms. It provides for such force where there is a “manifest 
intention” to seriously injure/kill or destroy/seriously damage property. This provides 
the police officer with a discretion to determine whether the participant shows such an 
intention even before such conduct has occurred. It seems reasonable that such a 
                                            
103 Dawson “Resistance and Repression” in Mobilising Social Justice in South Africa 105,106 & 107. 
104 For an analysis of the increase in public order policing after the 2008 xenophobic attacks see M 
Marks & D Bruce “Groundhog Day? Public order policing twenty years into democracy” (2014) 27 South 
African Journal of Criminal Justice 347 366-367.  
105 S 9(2)(a) of the Regulation of Gatherings Act (emphasis added).  
106 S 9(2)(b) of the Regulation of Gatherings Act. The officer must first attempt to disperse the crowd in 
terms of s 9(2)(a). If the crowd does not disperse in the allotted time as provided by the officer in terms 
of s 9(2)(a), the officer may give the order for force in terms of s 9(2)(b).  
107 S 9(2)(c). 
108 Hjul (2013) De Jure 460.  
109 455.  
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discretion is given as the police should have the power to prevent violence and 
property damage before it occurs.  The discretion granted by the Act is not necessarily 
a problem, but the actual exercise of this direction has been seen to be problematic. 
South Africa’s police force have on occasion abused this discretion to carry out acts 
of police brutality and controversial authoritarian practices.110 There are various cases 
where the police escaped liability based on their expressed belief that the protests 
might possibly turn violent. In South Africa, this discretionary power has resulted in the 
death of various protestors who may not have shown such an intent.111 It is also not 
clear whether the relevant police officers have the required training and capacities to 
determine such an intent.112 
The conduct of the police regarding gatherings is not only determined by the 
provisions of section 9, but also by how the police view protest action. Police officers 
frequently abuse the powers afforded to them or misunderstand the provisions due to 
inadequate training.113 Some guidelines have been created to assist police with crowd 
management and performing their duties in terms of the Regulation of Gatherings Act. 
The SAPS Standing Order (General) No. 262 on Crowd Management during 
Gatherings and Demonstrations provides guidelines to police officers on what they 
should do and how they should operate.114 It is a brief document, but provides a 
simpler and more extensive guideline to police officers regarding the process 
                                            
110 J Duncan Protest Nation: the right to protest in South Africa (2016) 26, 52 and 130. See page 124 
particularly, where police are alleged to have used live ammunition because the police considered these 
protests to be “unrest-related”. See also J Burger “To protect and serve: restoring public confidence in 
the SAPS” (2011) 36 SA Crime Quarterly 13 – 22. 
111 Marks & Bruce (2014) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 365-366. Of specific note is the 
death of Andries Tatane at the hands of police at a service delivery protest which gained media 
attention. All the police officers accused of causing his death were acquitted. See M de Waal 
“Remembering Andries Tatane, not forgetting police brutality” (18-04-2011) 
<https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2011-04-18-remembering-andries-tatane-not-forgetting-
police-brutality#.WffqQGiCzIU> (accessed 03-07-2017). The Marikana Protests are also examples of 
police violence which caused deaths. See chapter 2, specifically part 2 4 4 3. 
112 Marks & Bruce (2014) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 360-364. 
113 Hjul (2013) De Jure 455. 
114 The purpose of the Standing Order is to regulate crowd management during gatherings and 
demonstrations in accordance with democratic principles of the Constitution and acceptable 
international standards.  
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contained in the Regulation of Gatherings Act.115 The Policy and Guidelines116 
published by the Ministry of Police provide an indication of how the police view protest 
action and seek to address the problems with regard to gatherings and 
demonstrations. The Policy considers the shortcomings regarding the Public Order 
Policing unit, the lack of training of the police, and the resultant problems with violence 
and intimidation. It recognises the importance of gatherings and assemblies in a 
constitutional democracy, but does not recognise shortcomings beyond a lack of 
training and procedural mistakes in relation to the Act. It also does not address 
problems such as the intentional use by the police of violent and intimidation tactics to 
dissuade protests.117 The police also target and harass those identified as protest 
leaders before a gathering or demonstration occurs.118 Sometimes senior police 
officials instruct lower ranking officials to use forceful and intimidation tactics in order 
to protect their political or economic interests.119 The problem with state repression is 
that it either prevents or dissuades people from participating in gatherings or results in 
participants themselves becoming violent in reaction to state repression.120 The Policy 
documents and Standing Orders may indicate that there has been progress with 
regard to the regulation of gatherings, but in practice these documents are often not 
followed.121 
 
3 3 5 Conclusion: Legislative framework and executive action 
It is evident from the discussion above that the legislative framework places 
formidable obstacles in the way of the exercise of the rights contained in section 17 of 
the Constitution. The Act imposes onerous requirements and places serious 
                                            
115 Section 11(3) of the Standing Order (General) No. 262 on Crowd Management also provides a more 
detailed analysis of when force can be used and what type of force may be used. 
116 Ministry of Police “Policy and Guidelines: Policing of Public Protests, Gatherings and Major Events” 
(2013). 
117 Dawson “Resistance and Repression” in Mobilising Social Justice in South Africa 119-120. 
118 T Madlingozi “Post-Apartheid Social Movements and Legal Mobilisation” in Socio-Economic Rights 
in South Africa: Symbols or Substance? (2013) 110 and 116. See further Dawson “Resistance and 
Repression” in Mobilising Social Justice in South Africa 119-124. 
119 See the Marikana Report 2015 which indicates that there was evidence of collusion between mining 
officials, labour unions and members of the executive in order to supress these protest actions.   
120 Dawson “Resistance and Repression” in Mobilising Social Justice in South Africa 119-120. 
121 Madlingozi “Post-Apartheid Social Movement” in Socio-Economic rights in South Africa 110 and 116. 
See further Dawson “Resistance and Repression” in Mobilising Social Justice in South Africa 119-124. 
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restrictions on organisers of gatherings. In addition, it provides wide discretionary 
powers to local authorities and police. 
 The interpretation and enforcement of the Act by Local Government authorities and 
the police also leave much to be desired. Too often, these authorities use their wide 
discretion to abuse their powers. They also do not abide by the requirements of the 
Act, because they misunderstand the importance of the right to freedom of assembly 
or attempt to usurp the purpose of the Act.  
It is important to analyse the way in which the judiciary interprets the section 17 
right and the Regulation of Gatherings Act. Although the courts have emphasised the 
importance of freedom of assembly in various judgments,122 South African Transport 
and Allied Workers Union v Garvas123 (“SATAWU”) is the leading South African case 
on freedom of assembly. The importance of the judgment lies not only in the 
conclusions reached and orders made by the Constitutional Court, but also in the 
reasoning of that Court – and of the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal before 
it – in relation to freedom of assembly. The SATAWU case indicates how the judiciary 
interacts with freedom of assembly. The analysis above in 3 3 has not discussed 
section 11 of the Act regarding liability of organisers for damages. This was the central 
issue in the SATAWU case and will be dealt with in the course of the analysis of judicial 
interpretations of freedom of assembly. Furthermore, the High Court case of 
Mlungwana is a significant recent case which highlights the criminal sanctions 
imposed by section 12 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act (which was not discussed 
above in 3 3) and the possible unconstitutionality of section 12(1)(a).  
 
 3 4 Analysis of South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas 2013 1 
SA 83 (CC) 
3 4 1 Facts and background 
The South African Transport and Allied Workers Union organised a gathering in 
terms of the Regulation of Gatherings Act on 16 May 2006.124 The gathering followed 
                                            
122 South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 1999 4 SA 469 (CC); S v Mamabolo 
2011 3 SA 409 (CC); Growthpoint Properties Ltd v South Africa Commercial Catering and Allied 
Workers Union (SACCAWU) and Others 2011 1 BCLR 81 (KZD); South African National Defence Union 
v Minister of Defence and Others 2004 4 SA 10 (T). 
123 South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas 2013 1 SA 83 (CC). 
124 Garvis v SATAWU (Minister of Safety and Security, third party) 2010 6 SA 280 (WCC) para 1. 
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on a national strike action within the security industry by members of the union. The 
national strike action – which occurred before the gathering on 16 May 2006 – had 
resulted in the alleged loss of 50 lives.125 The Union had however complied with all the 
procedural requirements of the Regulation of Gatherings Act.126 It had given notice to 
local authorities in terms of section 3 of the Act and had gone through the 
consultation/meeting process in terms of section 4. The Union had also advised its 
members to refrain from unlawful and violent conduct.127 During these consultations, 
the police had also devised an “operational plan”.128 In terms of the Act, the Union had 
complied with all material requirements,129 yet during the organised gathering the 
protest action resulted in damage to the private property of the respondents. The 
respondents sought to hold the Union liable for “riot damages” in terms of section 11(1) 
of the Regulation of Gatherings Act which reads: 
“(1) If any riot damage occurs as a result of- 
   (a)   a gathering, every organization on behalf of or under the auspices of which that 
gathering was held, or, if not so held, the convener; 
   (b)   a demonstration, every person participating in such demonstration, 
shall, subject to subsection (2), be jointly and severally liable for that riot damage as a joint 
wrongdoer contemplated in Chapter II of the Apportionment of Damages Act, 1956 (Act 34 
of 1956), together with any other person who unlawfully caused or contributed to such riot 
damage and any other organization or person who is liable therefor in terms of this 
subsection.”130 
 
It was not denied that private property damage had occurred and the union itself 
conceded that the gathering “descended into chaos”.131 The union therefore raised the 
only defence in terms of the Act, namely the defence contained in section 11(2): 
“(2) It shall be a defence to a claim against a person or organization contemplated in 
subsection (1) if such a person or organization proves –  
(a) that he or it did not permit or connive at the act or omission which caused the 
damage in question; and 
                                            
125 Para 6. 
126 Para 11. 
127 Para 11. 
128 South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas & Others 2011 6 SA 382 (SCA) para 
17. 
129 South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas & Others 2011 6 SA 382 (SCA) para 22 
to 27. The court provides a careful explanation of the procedural requirements of the Act. 
130 Emphasis added. 
131 South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas & Others 2011 6 SA 382 (SCA) para 1.  
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(b) that the act or omission in question did not fall within the scope of the objectives         
of the gathering or demonstration in question and was not reasonably foreseeable; and 
      (c) that he or it took all reasonable steps within his or its power to prevent the act or    
       omission in question: Provided that proof that he or it forbade an act of the kind in    
       question shall not by itself be regarded as sufficient proof that he or it took all   
       reasonable steps to prevent the act in question.” 
 
The Union reasoned that it had taken all reasonable steps to ensure that the 
gathering took place “peacefully and without incident”.132 It argued that section 11(2) 
should be read to mean that, if it had taken all reasonable steps to prevent what was 
reasonably foreseeable, then any damage which occurred would be outside the 
spectrum of what it could have done to prevent it.133 In the alternative, the Union also 
contended that although such steps were taken, the defence in section 11(2) was 
unavailable because of the qualification contained in section 11(2)(b), namely that “the 
act or omission was not reasonably foreseeable”. The contention was firstly that the 
words “was not reasonably foreseeable” cause section 11(2)(b) to be internally 
inconsistent and irrational, thus rendering it constitutionally invalid.134 The main 
contention related to the relation between section 11(2)(b) and (c), and the inclusion 
of the word “and”. The inclusion of “and” required the Union to satisfy both 
requirements for the defence to succeed. However, the contention was that it is 
impossible to take reasonable steps to prevent an act that must also be reasonably 
unforeseeable. In addition, the union contended that section 11(2) leads to extensive 
liability and would have the effect of infringing on the constitutional right to assemble 
and demonstrate. It submitted that section 11 had a chilling effect on section 17 of the 
Constitution as organizations would be deterred from protesting if there was a 
possibility of such liability being attached to them.  
 
                                            
132 Para 21. Counsel for the Union indicated that all steps were taken in terms of the Act (section 3, 4 
and 5) and additionally all steps were taken to ensure that the “foreseeable damage” that might occur 
would not occur. Therefore, the union accepted that they foresaw the possibility, but took all reasonable 
steps to prevent the act that caused such damage. 
133 Woolman “My tea party, your mob, our social contract” (2011) SAJHR 350-351.  
134 South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas 2013 1 SA 83 (CC) para 26. 
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3 4 2 High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal 
The judgments of the High Court and the Supreme Court Appeal were quite similar, 
both in terms of their reasoning and the order made. For this reason, this analysis 
deals with the most important issues dealt with by both courts.  
The manner in which the courts set out the facts of the case is significant. The High 
Court contextualises the facts by stating that the gathering escalated into a full-scale 
riot.135 The court also mentions that the march was organised within a volatile milieu.136 
The court seems to accept that gatherings and riots are closely related. It does not 
emphasise the importance of the right in a democracy, but appears to view the right 
as having an inherently negative destabilising character. The court views 
destabilisation and disturbance as a social ill. Gatherings lead to riots. Riots cause 
damage. Therefore, the right to protest is a danger. This type of presumptive language 
and reasoning by the courts indicate that “freedom” of assembly is only a freedom if 
there are no indications of any disturbance.  
Both courts set out the detailed procedure necessary to organise a gathering.137 
Both courts use these provisions in order to provide context to section 11 of the Act 
and both courts accept that the Union has done everything required in order to proceed 
with the gathering in terms of the Act.138 The court accepts that the prescribed process 
of organising a gathering (providing for notice, negotiations, consultations etc.) was 
designed to minimise the risk of any problems occurring. The reason why the process 
involving the conveners, police and local authority is so arduous and extensive, is to 
ensure that all parties involved can cover all possible occurrences. Interestingly, the 
court accepts that the union has done this, but still concludes that it is liable. 
Consequently, organisers need to do more to escape liability than only meeting the 
procedural requirements laid down in the Act.  
The main contention of the Union, that the words “was not reasonably foreseeable” 
cause section 11(2)(b) to be internally inconsistent and irrational, thus rendering it 
constitutionally invalid, was rejected by both courts. The Supreme Court of Appeal’s 
                                            
135 Garvis v SATAWU (Minister of Safety and Security, third party) 2010 6 SA 280 (WCC) para 5. 
136 Para 6. 
137 The High Court does so in paras 12 to 17 in its judgment, while the Supreme Court of Appeal does 
so in paras 22 to 25 of its judgment.  
138 South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas & Others 2011 6 SA 382 (SCA) para 
27.  
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reasoning in terms of this contention is quite important. The court invokes several 
“imaginary” scenarios, in which the convener could not and would not have reasonably 
foreseen certain circumstances and therefore would not be held liable.139 But these 
scenarios are not a true reflection of all the possibilities of protest action. They only 
cover instances where the act causing the damage is not foreseeable, and not ones 
where the organisers foresee such an act or an omission and guard against it, but 
where the act or omission still occurs. The Union raised the argument that in many 
cases the conveners and police foresee the possibility of violence and that the 
convener would therefore be held liable if such violence occurs, irrespective of the 
measures it took to prevent it. The Supreme Court of Appeal reasoned that in such 
cases where violence is foreseeable and there are arguably no measures to prevent 
such violence, the gathering should not be continued.140 Organisers who persist and 
go ahead would be liable.141 The “chilling effect” of section 11(2)(b) on section 17 was 
concluded to be unsubstantiated.142 The courts determined that the regularity of 
protest action contradicts allegations regarding this “chilling effect”. The chilling effect 
is on unlawful behaviour rather than the organisers who plan to exercise their right 
within the confines of section 17.143 This conclusion is flawed. The courts are 
disconnected from the reality of protest action and those who participate in protest 
action. The rise in protest action is not because organisers do not foresee the 
possibility of liability. The time and effort which is required to organise protests is an 
indication that organisers foresee the possibility of liability and attempt to prevent it. 
However, even with the risk of liability as a deterrent, organisers continue because 
they view gatherings as an inherent part of democratic culture.144  
The High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal’s main reason for determining 
that section 17 of the Constitution is not limited is because the right in section 17 only 
protects protests which are “peaceful”.145 The courts reasoned that section 11 of the 
                                            
139 Paras 36-42. 
140 Para 43. 
141 Para 43. 
142 Para 50. 
143 Para 43. 
144 S Woolman “Freedom of Assembly” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) in Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2 ed (OS 2007) 43-14.  
145 South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas & Others 2011 6 SA 382 (SCA) para 
48; Garvis v SATAWU (Minister of Safety and Security, third party) 2010 6 SA 280 (WCC) para 29. 
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Act deals with gatherings which cause riot damage and therefore the liability imposed 
is in relation to violent or riotous gatherings.146 The courts simply used the internal 
modifier “peaceful” to conclude that section 17 is not limited as the gathering which 
causes “riot damage” is not peaceful. This approach is problematic. Firstly, neither the 
High Court nor the Supreme Court of Appeal attempts to interpret what section 17 
means by “peaceful”. The courts view the right to assemble as “an essential feature of 
democratic society”,147 but do not analyse the right in order to determine the nature 
and scope of freedom of assembly in a constitutional democracy. No attempt is made 
to interpret “peaceful” in the South African context or in comparison with international 
instruments or foreign constitutions. When considering “the nature of the right” (in 
accordance with section 36 limitation analysis),148 the High Court judge only states 
that the “right implicated is enshrined in s 17 of the Constitution. The right is afforded 
to organisations and/or trade unions to assembly, demonstrate, picket and petition”. 
Secondly, the courts accept that “riot damage” means damage caused by violent 
crowd action.149 However, the definition of riot damage150 does not refer to peace or 
violence. It simply refers to “any damage/loss” caused by the “holding of a gathering”. 
Therefore, if riot damage is given its meaning as the legislature has defined it, it is 
wide enough to include damage caused either by peaceful or violent gatherings.151 
This has far reaching consequences for the exercise of section 17 rights.  
                                            
146 South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas & Others 2011 6 SA 382 (SCA) para 48 
and 52; Garvis v SATAWU (Minister of Safety and Security, third party) 2010 6 SA 280 (WCC) para 29 
and 51. 
147 South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas & Others 2011 6 SA 382 (SCA) para 
47. 
148 Garvis v SATAWU (Minister of Safety and Security, third party) 2010 6 SA 280 (WCC) para 48. 
Judge Hlophe concluded that there had been no limitation of the right, but the court nevertheless 
engaged with section 36 to reinforce its opinion that “even if” there was a limitation, it would be in 
accordance with section 36 of the Constitution.  
149 South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas & Others 2011 6 SA 382 (SCA) para 
52.  
150 The Regulation of Gatherings Act defines riot damage as:  
 “any loss suffered as a result of any injury to or the death of any person, or any damage to or 
destruction of any property, caused directly or indirectly by, and immediately before, during or after, 
the holding of a gathering.”  
151 SATAWU para 134. In the minority judgment, Jafta J disagrees with the Supreme Court of Appeal 
regarding its interpretation of “riot damage”. Jafta J states that definitions included in legislation should 
be confined to the defined meaning.  
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The courts’ conclusion regarding the limitation of the right to assembly is also 
noteworthy. The High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal both indicate that the 
limitation in terms of section 11(2) is a “small price to pay”.152 This is disconcerting, 
particularly within the context of a limitation that could have a chilling effect on the 
exercise of a right that is fundamental to constitutional democracy. The courts’ failure 
to analyse the nature and importance of the right firstly indicates that they under-
appreciate the role of protest action and gatherings in South Africa’s constitutional 
democracy. Secondly, it shows the courts’ caution in the face of the destabilising 
effects protest action may have on the constitutional order.153 Thirdly, the courts seem 
to be disconnected from the reality of the participants in gatherings,154 as they do not 
inquire into the seriousness of the issues that give rise to the protest actions. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal does mention that “the reasons for the riot ought to be 
properly explored by the trial court in due course. This court has repeatedly warned 
that piecemeal litigation is not to be encouraged”.155 However, this would not qualify 
as piecemeal litigation as it is difficult to separate the reasons for protest from the 
protest itself. There is an inherent link between the purpose of protest action and the 
importance of the right itself. It is important for the court to be able to contextualise the 
protest action in order to determine if such a limitation truly is reasonable and 
justifiable. There is an inherent link between the urgency of the issues surrounding the 
purpose of the gathering, and the destabilising or disturbing nature of these 
gatherings. By not attempting to grapple with the realities which give rise to the protest, 
the court is in danger of making the section 36 limitations analysis far removed from 
the realities of those actually exercising the right.  
 
3 4 3 Constitutional Court  
The judgment of the Constitutional Court is an improvement on the lower courts’ 
judgments regarding the analysis of section 17 of the Constitution. The judgment also 
provides a more comprehensive analysis of the Regulation of Gatherings Act and 
                                            
152 Garvis v SATAWU (Minister of Safety and Security, third party) 2010 6 SA 280 (WCC) para 45; 
South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas & Others 2011 6 SA 382 (SCA) para 49. 
153 Woolman (2011) SAJHR 349.  
154 352.  
155 South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas 2013 1 SA 83 (CC) para 45.  
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gives greater clarity regarding the importance of the fundamental right. However, the 
conclusions drawn by the Constitutional Court are still problematic. 
The majority judgment firstly deals with the contention that the words “was not 
reasonably foreseeable” cause section 11(2)(b) to be internally inconsistent and 
irrational, thus rendering it constitutionally invalid. In sketching the background to 
section 11(2), the court finds that the intention of the legislature was to make the 
defence “deliberately tight” because the nature of protest calls for “extraordinary 
measures to curb potential harm”.156 It is interesting to note that although the court 
mentions that this is an “unusual” defence,157 it still concludes that it is rational to put 
the burden on the organiser to avoid liability. The objective of the legislature was that 
organisers should be aware of the possible harm and if such harm occurs, it “would 
be placed at their doorstep”.158 The court emphasises that section 11(2)(a), (b) and (c) 
must be read together. Organisers should always be alive to the possibility of 
damage.159 In every step organisers should be wary of the possibility and therefore 
take steps to avoid such damage. The process of determining if the reasonable steps 
were sufficient (in terms of section 11(2)(c)) to make the act “unforeseeable”, in terms 
of section 11(2)(b), might be “very exacting”.160 The court concludes that the defence 
is “deliberately tight” and “very exacting”. It is therefore not enough to comply with the 
requirements of sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Act in relation to organising a gathering. The 
defence in section 11 requires that organisers do more. They must use their 
imagination to conjure up possibilities of damage at all times.161 Beyond this, they must 
put steps in place to prevent such possibilities.  The scenarios used by the Supreme 
                                            
156 South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas 2013 1 SA 83 (CC) para 38.  
157 Para 38. 
158 South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas 2013 1 SA 83 (CC) para 38. In para 39 
the court provides, from its perspective, the purpose behind section 11(2), namely: 
“the purpose was (i) to provide for the statutory liability of organisations, so as to avoid the common 
law difficulties associated with proving the existence of a legal duty on the organisation to avoid 
harm; (ii) to afford the organiser a tighter defence, allowing it to rely on the absence of reasonable 
foreseeability and the taking of reasonable steps as a defence to the imposition of liability; and (iii) 
to place the onus on the defendant to prove this defence, instead of requiring the plaintiff to 
demonstrate the defendant’s wrongdoing and fault.” 
159 South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas 2013 1 SA 83 (CC) para 44. 
160 Para 44. 
161 S Woolman “You Break it, You Own it: South African Assembly Jurisprudence after Garvis” (2015) 
9 Vienna J. on Int'l Const. L 560-561. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
70 
 
Court of Appeal were also mentioned in the Constitutional Court judgment. The court 
used these examples to find that section 11(2) was not irrational. However, these 
scenarios (as discussed above) are quite unrealistic as a basis to decide whether the 
defence is rational in all cases. They do not deal with the intricacies of protest action 
and the various ways in which these numerous possibilities may occur.  Although the 
court deals separately with the limitation of section 17, it is interesting to note that the 
court does not mention the section 17 right at all in paragraph 34 to 49 dealing with 
irrationality. The statute is so inherently linked to section 17 and to conclude that it 
meets the constitutional standard of rationality without reference to the nature of 
section 17 is questionable.162 
Unlike the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal, the Constitutional Court 
found that there was a limitation of section 17. Importantly, the court dealt with the 
internal modifier “peaceful”. It found that section 17 should be interpreted 
generously.163 The right to assemble is only lost once the holders of the right show no 
intention of acting peacefully.164 Therefore, participants and organisers who continue 
to exercise their right to assemble with a peaceful intent, will not lose such protection 
where there are isolated acts of unlawful behaviour.165 The court then concluded that, 
based on the definition of “riot damage”, even those gathered with a peaceful intent 
would be liable under the act where there has been damage.166 This is a significant 
limitation on the right to freedom of assembly. Considering the statements made by 
the court regarding the broad interpretation that should be afforded to the internal 
modifier of peaceful, this limitation is quite severe. It is difficult to reconcile the court’s 
broad interpretation regarding the internal modifier of “peaceful” in the text of section 
17 of the Constitution and its conclusion that the section 11 limitation of the Act can 
result in liability for the organisers, particularly where their overall intent is peaceful.  
So therefore, even where organisers protest “peacefully and unarmed”, they are still 
held liable for damages resulting from isolated acts of unlawful behaviour.  
The court also accepted that section 11 causes a significant increase in the cost of 
organising a gathering and that many people or poorly resourced organisations may 
                                            
162 Woolman (2015) Vienna J. on Int'l Const. L 560-562. 
163 South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas 2013 1 SA 83 (CC) para 53. 
164 Para 53. 
165 Para 53. 
166 Para 56. 
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therefore be greatly limited in organising gatherings and exercising their section 17 
rights.167 The mere possibility of harm caused by a minority in the group limits the 
rights of a vast number of participants through the possibility of liability in terms of 
section 11(2).168 The court recognised that this also amounted to a limitation of section 
17.  
In its analysis of the nature and importance of the right (in terms of the section 36 
limitation analysis) the court continued with its “generous” interpretation. The court 
emphasised the importance of the right and stated that “the right to freedom of 
assembly is central to our constitutional democracy.  It exists primarily to give a voice 
to the powerless”.169 This seems to suggest that groups with no power need this right 
to participate in a democracy. The court continued by stating that “this right will, in 
many cases, be the only mechanism available to them to express their legitimate 
concerns”.170 If this is the only mechanism available, then a limitation of this right would 
be very serious indeed in circumstances where these groups have no other viable 
mechanisms to participate. The court also linked the right to assemble to the exercise 
of other rights. It stated that “in assessing the nature and importance of the right, we 
cannot therefore ignore its foundational relevance to the exercise and achievement of 
all other rights”.171 However, the court did not explore these other rights, or analyse 
the values which underlie freedom of assembly. Specifically, in the case at hand, the 
link between freedom of assembly, labour rights and socio-economic rights was not 
analysed at all. Despite this, the Court’s discussion of the importance of the right 
seems to place freedom of assembly in a fundamental position in our constitutional 
democracy. The court recognises that there may be a limitation on its exercise, but 
such limitation must not be “without good reason”.172 The purpose sought to be 
achieved through the limitation must be sufficiently important to warrant the limitation. 
The purpose of the current limitation(s) is to “protect members of society, including 
those who do not have the resources or capability to identify and pursue the 
                                            
167 Para 57. 
168 Para 58. 
169 Para 58. 
170 Para 58 (emphasis added). 
171 Para 61. 
172 Para 66. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
72 
 
perpetrators of the riot damage for which they seek compensation”.173 The purpose is 
to protect the “physical integrity, the lives and sources of livelihood” of the 
“vulnerable”.174 This purpose is important. However, the conclusion of the court 
regarding such importance is problematic for several reasons. Firstly, the court makes 
reference to the “organisation” which organises the protest. Although, in the case at 
hand South African Transport and Allied Workers Union was a large trade union, there 
are many cases where those who organise do not have such resources as established 
organisations. The court creates the impression that it is the vulnerable individual who 
must be protected by the large organisation. However, the organisers of protest action 
are often individuals or organisations with no resources or power. Secondly, the court 
emphasises the importance of protecting the livelihood of the vulnerable. However, 
the participants and organisers of gatherings are themselves often vulnerable.  
The court also states, in view of the importance of the purpose of the limitation, that 
the “organization always has a choice between exercising the right to assemble and 
cancelling the gathering in the light of the reasonably foreseeable damage”.175 This is 
difficult to square with the statement that protests may be the only mechanism for 
participants to exercise their rights. A decision not to exercise the right to assemble as 
a result of the fear that the organisers may incur liability for any damages arising from 
the protest, may therefore place a significant restriction on the ability of vulnerable 
groups to enforce their rights. Often, these rights may be closely connected with their 
own livelihood, as is the case with labour rights and socio-economic rights. 
The problematic nature of the choice between exercising the right to assemble and 
cancelling the gathering is also evident from the court’s analysis of the nature and 
extent of the limitation. The court states that “potentially, the exercise of the right also 
occasions deterrent consequences.  One of them is the presumption of liability for riot 
damage, which can be traced back to the organization’s decision to exercise the right 
to assemble”.176 The court finds that although this is a chilling effect, it does not deny 
the right to freedom of assembly.177 This is debatable, as the deterrent effect of 
extensive liability could effectively amount to a denial of this right.  
                                            
173 Para 67. 
174 Para 67. 
175 Para 68 (emphasis added). 
176 Para 69 (emphasis added). 
177 South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas 2013 1 SA 83 (CC) para 69. 
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The Constitutional Court judgment is an improvement on the High Court and 
Supreme Court of Appeal judgments. The court gives section 17 a more generous 
interpretation and places greater emphasis on the nature of the right and its 
importance. And yet, the judgment is problematic, as it assumes that the organisers 
of gatherings are well-resourced organisations, underplays the invasive nature of the 
limitation, and underestimates its chilling effect on the right to assemble. This judgment 
is indicative of a very restrictive view of freedom of assembly within a constitutional 
democracy. The court seems to sidestep the important inquiry into the everyday reality 
of protest action in South Africa and how the chilling effect has a vast impact on the 
voices of millions of South Africans. The judiciary examines the meaning and 
importance of assembly in the Act by focussing on the legislative intent.178 This is 
surprising considering that the Act was promulgated before the introduction of the Final 
Constitution.  
While there are various aspects in this series of judgments which are problematic, 
the recent case of Mlungwana and the pending Constitutional Court judgment may 
provide a significant development. The recent High Court judgment of Mlungwana 
specifically dealt with the harsh consequences of criminal sanctions in section 12(1)(a) 
and its unconstitutionality. 
 
3 5 Criminal Liability in terms of the Regulation of Gatherings Act: S v Mlungwana  
3 5 1 The facts, section 3 and section 12(1)(a) of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 
The appellants were convicted in the Cape Town Magistrates Court of contravening 
section 12(1)(a) of the Regulation of Gatherings Act.179 Section 12 provides as follows: 
 
Offences and penalties  
(1) Any person who-  
(a) convenes a gathering in respect of which no notice or no adequate notice was 
given in accordance with the provisions of section 3; 
shall be guilty of an offence and on conviction liable-  
(i) in the case of a contravention referred to in paragraphs (a) to (j), to a fine or to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year or to both such fine and such 
imprisonment; and  
                                            
178 See specifically where the court focuses on the intention of the legislature to make the defence 
“deliberately tight” because the nature of protest calls for “extraordinary measures to curb potential 
harm” in para 38 of South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas 2013 1 SA 83 (CC).  
179 S v Mlungwana 2018 1 SACR 538 (WCC) para 3-5 and para 12. 
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(ii) in the case of a contravention referred to in paragraph (k), to a fine or to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years. 
 
The appellants organised a demonstration.180 They specifically intended the 
number of the participants to be under the threshold of 15 to ensure that it would qualify 
as a demonstration.181 They would therefore not have to provide notice to the 
municipality, as required by section 3 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act. However, 
the appellants were aware that there was a risk that the demonstration may evolve to 
a gathering where a greater number of people would participate.182 The protest 
occurred on 11 September 2013. While it began with 15 participants, others joined 
and it did eventually go beyond the number of 15 people.183 The protest was peaceful 
and non-armed.184  
As highlighted above, the Regulation of Gatherings Act requires notification of a 
gathering to the local authority.185 These notification requirements are burdensome, 
but are exacerbated when coupled with a potential criminal conviction. The appellants 
challenged the criminalisation of a person who convenes a gathering without giving 
notice.186 They accepted that the notice requirement served a legitimate purpose, but 
argued that the criminalisation of a failure to do so deterred people from gathering.187  
The following section will briefly discuss the finding of the High Court and provide a 
similarly brief comment on the pending Constitutional Court case, based on supporting 
documentation of the various parties.  
                                            
180 The appellants are members of the Social Justice Coalition. The demonstration was directed at the 
Mayor of the City of Cape Town and was a demonstration which dealt with service delivery and 
specifically sanitation facilities. See S v Mlungwana 2018 1 SACR 538 (WCC) para 8.  
181 Para 22 of M Bishop “Appellants Heads of Argument” in S v Mlungwana 2018 1 SACR 538 (WCC) 
and para 16 and 17 of M Bishop “Applicants Heads of Argument” in Mlungwana and Others v S and 
Another CCT32/18. 
182 Para 22-23 of M Bishop “Appellants Heads of Argument” in S v Mlungwana 2018 1 SACR 538 (WCC) 
and para 16-17 of M Bishop “Applicants Heads of Argument” in Mlungwana and Others v S and Another 
CCT32/18. 
183 Para 10-11. 
184 Para 11.  
185 See above part 3 3 2 Section 3, 4, 5 and 6. See also S v Mlungwana 2018 1 SACR 538 (WCC) para 
22-28. 
186 S v Mlungwana 2018 1 SACR 538 (WCC) para 20.  
187 Para 20.  
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3 5 2 The (un)constitutionality of section 12(1)(a)  
The High Court declared section 12(1)(a) of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 
unconstitutional. It found that the “effect of the section 12(1)(a) sanctions appears to 
be quite chilling. This is so because of the well-known calamitous effects of a previous 
conviction recorded against an individual”.188 After finding that section 17 of the 
Constitution was limited, the court then continued to determine whether the limitation 
was justifiable in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.  
In analysing the justification of this limitation the court found that, although the 
nature and importance of the right cannot be overemphasised, the limitation did in fact 
serve a legitimate government purpose in that the exercise of the right must be done 
with “due regard to the rights of others”.189 In this regard, it referred to various 
submissions made by the State. The State submitted that the deterrence of non-
notified gatherings – through criminalisation – serves a legitimate government purpose 
“in that there is a greater risk in non-notified gatherings not being peaceful and 
unarmed and thereby infringing the s 17 right that vests in all persons”.190 Additionally, 
the State submitted that the notification requirement provides the police and the local 
authority with the opportunity to organise and plan in order to protect the safety and 
order of society.191 The court however found that the nature and extent of the limitation 
was to chill free speech.192 The court held that “the effect of the limitation therefore is 
not only to punish the conveners for failing to serve a notice; it is also to deter people 
from exercising their right to free assembly”.193 In making this finding, the court made 
reference to submissions made by the applicant and submissions made by amici 
curiae.194 These submissions focussed on the importance of the right to assemble in 
the international law context. Furthermore, it was submitted that failure to notify, in 
itself, should not result in sanctions. This is especially true where the failure to notify 
                                            
188 Para 42.  
189 Para 55.  
190 Para 50.  
191 Para 51- 52. 
192 Para 84.  
193 Para 84.  
194 The first amicus (Open Society Justice Initiative) and the second amicus (United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association) made specific reference 
to various International law instruments. See para 60- 74 of S v Mlungwana 2018 1 SACR 538 (WCC).  
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does not result in harm or disruption where there is no violence.195 The court therefore 
found that there is a legitimate governmental purpose served by a notice requirement, 
as it helps enable the government to fulfil its positive obligations, but that a criminal 
sanction for non-notified gatherings does not serve a legitimate governmental 
purpose.  
The court made the following comment with regard to the collective nature of protest 
action and the importance of protest in relation to the exercise of other rights: 
“Ms Mlungwana's evidence establishes that the Khayelitsha community had for several 
years bemoaned and decried the state of ablution facilities without getting a satisfactory 
response from the City of Cape   Town. According to her evidence, the current facilities 
have resulted in opportunistic criminal elements taking advantage of those using the 
outside toilets, more especially during the night. The gathering which forms the subject-
matter of this appeal was organised to draw attention to their plight. It appears from the 
charge-sheet that most of the appellants (also the conveners) are residents of Khayelitsha. 
From the aforegoing it is easy to discern that, central to the people's exercise of the s 17 
rights, the call to mobilise and organise a demonstration is pivotal. It can be accepted that 
those who make the clarion call for people to come together in order to demonstrate their 
dissatisfaction must, in addition to being members of the SJC, be leaders in their 
communities, otherwise they would not, in my view, have the clout to make the 
call.  Bearing in mind that the right of assembly enables people to access their other 
constitutional rights, the role played by the conveners cannot be overemphasised.”196  
 
From the above, it is clear that the court considered the context of the case. The 
court highlighted the relationship between the Government (City of Cape Town) and 
society (Khayelitsha community).  Moreover, the court highlighted the role of protest in 
enforcing and protecting other human rights. Accordingly, the court found that section 
12(1)(a) violated section 17 of the Constitution and that such a limitation was not 
reasonable in an open and democratic society based on the values of freedom, dignity 
and equality.197  
                                            
195 See Para 70 and 83-84 23 of M Bishop “Appellants Heads of Argument” in S v Mlungwana 2018 1 
SACR 538 (WCC) 
196 S v Mlungwana 2018 1 SACR 538 (WCC) para 92.  
197 Para 94. The court also provided that those who will most likely be affected by this criminalising 
section are those who are already in a particularly weaker position. See para 92 where the court states  
“Furthermore, it cannot be seriously contested that, in the context of South African society, those 
most likely to fall foul of s 12(1)(a) are the very communities previously disadvantaged as they, to a 
certain extent, remain the voiceless." 
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Mlungwana is an important judgment as it firstly provides a useful analysis of the 
notice requirements of the Regulation of Gatherings Act. Furthermore, it confirms that 
protest action is a vitally important part of South Africa’s democratic dialogue and that 
any limitation must be legitimate and justified. The matter has been taken on appeal 
to the Constitutional Court. As of yet, the Constitutional Court has not handed down 
judgment. The hearing date was 21 August 2018. 
  
3 5 3 The nature of criminal liability,198 the State and protest action 
3 5 3 1 SATAWU and Mlungwana: Criminal and Civil Liability  
An important distinction must be drawn between SATAWU and Mlungwana. While 
in SATAWU, the focus was on civil liability of conveners and recourse for those who 
suffered actual loss/damage, the Mlungwana matter specifically deals with criminal 
liability where no notice is given. The distinction between civil and criminal liability is 
an important one. The SATAWU civil sanction was for actual harm (such as “riot 
damage”). In Mlungwana it is about a criminal sanction for potential harm irrespective 
of whether any harm had occurred or not. Furthermore, irrespective of whether the 
conduct of the gathering is in line with the Act – and whether such conduct is peaceful 
and unarmed as required by the Constitution – criminal liability may still follow for those 
who organise such a gathering.  
 As recognised in the judgment, criminal liability is a harsh consequence that may 
come “with the loss of liberty, and the effect of a previous conviction impacts very 
negatively on one's future employment, travel, or study prospects”.199 The court also 
found that criminal conviction leaves “an indelible mark” on the appellants, “hampering 
almost every aspect of their lives”.200 Given the severe consequences of a criminal 
conviction, the Legislature will only criminalise conduct in specific circumstances. 
Beyond the obstacles imposed on organising a protest, the additional hurdle of a 
potential criminal liability places protest action, which may be peacefully exercised, 
squarely outside the bounds of a legitimate exercise of democratic participation. It is 
                                            
198 It must be noted that section 12(1)(a) is not the only section in the Regulation of Gatherings Act 
which gives rise to a possible criminal sanction. See particularly section 12(1)(a)-(e).  
199 Par 80. 
200 Para 92.  
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therefore clear that the legislature views the organisers of and participants in protest 
action as potential criminals rather than citizens exercising their constitutional rights.  
Notably, SATAWU concerned a dispute that arose between private parties. 
Mlungwana, by contrast, is a criminal case, which deals with the specific power 
relationship and dynamic between the State and individuals. The respondents in the 
Constitutional Court case are the State (as first respondent) and the Minister of Police 
(as second respondent).201 The arguments put forward by the State in supporting the 
constitutionality of section 12(1)(a) provide a useful perspective on how the State 
views protest action. A few important points raised by the State in their heads of 
argument must be analysed and commented on.  
 
3 5 3 2 Heads of Argument of the State and perspective on protests 
The State’s argument before the Constitutional Court can be summarised with 
reference to a few excerpts from the Heads of Argument. Firstly, their argument is 
based on a few separate and interlocking contentions: 
 
“(a) the giving of notice serves a legitimate government objective of ensuring that proper 
planning may occur so as to ultimately facilitate the exercise of the right protected by 
section 17 of the Constitution; (b) the giving of notice imposes modest requirements on the 
person(s) convening a gathering; and (c) the law provides as a defence to such a charge, 
that the gathering concerned took place spontaneously.”202 (emphasis added) 
 
Furthermore, an important point put forward by the Minister is that  
 
“criminalising the conduct of a convenor who fails to give notice serves as a deterrent to 
the convening of un-notified gatherings, which bear a higher risk of not being peaceful; 
facilitates the proper allocation of scarce police resources and in so doing, ultimately serves 
to give effect to the rights protected by section 17 of the Constitution.”203 (emphasis added) 
 
It is clear from these statements that the State embraces a specific understanding 
of protest action. It is focussed primarily on the potential danger that protests present 
                                            
201 Para 1 of K Pillay and M Mokhoaetsi “Heads of Argument on behalf of the First and Second 
Respondent” in Mlungwana v S and the Minister of Police CCT 32/18. 
202 Para 3 of K Pillay and M Mokhoaetsi “Heads of Argument on behalf of the First and Second 
Respondent” in Mlungwana v S and the Minister of Police CCT 32/18.   
203 Para 3.  
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to the State. The State does not provide a basis for its contention that un-notified 
gatherings bear a greater risk, and balloons the potential risk rather than focusing on 
the importance of the right itself. Protest action is seen as a hindrance which should 
be controlled. Notably, the State, in its Heads of Argument, does not focus on the 
importance of freedom of assembly in a democratic society, or the consequences of 
criminalisation. Central to their enquiry is not the citizens who exercise the right, but 
the ability of the police to exercise their powers and the allocation of sources.  
The State’s restrictive view on protest action is typified by its response to the 
Applicants’ contention that the notice requirement, in practice, is in fact an application 
process rather than a notice requirement.204 It submits that  
“it is clear that the Gatherings Act contemplates a notice procedure. If there is a complaint 
that that process as applied in practice is too onerous or that it amounts to more than what 
the legislation prescribes, we submit that the Applicants’ complaint lies elsewhere.”205  
 
This response demonstrates the Executive’s lack of concern for the practical problems 
experienced by the organisers of protests, and for the capacity of criminalisation to 
deter the exercise of freedom of assembly. In the State’s view, the perceived threat of 
protest action justifies criminal sanction even where the protest may turn out to be 
peaceful and unarmed.206 The act of not notifying is enough to label an organiser a 
criminal because of the potential risk. The State does not even investigate the balance 
between the consequence of criminal sanction and the importance of the exercise of 
the right.  
   
 3 6 Conclusion 
While it is evident that freedom of assembly has an important role to play in South 
Africa’s constitutional democracy, the ideal of section 17 of the Constitution and the 
reality of the regulation of protests in South Africa are far removed from each other. 
The Regulation of Gatherings Act is problematic, and so is its enforcement by local 
authorities and the police and its interpretation by the courts. 
                                            
204 See above part 3 3 2. 
205 Para 46.1 of K Pillay and M Mokhoaetsi “Heads of Argument on behalf of the First and Second 
Respondent” in Mlungwana v S and the Minister of Police CCT 32/18. 
206 Para 53 of S v Mlungwana 2018 1 SACR 538 (WCC). 
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The legislative framework seems out of touch with the centrality of protests to 
democratic contestation in South Africa. The distinction made between 
demonstrations and gatherings is problematic; and the requirements relating to 
notification are onerous. Legislative provisions relating to the liability of the organisers 
of gatherings also have serious implications for the right to assemble. Furthermore, 
local authorities and police often act in an arbitrary manner and use the powers 
bestowed on them to deny the exercise of the right. SATAWU seems to illustrate that 
the judiciary also tends to take a restrictive view of freedom of assembly. Despite 
emphasising the importance of protests in a democracy, the courts seem to distance 
themselves from the disruptive potential of protests in creating spaces for participation 
outside the normal institutional forums.  
Protests exist at the periphery of democratic thought and participation. Freedom of 
assembly, viewed through the lens of constitutional values like freedom and equality, 
should allow for contestation and plurality. It should not allow the police and executive 
authority to repress these spaces of disruption and contestation. While the Mlungwana 
judgment does provide an important improvement on SATAWU in the broader context 
of section 17, it also paints a picture of a State which has a very restrictive view of 
protest action. Here the State uses the procedural requirement of notification as a 
basis for control through the deterrent of potential criminal liability. The Executive 
seems to view protests as a hindrance which requires police control and management 
rather than as an important vehicle for democratic participation. Assemblies and 
demonstrations should allow for a democratic space controlled and prompted by those 
participating or organising (such as conveners). The importance of these conveners 
should not be understated, as they help to provide a space for the citizenry to 
participate in democratic dialogue. The criminalisation of their actions has severe 
consequences for the ideal of an active and engaged citizenry.  
There is a tension between state authority and protests, but this tension should be 
viewed as an inherent part of democracy. In a country with substantial economic and 
political inequality, contestation should be recognised as an important part of 
democratic participation rather than as a hindrance to the police, local government or 
the rule of law.  
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Chapter 4 
4    Freedom of assembly: direct and representative democracy 
4 1 Introduction 
This chapter and the next one seek to understand how understandings of freedom 
of assembly are informed by different models of democracy. Two broad 
understandings of democracy will be highlighted in this chapter, namely direct 
democracy and representative democracy.1 These models are often contrasted to 
one another.  
The chapter starts with a brief discussion of the meaning of democracy, both 
generally and within the South African context. It then distinguishes between direct 
and representative democracy. The two models are discussed separately: in both 
cases, a brief historical context is provided, and their specific characteristics are 
identified. The link between freedom of assembly and these forms of democracy is 
examined, with reference to academic literature. The question is posed whether and 
to what extent these understandings of democracy enable an adequate understanding 
of freedom of assembly in the South African context.   
It must be noted that there are various conceptions of democracy which are often 
identified with, or used to supplement, the broad notions of representative and direct 
democracy.2 These include ideas such as participatory, deliberative and agonistic 
democracy. These conceptions of democracy are not discussed in this chapter, but 
will be examined in chapter five. The present chapter therefore examines 
representative democracy through the lens of more conventional interpretations, 
which typically understand it in fairly restrictive or formalistic terms. It further 
juxtaposes this conception with the so-called “pure” form of democracy, namely direct 
democracy.  
 
                                            
1 T Roux “Democracy” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (RS 6 
2013) 10-2. 
2 D Held Models of democracy 3rd ed (2006) 4. 
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4 2 Democracy and South Africa  
Democracy is commonly defined as “a form of government in which, in 
contradistinction to monarchies and aristocracies, the people rule”.3 While there have 
been various attempts to define democracy, central to these definitions is the ideal 
that “the people rule”. The original Greek word demokratia literally means rule (kratos) 
by the people (demos).4 However, there is disagreement about what exactly it means 
to say that the people rule, and how this is to be achieved. As a result, the term 
democracy has come to be qualified by a variety of adjectives, each of which signifies 
a particular model, conception or form of democracy.5 All concepts of democracy 
place the people at the centre of this form of government. Democracy is sometimes 
also described as a “political ideal” whereby decisions are binding on members of a 
society (or community) through the process of collective decision making.6 The 
manner in which the people exercise their sovereign power is an important key to the 
various understandings of democracy.  
Held further points out that democracy “entails a political community in which there 
is some form of political equality among the people”.7 To a certain extent, this ideal 
is defined by the phrase “one person, one vote”.8 This phrase was central to the 
revolutionary politics of the African National Congress and the anti-apartheid 
struggle.9 It was used to describe a government which would be truly representative 
of the people on the basis of political equality among all citizens. That would be in 
sharp contrast to the system of government under apartheid, where the majority of the 
people were excluded from the voting process and where, as a result, the 
                                            
3 Held Models of democracy 1.  
4 Held Models of democracy 1. 
5 Roux “Democracy” in CLOSA 10-1. Roux describes democracy as “a noun permanently in search 
of a qualifying adjective.”  
6 J Cohen & C Sabel “Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy” (1997) 3 European Law Journal 317. 
7Held Models of democracy) 1. See further R Dahl On Democracy (1998) 36. Dahl provides certain 
criteria to determine whether there is political equality and consequently whether there can be said to 
be a democracy. These are effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, control 
of the agenda and the inclusion of adults.  
8 D Moseneke “Striking a balance between the will of the people and the supremacy of the 
Constitution” (2012) 129 SALJ 10. 
9 The Freedom Charter adopted at the Congress of the People, Kliptown 1955. 
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governmental system was not truly representative of “the people”.10 The exclusion of 
black people from citizenship and the rights associated with it, was further cemented 
by the system of parliamentary sovereignty, which made it impossible to challenge the 
validity of duly adopted Acts of Parliament that were discriminatory or oppressive.11 
For these reasons, those excluded from participation in government institutions 
resorted mainly to extra-institutional forms of politics, which included protest action, in 
their struggle for a representative government based on the principle of one person, 
one vote.  
Section 1 of the South African Constitution states that the “Republic of South Africa 
is one, sovereign, democratic state”. The preamble to the Constitution also makes it 
clear that the Constitution envisages “a democratic and open society in which 
government is based on the will of the people”.12 The Constitution uses a variety of 
adjectives to qualify democracy, such as representative,13 participatory,14 
                                            
10 The attempt to include some of the population groups that were previously excluded from the vote 
through the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 110 of 1983 did not fulfil the requirement of political 
equality. The tricameral parliament established in terms of the Constitution created three houses of 
Parliament: The House of Delegates (for Indians), the House of Representatives (for Coloureds) and 
the House of Assembly (for Whites). This parliament was a charade. The political power remained 
vested in the House of Assembly which represented only white citizens. See J Dugard “Racism and 
Repression in South Africa: The Two Faces of Apartheid” (1989) 2 Harvard Human Rights Law Journal 
97-9. 
11 The link between parliamentary sovereignty and apartheid laws and policies can be illustrated with 
reference to the disenfranchisement of coloured voters. Parliament’s early efforts to circumvent the 
entrenchment of the coloured vote in the South Africa Act of 1909 were frustrated by two successful 
constitutional challenges. In Harris & others v Minister of the Interior & another 1952 2 SA 428 (A), the 
Appellate Division declared the Separate Representation of Voters Act 46 of 1951 invalid, on the ground 
that Parliament had not complied with the prescribed constitutional procedure. In Minister of the Interior 
v Harris 1952 4 SA 769 (A), the High Court of Parliament Act 35 of 1952, which allowed Parliament 
itself to set aside decisions of the Appellate Division, was also declared invalid. However, Parliament 
overcame these challenges after it expanded the Senate and Appellate Division. It then amended the 
South Africa Act, this time with the required two-thirds majority in a joint sitting of both Houses of 
Parliament. A challenge to the validity of the amendment failed in Collins v Minister of the Interior & 
another 1957 1 SA 552 (A).   
12 See Moseneke “Striking a balance between the will of the people and the supremacy of the 
Constitution” (2012) SALJ 12. 
13 Ss 57(1)(b), 70(1)(b), 116(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
14 Ss 57(1)(b), 70(1)(b), 116(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
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constitutional15 and multi-party.16 The Constitution therefore envisions a type of 
democracy which combines these different dimensions of democracy. Beyond these 
descriptive indicators and a description of democracy as a system of government,17 
democracy is also described as a form of society,18 a principle,19 a set of values,20 
and a culture.21 The goal of these references to democracy is to ensure that “the 
people” as a collective are central to the system of government in various ways, which 
cannot necessarily be captured in terms of a single model of democracy.  
South Africa’s democracy must be understood with reference to the preamble which 
begins with the words, “We, the people”. In another reference to the people, the 
preamble states that “We therefore, through our freely elected representatives, adopt 
this Constitution”. Despite the introduction of representatives into our democracy, the 
people remain central. The position of the people in South Africa’s democracy can be 
explained with reference to direct and representative models of democracy. Both these 
models emphasise the central place of the people, but the way this is done is quite 
different.  
 
4 3 Freedom of assembly and direct democracy 
It is quite rare in modern democracies to have any type of direct democracy.22 
Many academics accept that the modern conception of democracy possibly has 
elements of direct democracy. The Constitution does make provision for 
referendums,23 which is a form of direct democracy, but this mechanism has not been 
used since the dawn of democracy in South Africa, and seems unlikely to be used any 
time soon. Some academics are of the view that freedom of assembly institutes a 
modern form of direct democracy.24 However, they generally provide little or no 
                                            
15 S 181(1) of the Constitution. 
16 S 236 of the Constitution.  
17 Ss 1(d), 152(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
18 The preamble and ss 36(1), 39(1) (a), 59(2), 72(2), 118(2) of the Constitution. 
19 S 195(1) of the Constitution.  
20 The preamble and ss 7(1), 195(1) of the Constitution. 
21 S 234 of the Constitution.  
22 Roux “Democracy” in CLOSA10-4. 
23 Ss 84(2)(g) and 127 of the Constitution.  
24 Roux “Democracy” in CLOSA 10-1-10-4 and 10-8; S Woolman & J Swanepoel “Constitutional 
History” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2008) 2-1-2-5. 
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backup for this statement. Before challenging the idea of freedom of assembly as 
direct democracy, it is useful to provide a basic overview of direct democracy.  
 
4 3 1 Direct democracy25 
Roux describes direct democracy as “a system of government in which major 
decisions are taken by the members of the political community themselves, without 
mediation by elected representatives”.26 It is regarded as the oldest form of 
democracy. In the city-state of Athens in the fifth century BC, the form of government 
was based on “self-government”, where the people held the sovereign power to make 
legislative and judicial decisions.27 Held refers to this model as “classical 
democracy”.28 This ancient form of democracy highlighted the equality and liberty of 
the citizens of the city-state (polis).29 The centrality of the people was based not only 
on the idea that the people should have the right to participate and make decisions, 
but on the understanding that it was a social good for the people to participate. It was 
a citizen’s duty to participate in this form of government. This was not seen as a 
violation of the citizen’s freedom but as a reinforcement of his liberty.30 In many 
respects, the ideal of the direct rule of the people represents a “pure” form of 
democracy. However, it was only made possible by limiting who qualified as citizens31 
and by virtue of the fact that the community of the city-state was small enough for 
decisions to be made directly by those citizens.  
While this form of democracy did not endure, these ideas were revived in the 
sixteenth century in the city republics of Italy.32 An important figure of this time was 
                                            
See further I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 16; I Currie and J De Waal 
The new constitutional and administrative law volume 1: constitutional law (2001) 88-89; 
25 This section touches only very briefly on different theoretical contributions to the idea of direct 
democracy. For a fuller analysis see Held Models of democracy 11-27 and 96 - 124.  
26 Roux “Democracy” in CLOSA 10-1-10-4. 
27 Held Models of democracy 45. 
28 11. 
29  13. Only Athenian men over the age of 20 qualified for citizenship. See Held Models of democracy 
19.  
30 Held Models of democracy 13-16. 
31 Those who qualified as citizens were Athenian men over the age of 20. Therefore, Athenian 
democracy excluded women, immigrants, and a large slave population. See Held Models of democracy 
19.  
32 Roux “Democracy” in CLOSA 10- 5. See further Held Models of democracy 40-43.  
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Niccolò Machiavelli. Machiavelli was a proponent of a form of democracy which Held 
describes as protective republicanism.33 This was closely related to the Athenian form 
of classical democracy and highlighted the need for political participation to ensure 
personal liberty. The basis of the citizenry ruling themselves is to ensure that they 
cannot be dominated by other powers.34 Direct participation ensured that the citizenry 
could protect their liberty in their interaction with other citizens in assemblies. This 
would lead to individual (“egoistic”) concerns being subordinate to the collective public 
good.35 Another advocate of a more direct democratic form of government was the 
eighteenth-century French political philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau 
advocated a system of government which he referred to as “republican” and which 
Held refers to as developmental republicanism.36 Rousseau reaffirmed the notion of 
active citizenship and self-rule. He posited that in an ideal political system, individuals 
should participate directly in legislative functions. Rousseau attempted to reintroduce 
ideas of citizen assemblies which would allow citizens to come together as a 
community and generally decide for the communal good – based on this, they would 
produce laws appropriately. Central to Rousseau’s thought was the ideal of the 
sovereignty of the people. The people are sovereign and therefore, the dividing line 
between state and civil society must be reshaped, as self-rule creates a new type of 
society.37 Self-government, and decisions based on the will of the citizenry, is an end 
in itself.38 There is no distinction between the state and the civil society (the 
community of people).  
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were also important contributors to the idea of direct 
democracy. Their ideas were shaped through their understanding of a capitalist market 
economy in which relations between individuals are determined by class structures.39 
They emphatically made the point that liberal democracy (as discussed below under 
section 4 5 1) and the free market economy did not support the ideals of equality, 
                                            
33 Held Models of democracy 40. 
34 44. 
35 43. 
36 35. 
37 43. 
38 45. 
39 96-100. 
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security of the person and liberty.40 This was because the capitalist system created 
and reinforced class divisions and because the protection of property rights – and the 
control of the private bodies of the means of production – resulted in the exploitation 
of the working class. For Marx, a true democracy would see the eventual eradication 
of the state or “the end of politics”41 where all class structures are eradicated.  
A key aspect for Marx was “accountability”. The form of direct democracy that he 
advocated rejected the structure of separation of powers that is typical of 
representative democracies, and instead favoured regular elections where all 
structures were accountable to the people (working class).42 These elections would 
not function like those in a representative democracy. The elections were to appoint 
administrators who would be mandated to communicate the demands of the people. 
If they failed to accurately depict these demands (in all issues and at all times), they 
would immediately be recalled.43 This was to ensure that all decisions in government 
were the precise decisions of the people. Those appointed did not have discretionary 
powers to depart from the decisions mandated to them.  Marx required the people not 
only to be constantly involved in the decision making process, but also to make all 
decisions. Similar to Rousseau, the decisions made should depict the will of the 
people, and those who were appointed to communicate these decisions did not have 
the power to deviate from their specific mandate.  
Direct democracy requires decision making by the citizens. The different authors 
referred to above structured the manner in which the citizens would make decisions 
differently, but nevertheless agreed that eventually the decisions made by legislative, 
executive or judicial functionaries would be indistinguishable from the will of the 
citizenry. Even where “representatives” make decisions, they must be approved by the 
people so that all decisions are in fact the decisions of the people. Rousseau famously 
wrote:  
 
“Sovereignty cannot be represented, for the same reason that it cannot be alienated; its 
essence is the general will, and will cannot be represented — either it is the general will or 
                                            
40 103-106. 
41 106. Held refers to this idea as the end of the state and the transformation of society. See specifically 
K Marx & F Engels The Communist Manifesto (1848) 127. Marx regarded political power as “merely 
organised power of one class oppressing another”. 
42 Held Models of democracy 100. 
43 100-103.  
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it is something else; there is no intermediate possibility. Thus the people’s deputies are not, 
and could not be, its representatives; they are merely its agents; and they cannot decide 
anything finally. Any law which the people has not ratified in person is void; it is not law at 
all.”44 
 
Direct democracy and representative democracy are in contradistinction to one 
another. Although modern democracies may contain elements of direct democracy 
within a representative system, advocates for direct democracy recognise the inherent 
tension between representative and direct democracy. As shown in the above quote 
of Rousseau, proponents of direct democracy are of the view that the sovereignty of 
the people is either expressed through direct participation (or direct decision making) 
or is extinguished through an attempt to represent it. If democracy concerns itself with 
the authority to make collective decisions, then the distinction between direct and 
representative democracy is not only on the level of participation of the electorate. The 
difference also lies in the type of decision being made. When people vote in a 
representative democracy, they decide who (which representatives) will make 
decisions of substance on their behalf. In a direct democracy, the people themselves 
make decisions of substance.45  
Direct democracy requires an active citizenry. It requires the direct participation of 
the people on a regular basis. The citizenry must actively involve itself in the state as 
the state and the citizenry are the same.  An active citizen, from this perspective, is an 
individual whose very being is affirmed in and through political action. In this sense, to 
be involved in the system of government is a social good. It places a duty on citizens 
to be involved in their community.46 This is not necessarily seen as a restriction of 
liberty, as political participation represents the highest form of freedom and secures 
individual liberties.  
                                            
44 J Rousseau The Social Contract (1762) 141 as quoted in Held Models of democracy 46. 
45 Cohen & Sabel “Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy” (1997) European Law Journal 321. See also M 
Bishop “Vampire or Prince? The Listening Constitution and Merafong Demarcation Forum v President 
of the Republic of South Africa & Others” (2009) 2 Constitutional Court Review 320. Bishop discusses 
the fact that both theories are based on the question of who makes the decision. While in a 
representative democracy the representatives make decisions, in a direct democracy the people make 
the decisions. 
46 According to Held, Rousseau was of the view that the role of the citizen was “the highest to which 
an individual can aspire”. See Held Models of democracy 46.  
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While the Constitution makes specific reference to representative and participatory 
democracy, it does not expressly refer to “direct” democracy. Referendums are 
provided for in the Constitution, which are seen as a form of direct democracy.47 The 
Constitutional Court has also referred to elements of direct democracy in South 
Africa.48 The court in these cases seems to assert that these direct elements are part 
of a more participatory model of democracy.49 Direct democracy is sometimes also 
said to act as a “counterweight to political parties in a representative democracy” and 
to protect the rights of those who find it difficult to participate in existing representative 
and participatory structures.50 For the most part, however, these claims appear to 
refer to a broader right of political participation, which is often far removed from the 
type of direct involvement of citizens in decision-making which is associated with direct 
democracy. 
 
4 3 2 Freedom of assembly: “a piece (moment) of original un-harnessed/untamed    
direct democracy” 
 The perceived link between freedom of assembly and direct democracy has been 
asserted in the German case of Brokdorf as follows:  
 
"[Demonstrations] offer...the possibility of exerting public influence on the political process, 
for the development of pluralist initiatives and alternatives or even for criticism and 
protest...; they contain a piece of original un-harnessed/untamed direct democracy which 
is appropriate to preserve the political operation from paralysis in its busy routine."51 
                                            
47 Ss 84(2)(g) and 127 of the Constitution.  
48 See Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly & Others 2006 6 SA 416 (CC) 
paras 90-99. 
49 South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas 2013 1 SA 83 (CC) para 62. 
50 R Malherbe & M van Eck “The state’s failure to comply with its constitutional duties and its impact 
on democracy” (2009) TSAR 209-223. The link between direct democracy and the protection of 
neglected groups is not necessarily clear. This is because within direct democracy, more often than not, 
decision making is based on the will of the majority. The manner in which decisions are made is not as 
important as the fact that the majority makes the decision. The emphasis is on uniformity and the 
“general will” rather than protection of minority voices.  
51 BVerfGE 69, 315 (emphasis added). The original text: “Sie bieten ... die Möglichkeit zur öffentlichen 
Einflußnahme auf den politischen Prozeß, zur Entwicklung pluralistischer Initiativen und Alternativen 
oder auch zu Kritik und Protest ...; sie enthalten ein Stück ursprünglich-ungebändigter unmittelbarer 
Demokratie, das geeignet ist, den politischen Betrieb vor Erstarrung in geschäftiger Routine zu 
bewahren". Translation found on http://www.legislationline.org/topics/country/28/topic/15. Translated 
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This idea, while attractive, is open to a number of criticisms. Firstly, direct 
democracy requires “the people” to be present in order to exercise such decision-
making power. It cannot be said that in all protest actions the “people” are present. 
Protestors usually represent a small segment of the people. In a country as diverse as 
South Africa it would be very rare that a faction of protesters could be said to embody 
the “people”. Even where thousands of people are present, these participants cannot 
be said to represent the “entire polity”.52 
Secondly, it is difficult to conceptualise protest action as untamed. Salat argues that 
protest action cannot be said to be un-harnessed or untamed,53 as it must occur within 
a particular legislative framework, which imposes numerous limitations on the exercise 
of the right.54 The imposition of a substantial amount of limitations and qualifications 
of the exercise of this right through the Regulation of Gatherings Act is indicative of a 
controlled space of direct participation. As this control is largely exercised by State 
institutions, it is difficult to see how protest action can be untamed and direct. State 
parties dictate the bounds of the exercise of this freedom.  
Thirdly, and most importantly, if direct democracy requires major decisions to be 
taken collectively by the people, and if freedom of assembly is a form of direct 
democracy, then the following question needs to be answered: how can major 
decisions be made through protest action? Even if “the people” in its entirety are 
present at a protest action, it is unlikely that such action will result in a decision being 
taken.55 Protests and demonstrations are usually not spaces for collective decision 
making. This critique also incorporates the idea that direct democracy and 
representative democracy are in contradiction to each other, as discussed above. If it 
is assumed that these two systems cannot exist simultaneously, then protests would 
rarely be spaces of direct democracy. This is because protests are normally directed 
at representatives or institutions within an existing representative democracy. While 
protesters may want to influence state officials to make decisions, the protesters 
                                            
by German Cases and Materials Under the direction of Professors P Schlechtriem, B Markesinis and S 
Lorenzand.  
52 O Salat The Right to Freedom of Assembly: A Comparative Study (2015) 48. 
53 Salat The Right to Freedom of Assembly 48. 
54 See the discussion in chapter 3.  
55 Salat The Right to Freedom of Assembly 49. 
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themselves do not make decisions. Even in violent protests where pressure is placed 
by the protesters on an official, the power to change the decision is still vested in the 
official.56 Protesters therefore may have the power to influence decisions, but not to 
make decisions.57 
 
4 3 3 The link between protests and direct democracy   
The analysis above raises critical questions over the assumption that freedom of 
assembly is a form of direct democracy. Salat argues, on the basis of these criticisms, 
that the link made between assembly and direct democracy is nothing more than “a 
romantic metaphor, with close to zero effective meaning”.58 In her view, it is not a lens 
which provides any substantial assistance in understanding freedom of assembly in 
modern democracies.  
It nevertheless seems helpful to consider possible responses to these criticisms, as 
this may help us to understand the reasons why freedom of assembly is often linked 
to direct democracy. In the first place, as stated above, direct democracy requires “the 
people” to be present. While in national or provincial issues it is highly unlikely that the 
people can be present, it is possible that a substantial part of a specific local 
community may be present at demonstrations directed against local government. The 
protest actions in Merafong in 2005, regarding the change in municipal boundaries of 
that community, is an example of such protests.59 The members of the Merafong 
community were resisting the proposals, through two Bills,60 to incorporate parts of 
Merafong which up to then formed part of Gauteng within the North West province. 
The majority of the residents of the Merafong community were opposed to the 
proposal.61 Members of the community who were affected by this decision indicated 
                                            
56 See discussion in chapter 2 part 2 4 4. 
57 This idea is addressed under the discussion of representative democracy under part 4 4. 
58 Salat The Right to Freedom of Assembly 48. 
59 Merafong Demarcation Forum & Others v President of the Republic of South Africa & Others 2008 
5 SA 171 (CC). See also Bishop (2009) Constitutional Court Review 313-317. 
60 The Twelfth Amendment Bill B33B-2005 and the Cross-boundary Municipalities Laws Repeal and 
Related Matters Bill B36B-2005. 
61 Merafong Demarcation Forum & Others v President of the Republic of South Africa & Others 2008 
5 SA 171 (CC) para 134-135. In this case, although the Merafong community had largely indicated their 
resistance to their incorporation in North West province, the amendment was passed. Therefore, 
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their resistance through petitions, demonstrations and assemblies.62 These series of 
protests arguably show that, where protests are specifically directed at a decision 
affecting a specific local community, and where a majority of the members of that 
community participate in those protests, it could be said that the polity is present.63 
Secondly, although Salat argues that protests are always subject to limitations64 
and therefore cannot be untamed, many protests in South Africa at times appear to be 
untamed. According to Woolman, the power of assemblies lies precisely in the fact 
that they are “loud, noisy, disruptive, and sometimes dangerous”.65 Woolman states 
that “section 17 creates a unique space in which citizens can stand outside the 
Constitution”.66 It is difficult however to reconcile this idea with current constitutional 
thought and case law. 
Thirdly, it was pointed out above that, while in a direct democracy the people have 
the power to decide matters of substance, crowds that are assembled together 
generally do not take binding decisions. Although this is a valid point, it is nevertheless 
easy to see why freedom of assembly is linked to direct democracy. Freedom of 
assembly symbolises a space where the people proactively participate without the 
                                            
although a large portion of the community were present, they still did not exercise decision-making 
power which is necessary in a direct democracy.  
62 Merafong Demarcation Forum & Others v President of the Republic of South Africa & Others 2008 
5 SA 171 (CC) para 134-135. The protesters included “residents, supported by community formations, 
which included the labour federation Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), political 
organisations such as local branches of the South African Communist Party (SACP) and African 
National Congress (ANC), non-governmental organisations, churches, taxi organisations and social 
movements”.  
63 There are various other examples of protest action that were directed at decisions taken or laws 
adopted in the national or provincial spheres, yet were focused on the interests of a particular 
community. Some of these disputes led to court cases such as Matatiele Municipality & Others v 
President of the Republic of South Africa & Others 2006 5 SA 47 (CC); Matatiele Municipality & Others 
v President of the Republic of South Africa & Others (No 2) 2007 6 SA 477 (CC); Poverty Alleviation 
Network & others v President of the Republic of South Africa & others 2010 6 BCLR 520 (CC). 
64 See chapter 3. 
65 S Woolman “You Break it, You Own it: South African Assembly Jurisprudence after Garvis” (2015) 
9 Vienna J. on Int'l Const. L 550. 
66 S Woolman “My tea party, your mob, our social contract: Freedom of Assembly and the 
Constitutional right to rebellion in Garvis v SATAWU (Minister for Safety & Security, Third Party) 2010 
(6) SA 280 (WCC)” (2011) 27 SAJHR 348.  
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mediation of representatives.67 Citizens do not have to wait for the state to invite them 
to participate in consultative processes, in which the terms of interaction are dictated 
by the state. During protests and other assemblies, citizens themselves, acting 
together, can determine the agenda as well as the terms of interaction. A protest in 
South Africa is a striking image of a collective citizenry proactively voicing their 
opinions and resolve. Woolman describes participating in demonstrations in South 
Africa as being “part of a truly dynamic and muscular beast”. He uses this imagery to 
describe a protest as a living, active collective being,68 and claims that demonstration 
is a direct expression of popular sovereignty.69  
These responses to the criticisms outlined in the previous section show that there 
is a certain affinity between freedom of assembly and direct democracy. It is 
nevertheless misleading to view freedom of assembly solely through the lens of direct 
democracy. It may also be dangerous, to the extent that it creates the expectation that 
we can ignore an established representative system of government and rather give 
effect to the direct wishes of “the people”.70 
 
4 4  Freedom of assembly and representative democracy 
4 4 1  Representative democracy  
 Modern democracies can largely be described as representative forms of 
government. It is therefore important to provide a brief overview of the development of 
representative democracy, with its roots in the liberal tradition. This section highlights 
important features of representative government in order to provide a platform to 
discuss the link between freedom of assembly and South Africa’s representative 
system of government. Representative democracy can be defined as a system of 
government where “the people” elect representatives through regular elections and 
                                            
67 Woolman (2011) SAJHR 346-353. Woolman (2015) Vienna J. on Int'l Const. L 550.  
68 Woolman (2015) Vienna J. on Int'l Const. L 550. 
69 Woolman (2015) Vienna J. on Int'l Const. L 550. For a full analysis of these ideas see also L Kramer 
The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (2004). 
70 This type of disregard of the representatives within a representative system negates an established 
and legitimate system of representative government. Therefore, freedom of assembly as a form of direct 
democracy is most likely to gain support in conditions where a representative system has degenerated 
into a system of tyranny or absolutism. See Salat The Right to Freedom of Assembly 49. 
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whereby those representatives make collective decisions on behalf of “the people”.71 
Central to this conception of representative democracy is the vote. 
The earliest conceptions of representative government came from the writings of 
Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Bentham, Madison and James Mill.72 Several of these 
writers emphasised the impossibility of direct democracy in modern states. Some 
writers admired the active citizenship within more direct forms of government, but 
argued that modernisation and larger societies rendered direct democracy impossible 
in larger societies.73 Others, such as Madison and Bentham, were highly critical of 
direct forms of government as being impractical and inevitable failures.74 Madison 
emphasised that “pure democracies”, in other words direct democracy, were unstable. 
The “tyranny of the majority” and excesses of “pure democracy” could only be 
prevented through institutional arrangements and a system of representation.75 
Representative democracy principally developed from a liberal tradition.76 
Understandings of liberal democracy are therefore closely linked with the development 
of representative government. To a large extent, the idea of liberal democracy 
developed as a response to absolutism, despotic power and tyranny.77 Liberalism 
highlighted the need to protect the freedom of individuals against these dangers. In 
accordance with this outlook, representative democracy is aimed at ensuring the 
protection of individuals from these abuses of State power.  Central to these ideas is 
that human beings are free and equal.78 This is closely related to a conception of 
negative freedom, namely the freedom from State power.79 This led to restrictive 
ideas about the involvement of the people within State affairs. While sovereignty 
                                            
71 Roux “Democracy” in CLOSA 10-4. 
72 See generally Held Models of democracy 56-95. For the original works see T Hobbes Leviathan 
(1651); J Locke Two Treatises of Government (1689). C Montesquieu The spirit of laws/ De l’Esprit des 
Lois (1748). 
73 Held Models of democracy 66. 
74 70-72. 
75 73. 
76 60. 
77 60-62 and 81-83. 
78 Although the liberal thought on free and equal individuals was conceptualised early on through 
theorists such as Locke and Hobbes, these ideas were based on restrictive understandings based on 
property and excluded various groups from the conception of individuals. See generally J Locke Two 
Treatises of Government (1689). 
79 Held Models of democracy 78.  
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remained with the individual, in order to protect individual liberty, the State should be 
separate from the sphere of individuals (civil society).80 There should be a minimalist 
and non-interventionist State.81  
Even though sovereignty is vested in the people, once space has been created for 
regular elections, political power shifts to the representatives who can legitimately 
exercise state functions. Beyond this, the accountability of the governors to the 
governed is ensured through constitutional arrangements and political institutions. The 
vote also ensures political equality82 between citizens which is linked to conceptions 
of “free and equal individuals”. Political equality is necessary to establish the freedom 
of the individual.83 Separation of powers is also a crucial mechanism for ensuring 
State accountability and utility within civil society. These features are aimed at 
ensuring protection for individuals – from the State and each other.84 Even though 
representative democracy is based on the sovereignty of the people, this sovereignty 
does not require the constant direct involvement of the people in state affairs. The 
sovereignty of the people is expressed through the vote. This idea is completely at 
odds with the ideas of sovereignty and representation developed by Rousseau. These 
ideas can be referred to as restrictive or protective representative democracy85 and 
were mainly based on understandings of the State as a potential threat to liberty. From 
this perspective, a citizen would not have to participate in politics beyond elections.86  
Although these ideas of a “protective” representative democracy are important, 
John Stuart Mill provided a different perspective on representative government. His 
ideas on representative government and its elements still influence modern 
democracies and the ideas of participatory and deliberative democracy as discussed 
in chapter five. Mill defined representative government as a form of government in 
which 
                                            
80 77.  
81 75-77 and 81-84. 
82 78-79. 
83 78. 
84 78. 
85 60. 
86 78. See also G Quinot "Snapshot or Participatory Democracy? Political Engagement as 
Fundamental Human Right" (2009) 25 SAJHR 392 - 402.  
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“the whole people, or some numerous portion of them, exercise through deputies 
periodically elected by themselves, the ultimate controlling power, which, in every 
constitution, must reside somewhere.”87  
Central to Mill’s ideas on representative government was that, although sovereignty 
remained with the people, they exercised this “ultimate controlling power” through their 
representatives. Mill considered participation as an important aspect of representative 
government, although the vote remained the basis for the “ultimate controlling 
power”.88 Unlike proponents of a protective notion of representative government, Mill 
considered active involvement and citizenship as vital to a representative system.89 
Although he emphasised the protection of the individual, participation was important 
to ensure a vibrant and informed electorate for the furthering of society.90  
Mill provided an additional justification for the limited role of the electorate in 
government, namely the necessity for effective government. He famously wrote that 
there is a “radical distinction between controlling the business of government and 
actually doing it”.91 This also adds to a restrictive role of the people within 
representative government. Active citizenship is considered a social good provided it 
does not disturb the effective running of government by those elected to be specialists. 
This elitist conception views the role of the electorate as being restricted to the voting 
process and participation only insofar as the electorate do not hinder the government.  
Modern representative governments are characterised by universal adult suffrage, 
separation of powers, a free press, assembly and a general set of political institutions 
within the representative system.  
 
4 4 2 South Africa’s representative democracy  
The Constitution makes various references to the representative nature of the South 
African democracy. The representative model of democracy could be described as a 
                                            
87 JS Mill Considerations of Representative government (1861) 269.  
88 Held Models of democracy 97. The participation of individuals in between elections was not seen as 
important for exercising control but rather to provide for a more participatory form of representative 
government and for an informed citizenry. The space for the active citizen was mainly in order for 
individual development, debate and for an informed citizenry. 
89 79.  
90 80.  
91 Mill Considerations of Representative government 229-30. 
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social contract92 between the “elected representatives” and “the people” as described 
in the Preamble to the Constitution.93 The basis of this contract is mainly through the 
vote.94 The people, by electing and voting for their representatives, set them a 
mandate to represent their interests. The legislature’s institutional legitimacy is based 
on the “will of the people” which is expressed through the vote.95 A key aspect of 
South Africa’s vision of democracy is included in section 1(d), which lists “universal 
adult suffrage” as one of the values on which the Republic is based. 
While the vote is central to representative democracy, an overly restrictive view of 
representative democracy over-emphasises the role of representatives rather than the 
role of the people. The Constitutional Court has on occasion provided a very formalistic 
and restrictive view of representative democracy. Such a formalistic view of 
representative democracy was displayed in United Democratic Movement v President 
of the Republic of South Africa (“UDM”).96 The court had to decide whether legislation 
permitting floor crossing at the national, provincial and local levels was constitutional. 
The court stated that voters cannot control the conduct of their representatives 
between elections.97 It went on to state that the recourse for voters, who felt aggrieved 
by the decisions of those they elected, is at the next election.98 In this judgment, 
representative democracy is conceived as a system in which the electorate can only 
make political decisions and control the conduct of their representatives every few 
years.99 
                                            
92 Woolman (2011) SAJHR  353. 
93 The Preamble to the Constitution.  
94 S 19 of the Constitution. S 19(3) provides that “every adult citizen has the right to vote for any 
legislative body established in terms of the Constitution”. Therefore through the exercise of the right to 
vote, the citizenry elects its representatives.   
95 N Raboshakga "Towards participatory democracy, or not: the reasonableness approach in public 
involvement cases” (2015) 31 SAJHR 4 10. 
96 United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of South Africa & Others (African Christian 
Democratic Party & Others Intervening; Institute for Democracy in South Africa as amici curiae) 2003 1 
SA 488 (CC).   
97 Para 49. 
98 Para 49. 
99 See Quinot (2009) SAJHR 392 - 402. 
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Another judgment which highlights a restrictive and formalistic interpretation of 
representative democracy is the dissenting judgment of Yacoob J in Doctors for Life.100 
This case dealt with whether the Constitution placed an enforceable obligation on the 
legislature to facilitate public participation/involvement in the legislative process. In his 
judgment, Yacoob J states that “government by the people” means that decisions of 
the National Assembly are made by representatives.101 Yacoob J equates the 
decisions and activities of the representatives with the decisions of the people. His 
understanding of representative democracy relies heavily on the notion that the 
decisions of the representatives (the elected) are identical to the “will of the people”. 
He also indicates that the right to vote is a “participatory element” of our democracy.102 
It seems that any frustration that the people have with those elected should be settled 
at the following elections. This restrictive view of representative democracy does not 
enable an understanding of the innate tension between the people and their 
representatives between elections.103 This interpretation is in line with the liberal 
tradition of representative thought and it seems that Yacoob J assumes the unity and 
identity of representatives and the electorate.104 Yacoob J states, “[i]t is these elected 
representatives that govern the people and their representative activities are activities 
of the people”.105 Although the liberal tradition of representative democracy recognises 
                                            
100 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 6 SA 416 (CC) paras 246-
339. 
101 Paras 282-284. 
102 Para 291. It is difficult to reconcile this understanding with the idea that participatory democracy 
supplements representative democracy, and therefore refers to something additional to the vote. See 
the discussion of participatory democracy in chapter 5.  
103 This restrictive and formal interpretation of representative democracy almost resounds with 
Rousseau’s criticism of representation and sovereignty – as discussed above in 4 3 1. Yacoob J 
assumes that the vote confers all authority to the representatives. Once South Africans have voted, 
sovereignty is represented until the next election. Parliament cannot be compelled to facilitate public 
participation in the absence of a constitutional provision which clearly and unequivocally requires it. 
104 See particularly paras 292, 294 and 319 of Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National 
Assembly 2006 6 SA 416 (CC). See also H Botha "Representing the poor: law, poverty and democracy" 
(2011) 22 Stell LR 521 525. 
105 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 6 SA 416 (CC) para 292 
(emphasis added). See also para 292 where he states “[t]o undermine these representatives is to 
undermine the political will of the people and to negate their choice at free and fair elections”. Yacoob 
J’s interpretation is informed by a particular vision of democracy which emphasises the decisions of the 
elected and equates these decisions with the decisions of the people. 
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the tension between the State and the people, it seems to sidestep the enquiry into 
this tension by equating the people’s decisions with the activities of the 
representatives.106 
Yacoob J also emphasises the history of disenfranchisement of the black majority 
under apartheid.107 He identifies the historical lack of representation of the majority of 
the people as the core cause of the absolutism and tyranny which characterised 
apartheid. He thus connects the struggle against apartheid with the struggle for the 
vote and representation in Parliament.108 Without in any way doubting the great 
importance of the shift from a racial oligarchy to a democracy based on universal adult 
suffrage, it could nevertheless be asked whether Yacoob J does not take a too 
restrictive view of the political disempowerment of the black majority under apartheid, 
and whether this view does not leave too little scope for forms of political participation 
other than the vote. In particular, his view that representation in Parliament should go 
a long way towards protecting human rights, seems to discount the need for extra-
institutional political struggles that are waged through protests.109  
 Although Yacoob J’s reasoning was rejected by the majority of the Constitutional 
Court in Doctors for Life, and although the Court seems to have moved away from the 
view of democracy adopted in UDM, these restrictive ideas nevertheless still seem to 
inform some of the thinking within the executive, legislature and the ANC.110 The 
                                            
106 This seems to point to a contradiction in this restrictive idea of representative democracy as provided 
above. While the liberal tradition of representative democracy provides a clear separation between the 
State and civil society, Yacoob J seems to indicate that the decisions of the representatives and the 
people are identical. It is an anomaly as the people need to be separate and protected from the State, 
but their will is also expressed through their representatives who are the State.  
107 For a full analysis of the vote in terms of section 19 and history of apartheid see the discussion under 
2 4 1. 
108 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 6 SA 416 (CC) para 294. 
109 See part 2 4 1.  
110 See part 2 4 4 4. The ANC increasingly equates itself with “the people”. See for example K Motau 
“ANC is incorruptible as an organisation because the ANC is the people of SA” (03-07- 2017) 
<http://ewn.co.za/2017/07/03/anc-is-incorruptible-as-an-organisation-because-the-anc-is-the-people-
of-sa> (accessed 04-08-2017). This article highlights how an ANC spokesperson equates the ANC with 
the people, and argues that the organisation is not corrupt because it is representative of the people. 
See also B Capazorio “Zuma: If you want to know reasons for cabinet reshuffles win elections” Times 
Live (17-11-2017) <https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-11-16-zuma-if-you-want-to-know-
reasons-for-cabinet-reshuffles-win-elections/ > (accessed 18-11-2017). Former President Jacob Zuma 
stated in parliament, in relation to his decision to change his cabinet that “the changing of a minister is 
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manner in which the executive and legislature view democracy shapes the manner in 
which the democracy operates and the exercise of rights within such a democracy, 
especially freedom of assembly as shown in chapter three.  
 
4 4 3 Freedom of assembly in a restrictive representative democracy 
Although modern representative democracies recognise freedom of assembly as a 
fundamental human right, freedom of assembly does not fit well within the formal and 
institutional conception of representative democracy outlined above. Firstly, the idea 
that the people do not have a space for controlling the conduct of their representatives 
outside established institutions minimises the power of protest action.111 The majority 
of protests in South Africa are directed towards the representatives; however, it seems 
that from this perspective, the elected can largely ignore protests until the following 
election.112 Furthermore, the formal conception of representative democracy views the 
vote as the only expression of popular sovereignty. However, this cannot mean that 
the people do not hold any power beyond the vote.113 Protests in South Africa indicate 
a tension between the elected and the electorate. The formal and institutionalised 
model of representative democracy does not expose the inherent tensions, 
disagreement and antagonism inherent in protests. It sidesteps this tension by 
requiring that any disagreement or complaint be remedied through the ballot.  
Additionally, understanding the historical denial of the political rights of black people 
during apartheid solely through the prism of the vote has problematic consequences 
for protests in the new constitutional dispensation. The problem is that it renders extra-
institutional spaces for participation such as protest action unimportant.114 It thus 
minimises the space for struggles which, for whatever reason, cannot be expressed 
through the vote.115  
                                            
the prerogative of the president and the reasons are not necessarily to be known by people. If you want 
to know, win elections and have a government” (emphasis added). He thus indicated that victory at 
election time is paramount and that he is not compelled to provide reasons to the electorate. 
111 J Duncan Protest Nation: the right to protest in South Africa (2016) 45.  
112 Quinot (2009) SAJHR 397-398. 
113 H Botha “Fundamental rights and democratic contestation: reflections on freedom of assembly in an 
unequal society” (2017) 21 Law, Democracy and Development 223-224. 
114 See the discussion under part 2 4 1. 
115 The institutional idea of representative democracy also seems to underestimate the extent to which 
certain classes of people are excluded from full citizenship and the exercise of fundamental human 
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Moreover, representative democracy as rooted in the liberal tradition views effective 
government as essential. Freedom of assembly usually takes place in the form of 
disruption and demonstration. Protests directed at government often aim to disrupt 
and destabilise the operations of government.116 The executive in South Africa seems 
to have a restrictive view of representative democracy which places much emphasis 
on the administration and effectiveness of government.117 The executive at times 
seems to view protests as a hindrance to effective government and democracy rather 
than as an opportunity to interact with the participants’ view. In this view, protesters 
are uninformed, ignorant or troublemakers118 who violate the Constitution and the very 
basis of democracy through the vote. The repressive reaction to protests by the police 
and other government departments indicate that protests directed towards 
government are rarely seen as beneficial to democracy.119 
However, the Constitutional Court has since moved beyond this restrictive view of 
representative democracy, by elaborating on two additional supplementing models of 
democracy, namely participatory and deliberative democracy. These two ideas of 
democracy, which will be discussed in chapter five, appear to enable a more nuanced 
understanding of the relationship between freedom of assembly and existing 
representative institutions. They also seem to be more in line with the German 
Constitutional Court’s statements in Brokdorf that assemblies contribute to the 
“formation of political will and opinion in a representative democracy”,120 and that 
assemblies can play a stabilising role in representative democracies by providing “a 
political early warning system”.121 These ideas presuppose an existing and legitimate 
                                            
rights. See Botha (2017) Law, Democracy and Development 223-2244. The overemphasis of the vote 
does not necessarily leave space for citizens to voice these struggles.  
116 See Duncan Protest Nation 36-41. See further Woolman (2015) Vienna J. on Int'l Const. L 550. See 
also C Mbazira “Service delivery protests, struggle for rights and the failure of local democracy in South 
Africa and Uganda: Parallels and divergences” (2013) 29 SAJHR 266-268. 
117 See Duncan Protest Nation 46. Duncan refers to former Presidents Mbeki’s emphasis on effective 
government which led to a more centralised executive branch of government. The emphasis on effective 
government led to executive attempts to control or prevent protest action.  
118 See T Madlingozi “Post-Apartheid Social Movements and Legal Mobilisation” in Socio-Economic 
rights in South Africa: Symbols or Substance? (2013) 106-112.  
119 106-112. 
120 BVerfGE 69, 315 347 (1985), as translated by Salát The Right to Freedom of Assembly 49. 
121 48. This statement expresses the idea that freedom of assembly provides citizens with the 
opportunity to show discontent and popular disaffection so that the representatives can address 
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representative democracy, and a dialogue between citizens and their representatives. 
Moreover, it is doubtful whether the above statements, which place freedom of 
assembly within an existing representative system, are reconcilable with the Brokdorf 
court’s statements regarding the link between freedom of assembly and direct 
democracy.122 
 
4 5 Conclusion  
Freedom of assembly is a vital part of a modern democracy. However, the 
traditional models of representative and direct democracy seem inadequate for fully 
understanding the link between democracy and protest action. 
While direct democracy is a normative ideal in democratic theory,123 it does not 
seem possible to have a “pure” form of direct democracy in contemporary 
democracies, which are largely representative in nature. This chapter discussed the 
link between demonstrations and direct democracy. It established that, while freedom 
of assembly reinforces the idea of an active citizenry and highlights the importance 
and centrality of the people in a democracy beyond elections, protests are not spaces 
for binding decision-making, and accordingly cannot be a form of direct democracy.  
The chapter then turned to examine the link between freedom of assembly and 
representative democracy. It found that overly formalistic and restrictive ideas of 
representative democracy — which still influence decision making by the legislature, 
executive and judiciary — do not enable an adequate understanding of the social 
context of the increase in protest actions in South Africa. These understandings of 
democracy assume the identity of the people and their representatives, and minimise 
the role of the people in a democracy between elections. The oversimplification of 
democracy by equating it with the vote does not allow for spaces of extra-institutional 
participation beyond and outside elections. However, this critique of a formalistic 
                                            
problems highlighted by the demonstration/protest. On this view, protest is legitimate as it appeals to 
the representatives — who have legitimacy to exercise public power — to address the issues. 
122 Salat states: “This rationale is actually the opposite of the previous one: assemblies are perceived 
to be eminently indirectly related to public power, exerting a mediating function from the people to 
government. I even think the two rationales are irreconcilable, as this one presupposes, the previous 
one denies a functioning, legitimate representative system.” Salat The Right to Freedom of Assembly 
49. 
123 Roux “Democracy” in CLOSA 10-2. 
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understanding of representative democracy should not be taken to suggest that ideas 
of representative democracy are unable to shed light on the meaning and importance 
of freedom of assembly. A more nuanced conception of representative democracy 
could possibly help to make sense of the role of assemblies and demonstrations in 
facilitating democratic processes of opinion- and will-formation, and instituting a 
dialogue between citizens and their representatives. This will be examined in more 
depth in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 5 
5 Freedom of Assembly: Participatory, deliberative and agonistic democracy 
5 1 Introduction 
Chapter four concluded that the idea of direct democracy and restrictive 
understandings of representative democracy cannot fully explain the nature and 
importance of freedom of assembly. This chapter seeks to determine whether other 
conceptions of democracy can assist us in understanding protest action in South 
Africa. The Constitutional Court has affirmed that participatory and deliberative 
democracy are part of South Africa’s democratic vision. Both these models of 
democracy move away from restrictive and formalistic understandings of 
representative democracy. Both are premised on the idea that South Africa “belongs 
to all who live in it”1 and attempt to reinject ideas of an active citizenry — beyond the 
elections — into the representative model.  The democratic possibilities of protest 
action can also possibly be better understood and supported through the democratic 
model of agonistic pluralism. This chapter seeks to determine if and to what extent 
agonistic pluralism may allow for a form of extra-institutional politics — as expressed 
through demonstration and assemblies — that supports democratic values.  
 The chapter will first provide a brief description of participatory and deliberative 
democracy. It will then assess the strengths and weaknesses of these models in trying 
to understand protest action. Thereafter it will focus on agonistic democracy as 
developed by Chantal Mouffe, and examine whether and to what extent this idea can 
explain protest action in South Africa.  
 
5 2 The role of freedom of assembly in the formation of political will and opinion 
In the German case of Brokdorf the court stated that assemblies and 
demonstrations contribute to the “formation of political will and opinion in a 
representative democracy”.2 Salat explains that demonstrations can play an important 
part in the formation of public opinion and can influence the formation of political will 
by exerting pressure on the decision-making process.3 The people thus use 
demonstrations to communicate their opinions to their elected representatives, and to 
                                            
1 The preamble to the Constitution of South Africa.   
2 BVerfGE 69, 315, 347 (emphasis added). 
3 O Salat The Right to Freedom of Assembly: A Comparative Study (2015) 49. 
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influence the decisions taken by them. Here, the court does not refer to direct 
democracy, as the people themselves do not take decisions. Instead, it places 
freedom of assembly within an existing representative democracy. At the same time, 
however, it resists a restrictive interpretation of representative democracy which 
simply emphasises the vote. This approach to democracy can possibly provide a more 
appropriate basis for understanding protest action.  
Both participatory and deliberative democracy seem to be in line with this idea. 
Participatory democracy concerns the question whether and how the people should 
be given the right to participate in the decisions which affect them.4  Deliberative 
democracy similarly emphasises participation. But while participatory democracy 
focuses on the creation of spaces for participation, deliberative democrats emphasise 
that, once those spaces have been established, they need to meet a specific set of 
standards to ensure that decisions are legitimate. Both these models must be 
understood within the context of an existing representative democracy rather than a 
challenge to that system. Because deliberative democracy also requires extensive 
participation, these two concepts of democracy are sometimes used interchangeably.5 
 
5 2 1 Participatory democracy 
5 2 1 1 A brief overview  
Participatory democracy developed as a means of reviving the ideas of Rousseau, 
Marx and Mill on the value of direct participation in government.6 It is important to note 
that these ideas of participatory democracy were influenced by these writers, but at 
                                            
4 T Roux “Democracy” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (RS 6 
2013) 10-14. Roux describes this model of democracy concisely as  
“essentially about the question whether, and if so, how, citizens should be given the right to participate in the 
making of decisions that affect them, notwithstanding the fact that the basic form of political organisation in the 
modern nation-state is, and is likely to remain, representative democracy.” 
5 For example, in discussing the nature of participatory democracy reference is made to s 1(d) of the 
Constitution, which refers to “accountability, responsiveness and openness”. The same provision is also 
used to substantiate the idea of deliberative democracy. See M Bishop “Vampire or Prince? The 
Listening Constitution and Merafong Demarcation Forum v President of the Republic of South Africa & 
Others” (2009) 2 Constitutional Court Review 320 at 321 where Bishop writes “...if you look a bit closer 
at the actual theories, there is an extensive overlap. Participatory democrats generally believe decisions 
should be taken through deliberation, and deliberative democrats almost universally call for greater 
citizen participation”. 
6 Roux “Democracy” in CLOSA 10- 15. See also D Held Models of democracy 3rd ed (2006) 209. 
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the same time also developed as a response to the shortcomings in the republican, 
liberal and Marxist theories.7  
The main contributors to participatory democracy, C Pateman and CB Macpherson, 
critiqued the restrictive and formalised conception of representative democracy rooted 
in the liberal tradition. These critiques related to the liberal notion of a strict separation 
between the State and civil society.8 They stressed that the State is neither impartial 
nor separate from civil society. Therefore, as the State participates in recreating and 
supporting unequal relations in the private sphere (civil society), the vote is insufficient 
to ensure the accountability of the State to the governed.9 Participatory democrats also 
accept the impossibility of self-government and direct democracy in the modern nation 
state.10 However, it does not follow that more spaces for direct participation, and 
continuous spaces for effective and meaningful participation, are not possible.  
Participatory democrats accept that modern societies are inherently representative. 
However, they call for more communication between the electorate and the elected 
beyond and between elections.11 Participatory democracy is considered a 
compromise between liberal conceptions of representative democracy and ideas of 
direct democracy.12 From the practical perspective, it does not seek to substitute the 
representative system, but to create participatory spaces within the representative 
system to ensure accountability, transparency and openness.13 Through a more 
participatory form of democracy, the inherent shortfalls of a restrictive representative 
democracy will be cured. This is because through participation the quality of 
democracy improves as citizens can participate in the making of those decisions which 
directly affect them. Additionally, participation in those spaces performs an educative 
function for the citizenry.14 Participation is seen as having an instrumental role, rather 
                                            
7 Held Models of democracy 209; C Pateman Participation and Democratic Theory (1970) 13. See also 
D Vitale “Between participatory and deliberative democracy: A contribution to Habermas” (2006) 32 
Philosophy & Social Criticism 739 749. 
8 C Pateman The problem of political obligation: a critique of liberal theory (1985) 177. See also Held 
Models of democracy 210.  
9 Held Models of democracy 210. 
10 211-212. 
11 Pateman Participation and Democratic Theory 42. 
12 Bishop (2009) Constitutional Court Review 320.  
13 Vitale (2006) Philosophy & Social Criticism 750.  
14 Pateman Participation and Democratic Theory 42. Here Pateman writes: 
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than being an end in itself.15 Emphasis is therefore placed on the process of 
participation. Participatory democrats take for granted that participation can lead to 
more informed citizens, fewer social inequalities, and more legitimate decisions.16 
Therefore, although there are various ideas within participatory democratic thought 
about where and how participation should occur, the emphasis is on ensuring that 
there are institutionalised spaces for participation created within a representative 
democratic base. For the participatory democrat, decisions are legitimate insofar as 
they ensure spaces for citizen participation.17 
 
5 2 1 2 The distinction between participatory democracy and direct democracy 
According to Held, participatory democracy and direct democracy are closely 
related.18 Held points out that participatory democracy may be seen as a modern form 
of direct democracy.19 Even though they are related, it is nevertheless problematic to 
treat participatory democracy as a modern form of direct democracy, as this hides 
important differences between the two concepts. This an important point, as the 
discussion in chapter four highlighted key problems with the notion that freedom of 
assembly can be understood as a form of direct democracy.20 If it is simply assumed 
that participatory democracy is direct democracy, then the same reasoning as 
provided in chapter four could be used to argue that freedom of assembly is not a form 
                                            
"The existence of representative institutions at national level is not sufficient for democracy; for 
maximum participation by all the people at that level socialisation, or 'social training', for democracy 
must take place in other spheres in order that the necessary individual attitudes and psychological 
qualities can be developed. This development takes place through the process of participation itself. 
The major function of participation in the theory of participatory democracy is therefore an educative 
one, educative in the very widest sense, including both the psychological aspect and the gaining of 
practice in democratic skills and procedures." (emphasis added) 
14 Bishop (2009) Constitutional Court Review 320.  
15 Vitale (2006) Philosophy & Social Criticism 750. 
16 Roux “Democracy” in CLOSA 10- 17. 
17 Bishop (2009) Constitutional Court Review 320.  
18 Held Models of democracy 4. Held refers to direct and participatory democracy interchangeably in 
the introductory chapter and refers to direct participatory democracy in subsequent chapters. 
19 Held Models of Democracy 210-212. Held discusses the emergence of participatory democracy as a 
means to modernise those elements of direct participation within the classical model of direct 
democracy. See also G Quinot "Snapshot or Participatory Democracy? Political Engagement as 
Fundamental Human Right" (2009) 25 SAJHR 397-398. 
20 See chapter 4 part 4 3 2 and 4 5. 
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of participatory democracy. The differences between the two concepts relate to two 
questions, namely who initiates participation and who makes the decisions. 
 In the first place, in the representative and participatory models of democracy, it is 
the state which facilitates public involvement.21 The state (the representatives) 
consequently creates the space for public participation and thus initiates the 
participation. This can be explained with reference to the distinction between “invited” 
spaces and “invented spaces” of participation.22 The participatory space is mostly 
reliant on the existing system to create and invite the electorate to participate. The 
control of these spaces is in the state’s hands, and this may minimise the true purpose 
of direct democratic action. Direct democracy, on the other hand, presupposes that 
the power is in the hands of “the people” who themselves may create or initiate the 
space for direct participation. Direct democratic action places the onus on the people 
to create invented spaces for participation. Direct democracy thus typically occurs 
without the mediation of the representative state.23  
Secondly, the views expressed by participants in a participatory democracy are not 
binding on the representatives. It is of course possible that participation may impact 
the decisions made. But even where the people manage to convince and affect the 
outcome of a decision, it is problematic to attribute those actions as decision-making. 
The decision ultimately lies with the representatives, as they have the legitimate public 
power to make such decisions. By contrast, direct democracy empowers “the people” 
themselves to make decisions. 
 
5 2 1 3 South Africa’s participatory democracy 
The South African Constitution makes various references to “participatory 
democracy”.24 Despite some decisions of the Constitutional Court in which it adopted 
a restrictive view of representative democracy (as discussed in chapter four), the Court 
                                            
21 Matatiele Municipality & Others v President of the Republic of South Africa & Others (No 2) 2007 6 
SA 477 (CC) para 58. 
22 F Miraftab “Invited and Invented Spaces of participation: Neoliberal Citizenship and Feminists’ 
expanded notion of politics” (2004) 1 Wagadu 1 7. See also A Cornwall ‘Locating Citizen Participation” 
(2002) 33 IDS Bulletin. 
23 Ss 84(2)(g) and 127 of the Constitution make provision for referendums, which are a form of direct 
democracy; however, the state nevertheless mediates by formulating the questions to be voted on.  
24 Ss 57(1)(b), s 70(1) and 117(1)(b) of the Constitution.  
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has since affirmed that South Africa’s democracy has participatory elements.25 By 
emphasising participatory democracy as contemplated by the Constitution, the Court 
has affirmed why the principle of participation is important and what it seeks to achieve. 
The Court in Doctors for Life linked the principle of participatory democracy to the idea 
that the democratic government must be “accountable, open and transparent”.26 
Additionally participation is important because it creates an active citizenry, enhances 
the “civic dignity” of the citizenry and performs an educative role for those who 
participate.27 Importantly, participation “strengthens the legitimacy of legislation in the 
eyes of the people”.28  
The Constitutional Court has also dealt with the relationship between participatory 
and representative democracy. It has stressed that representative democracy through 
the vote would be inadequate without participatory democracy.29 Participatory 
democracy creates additional mechanisms for instituting a “dialogue” between 
representatives and the electorate.30 The Court has emphasised that the two 
conceptions of democracy should not be seen as being in tension with each other. 
Participatory democracy should supplement representative democracy.31 There is 
                                            
25 Land Access Movement of South Africa and Others v Chairperson of the National Council of 
Provinces and Others 2016 5 SA 635 (CC) para 57; Matatiele Municipality & Others v President of the 
RSA & Others (No 2) 2007 6 SA 477 (CC) (“Matatiele 2”) para 40, also see para 57. 
26 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly & Others 2006 6 SA 416 (CC) para 
116. 
27 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly & Others 2006 6 SA 416 (CC) para 
115. See also Land Access Movement of South Africa and Others v Chairperson of the National Council 
of Provinces and Others 2016 5 SA 635 (CC) para 57 where the court states that “[i]t is beneath the 
dignity of those entitled to be allowed to participate in the legislative process to be denied this 
constitutional right”.   
28 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly & Others 2006 6 SA 416 (CC) para 
115 (emphasis added).  
29 Para 115 where Ngcobo J states:  
“General elections, the foundation of representative democracy, would be meaningless without 
massive participation by the voters. The participation by the public on a continued basis provides 
vitality to the functioning of representative democracy.” 
30 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly & Others 2006 6 SA 416 (CC paras 
111, 115 & 122; and Matatiele 2 paras 40, 59, 50 & 129.  
31 Land Access Movement of South Africa and Others v Chairperson of the National Council of 
Provinces and Others 2016 5 SA 635 (CC) para 57. Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the 
National Assembly & Others 2006 6 SA 416 (CC) para 115. 
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nevertheless a tension between the two, which is evident from the fact that 
participation does not necessarily affect the outcome or decision made by the 
legislature.32 This poses the danger that meaningful participation may be prevented, 
and that public participation may become a sham.33 The court has attempted to 
counter the danger of “sham” participation by determining that there should be 
“reasonable opportunity”34 for participation and that those who participate should 
“enjoy the assurance that they will be listened to”.35 These ideas fit better under 
deliberative democracy and will be discussed below in 5 2 3 3.   
                                            
32 Merafong Demarcation Forum & Others v President of the Republic of South Africa & Others 2008 5 
SA 171 (CC) para 49, 50 and 59.  
33 Merafong Demarcation Forum & Others v President of the Republic of South Africa & Others 2008 5 
SA 171 (CC) para 282. Here Sachs J noted the danger that the perception of the public may be that 
their participation was a mere sham. See further the dissenting judgment of Van der Westhuizen J in 
Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly & Others 2006 6 SA 416 (CC) para 
244 where he states that, if:   
“…all that is required is to ''involve'' the public by, for example, mechanically holding public hearings 
for every piece of legislation…participatory democracy would appear to be quite cosmetic and 
empty, in spite of any idealistic and romantic motivation for promoting it.” 
34 Sachs J stated as follows in Minister of Health and Another v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and 
Others 2006 2 SA 311 (CC) at para 630: 
“The forms of facilitating an appropriate degree of participation in the law-making process are indeed 
capable of infinite variation.  What matters is that at the end of the day a reasonable opportunity is 
offered to members of the public and all interested parties to know about the issues and to have an 
adequate say.  What amounts to a reasonable opportunity will depend on the circumstances of  
each case.” (emphasis added)  
This statement was made with regard to section 4 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 2000 
which deals with administrative action affecting the public.  
35 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly & Others 2006 6 SA 416 (CC) para 
234. On the significance of listening (as opposed to merely “hearing”) in participatory democracy, see 
Bishop (2009) Constitutional Court Review 323. In the recent case of Land Access Movement of South 
Africa and Others v Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces 2016 5 SA 635 (CC), the 
Constitutional Court emphasised that reasonableness is an important indicator to determine whether 
the legislature fulfilled its duty of facilitating public participation. The court uses the reasonableness 
standard to address concerns about “sham” participation. What is reasonable depends on the context 
and circumstances of the case. Land Access Movement of South Africa and Others v Chairperson of 
the National Council of Provinces 2016 5 SA 635 (CC) para 60 and Doctors for Life at para 127. See 
also Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others, Mahlaule and Another v Minister 
of Social Development 2004 6 SA 505 (CC) where Mokgoro J held at para 49 “[i]n dealing with the issue 
of reasonableness, context is all important”. 
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The focus of the jurisprudence on participatory democracy is mainly on the duty of 
the legislature/executive rather than on the participation itself. The court enquires 
whether the legislature has taken reasonable steps to facilitate public participation. 
This reinforces the idea that the space is controlled by the legislature. This seems to 
be the shortcoming of the jurisprudence on participatory democracy. The emphasis is 
on the representatives creating institutional spaces for participation without 
necessarily considering the substantive requirements of what would constitute 
meaningful participation.36   
The Constitutional Court has mostly focussed on the obligation on the State to make 
spaces available for participation and engagement. It thus emphasises participation in 
invited spaces, rather than in spaces created by the people themselves. The obligation 
is on the state to facilitate or create such spaces.  
 
5 2 2 Protest as a form of participatory democracy 
In SATAWU, the Court emphasised that freedom of assembly is part of our 
participatory democracy. In its view, the importance of freedom of assembly for 
democracy lies in its ability to provide for participation of the people in the 
representative system.37  
Freedom of assembly may be part of our participatory democracy as it allows the 
people to participate in the system beyond elections. Furthermore, participatory 
                                            
36 Mnisi and Others v City of Johannesburg (08/17819) [2009] ZAGPJHC 55 para 21 held that “[t]here 
is clearly a profound difference between informing the community of decisions taken and engaging the 
community in arriving at agreed or mediated solutions”. See also L Chenwi “Democratizing the Socio-
Economic Rights-Enforcement Process” in GH Alviar, K Klare & LA Williams (eds) Social and Economic 
Rights in Theory and Practice: Critical Inquiries (2014) 178 182. Chenwi distinguishes between 
meaningful participation and mere participation within the context of meaningful engagement.  
37 The court firstly highlights the importance of freedom of assembly in its historical context. South 
African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas 2013 1 SA 83 (CC) para 62:  
“Spontaneous and organised protest and demonstration were important ways in which the excluded 
and marginalised majority of this country expressed themselves against the apartheid system, and 
was part and parcel of the fabric of the participatory democracy to which they aspired and for which 
they fought.” 
The court then goes on to explain the link between freedom of assembly and participatory democracy 
in footnote 29 by referring to para 115 of Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National 
Assembly & Others 2006 6 SA 416 (CC) which emphasised the importance of public participation in a 
representative system.  
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democracy emphasises dialogue between representatives and the electorate. 
Protests in the form of petitions, demonstrations and assemblies are quite often 
directed at representatives. To that extent, protests can be said to be part of an 
ongoing dialogue between the representatives and the electorate. In addition, 
participatory democracy places an obligation on representatives to facilitate 
participation. Even though protests typically occur in invented rather than invited 
spaces, the State nevertheless plays an important role in controlling those spaces. As 
discussed in chapter three, the legislative framework places quite a bit of control in the 
hands of the local municipality. Protests are therefore reliant on representative 
institutions. In these protests, there is also no decision-making, which seems to place 
freedom of assembly within participatory democracy.  
While certain types of protest may fit comfortably within the participatory paradigm, 
it is doubtful whether all protests can. Some of the protests in Marikana, as discussed 
in chapter two, fit awkwardly with ideas of participatory democracy. These protests 
were in direct opposition to the existing representative system within trade unions and 
the State. While some of the miners’ complaints were directed at these institutions, at 
times there was a complete rejection of these institutionalised spaces. The Marikana 
protests were volatile and unpredictable, and involved a great deal of violence 
between the miners and the police. Even though the model of participatory democracy 
recognises the tension between representatives and the people, it seems to anticipate 
a constructive relationship between them. It does not explain the violence and 
antagonism of existing relationships and seems to assume that more participation — 
in these invited spaces — will create legitimate decisions. Furthermore, in SATAWU 
the court interpreted certain forms of protest as illegitimate forms of expression. On 
this interpretation protests seem to be illegitimate where the police/municipality cannot 
control the participants.38 Where masses of protesters move beyond the bounds of the 
institutionalised control of the police and municipalities, the court seems more willing 
to accept that the participatory space transforms into an illegitimate space of 
expression.  
                                            
38 See the discussion of SATAWU in chapter 3 part 3 3. 
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On some understandings, freedom of assembly, or at least some instances of it, 
occurs outside of participatory democracy.39 Here it is emphasised that protests do 
not take place within “invited” spaces of participation created by government. Instead, 
protests are initiated and created by the people and not their representatives. Atkinson 
emphasises that protests increase where representative and participatory institutions 
fail.40 Protests happen when engagement, in participatory spaces, fail. Duncan also 
seems to distinguish between an operational and institutional participatory democracy 
and protests which seem to fall outside these spaces.41 Woolman emphasises that 
freedom of assembly “vouchsafes a commitment to a form of democracy in which the 
will of the people is not always mediated by political parties and the elites that run 
them”.42 Participatory democracy however relies on the mediation of representatives 
to a certain degree.  
Within the participatory model, freedom of assembly is seen as a vehicle for 
ensuring openness, responsiveness and accountability43 in a mainly representative 
government. As indicated by SATAWU, the Constitutional Court of South Africa seems 
to view freedom of assembly as an example of participatory democracy.44 If the court 
views freedom of assembly as part of the participatory democracy paradigm, then this 
provides a greater space for the State to control dissent. This is problematic as it may 
leave no space for citizens to go outside the bounds of State control by, for example, 
acting in a spontaneous fashion. This leaves limited scope for the power of the people 
to engage in direct democratic action. 
 
                                            
39 Bishop (2009) Constitutional Court Review 320 358-360. Bishop refers to “radical participation”, 
which includes protests, as a part of participatory democracy. However, in this Chapter, the term 
“participatory democracy” is used to refer to what Bishop terms “traditional participation”. 
40 D Atkinson “Taking to the streets: has developmental local government failed in South Africa?” in S 
Buhnlungu, J Daniel, R Southall & J Lutchman (eds) State of the Nation South Africa 2007 (2007) 53-
77. See also C Mbazira “Service delivery protests, struggle for rights and the failure of local democracy 
in South Africa and Uganda: Parallels and divergences” (2013) 29 SAJHR 251-275, 252, 264 and 265. 
Mbazira provides an analysis of local government failure and of public protests as a response to such 
failure.  
41 J Duncan Protest Nation: the right to protest in South Africa (2016) 1.  
42 Woolman (2011) SAJHR 348. 
43 S 1(d) of the Constitution refers to democratic government to ensure accountability, responsiveness 
and openness. 
44 South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas 2013 1 SA 83 (CC) paras 62 and 64. 
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5 2 3 Deliberative democracy 
5 2 3 1 Brief overview 
Deliberative democracy is similar to participatory democracy and also developed 
as part of a critique of restrictive understandings of representative democracy. It is 
closely linked to institutionalised forms of participatory democracy, but is more 
concerned with the manner in which decisions are taken.45 There are different versions 
of deliberative democracy, but most of these have been influenced by Habermas and 
Rawls, the major contributors to this model of democratic thought.46 
Similar to participatory democracy, deliberative democracy seeks to improve the 
quality of democracy. Deliberative democrats also place their ideas within existing 
representative systems. Thus, they do not seek to replace or challenge existing 
representative institutions, but rather want to ensure that the decisions made by 
political institutions, participatory bodies or representative institutions (such as 
Parliament), follow a procedure that is rational, fair and inclusive. In this sense 
deliberative democracy can be seen as a procedural form of democracy.47 Deliberative 
democracy therefore tries to avoid questions of substance. Deliberative democrats 
accept that there will be disagreement on substantive issues as a result of the plurality 
of values, and consequently focus on reaching a rational consensus through the 
dialogical procedure of deliberation. In order for decisions to be legitimate there needs 
to be a discussion (deliberation) between informed participants on an equal platform.48 
Habermas argues, “political choice must be the outcome of deliberation about ends 
among free, equal and rational agents”.49 This model is based on certain values such 
as rationality and impartiality.50 It is an institutionalised model of democracy as it 
requires systems to be put in place for a platform to be created for participation.51  
                                            
45 For a full explanation of certain primary features of deliberative democracy see M Freeman 
“Deliberative Democracy: A Sympathetic Comment” (2000) 29 Philosophy and Public Affairs 371–418. 
See also Bishop (2009) Constitutional Court Review 321. 
46 See C Mouffe The Democratic Paradox (2005) 84. See also Roux “Democracy” in CLOSA10-16; J 
Habermas Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy 
(trans W Rehg, 1996); J Rawls Political Liberalism (1993). 
47 Roux “Democracy” in CLOSA 10-17; Vitale (2006) Philosophy & Social Criticism 745-747.  
48 Bishop (2009) Constitutional Court Review 320 321. 
49 J Elster “Introduction” in J Elster (ed) Deliberative Democracy (1998) 1 5. 
50 Elster “Introduction” in Deliberative Democracy 1 5. See also Held Models of democracy 238-245. 
51 Vitale (2006) Philosophy & Social Criticism 745.  
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A key element of deliberative democracy is its emphasis on a specific type of 
discourse and how this discourse should be communicated from the citizenry to the 
elected.52 This discourse is intended to create a mutual understanding (consensus)53 
and is characterised by listening.54 Another significant component of deliberative 
democracy is public reasoning.55 The people should be given the opportunity to reflect 
on political issues and the decisions and policies of their leaders.56 Whereas 
participatory democracy emphasises the need to create participatory spaces, 
deliberative democracy focuses on the type of participation and the nature of the 
space. People should be given an opportunity to express their voice.57 Deliberative 
democracy presupposes an elimination of power politics in order to create a space in 
which participants can engage on an equal footing and reach a rational consensus.58 
 
5 2 3 2 Deliberative democracy in South Africa  
In addition to participatory democracy, the South African Constitution is also said to 
support a form of deliberative democracy.59 Even though the term “deliberative 
democracy” is not used in the text of the Constitution, the Constitution contains various 
provisions which overlap with the ideal of deliberative democracy. For instance, it 
makes provision for public access to parliamentary forums, public participation in the 
                                            
52 J Dryzek and P Dunleavy Theories of the Democratic State (2009) 219. 
53 See Vitale “Between participatory and deliberative democracy” (2006) Philosophy & Social Criticism 
741-743; and J Flynn “Communicative Power in Habermas’s Theory of Democracy” (2004) 3 EJPT 
433 436. 
54 Bishop (2009) Constitutional Court Review 323.  
55 See Freeman (2000) Philosophy and Public Affairs 371–411. See also J Cohen “Procedure and 
substance in deliberative democracy” in S Benhabib (ed) Democracy and difference: Contesting the 
boundaries of the political (1996) 67. 
56 C Van der Westhuizen “Democratising South Africa: towards a ‘conflictual consensus’” in H Botha, N 
Schaks & D Steiger (eds) Das Ende des repräsentativen Staates? Demokratie am Scheideweg/The 
End of the Representative State? Democracy at the Crossroads (2016) 75 80. 
57 80.  
58 Vitale (2006) Philosophy & Social Criticism 758. Here Vitale discusses the need for equality in the 
economic and social spheres in order to ensure political equality. See further Freeman 
(2000) Philosophy and Public Affairs 392. See also the critique of deliberative democratic conceptions 
of impartiality in Held Models of democracy 238-245. 
59 Democratic Alliance & another v Masondo NO & another 2003 2 SA 413 (CC) para 42. See generally 
Freeman (2000) Philosophy and Public Affairs 371–418.  
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legislative process,60 and the participation of minority parties in legislative 
committees.61 These provisions emphasise that the participation of diverse groups and 
interests is important in the parliamentary process. As the parliamentary process is 
fundamentally a space of deliberation and debate,62 ensuring the inclusion of the 
public and minority parties in these spaces strengthens the idea that deliberation 
should consider all voices.    
The Constitution requires a democratic system to ensure “accountability, 
responsiveness and openness”.63 This reinforces the idea of open communication 
between the people and the elected. It is also linked to the idea of reflection and debate 
among the electorate on social, economic and political matters, as a means of holding 
elected representatives accountable. Additionally, the Constitution requires a move 
from a “culture of authority ... to a culture of justification”.64 This culture of justification 
requires all exercises of public power to be defensible and justified. In Matatiele 
Municipality & Others v President of the Republic of South Africa & Others 
(“Matatiele”),65 Sachs J emphasised that, in order to achieve the goals of openness, 
accountability and responsiveness, the legislature must provide a rational explanation 
for legislative decisions.66 On this view, South Africa’s democracy requires a specific 
                                            
60 Ss 59 (1), 72(1), 118 (1) of the Constitution.  
61 Ss 57(2)(b), 116(2)(b) and 160(8). See Democratic Alliance & another v Masondo NO & another 2003 
2 SA 413 (CC) para18 where Langa DCJ states: 
 “[s]ection 160(8) is couched in terms very similar to provisions concerning the national legislature 
(section 57(2)(b)) and the provincial legislatures (section 116(2)(b)). The purpose of these provisions 
is to ensure that minority parties can participate meaningfully in the deliberative processes of 
parliament, provincial legislatures and municipal councils respectively”. 
62 On the deliberative nature of Parliament see Swartbooi & Others v Brink 2003 5 BCLR 502 (CC) para 
20; Dikoko v Mokhatla 2007 1 BCLR 1 (CC) para 39. These cases deal with the importance of freedom 
of speech in relation to the privilege of members of the legislature to ensure open democratic debate 
and deliberation.  
63 S 1(d) of the Constitution.  
64 E Mureinik “A bridge to where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights” (1994) 10 SAJHR 31. This 
sentiment was also quoted in Prinsloo v Van der Linde and Another 1997 3 SA 1012 (CC) para 25.  
65 2006 5 SA 47(CC). 
66 It is appropriate to quote Sachs J in Matatiele para 110:  
“Far from the foundational values of the rule of law and of accountable government existing in 
discreet categories, they overlap and reinforce each other. Openness of government promotes both 
the rationality that the rule of law requires, and the accountability that multi-party democracy 
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type of communication between the elected and the electorate in order for the 
decisions of the elected to be legitimate.67 Such communication has to be informed by 
openness.  
In this context it is also important to refer to certain cases which affirm the 
deliberative nature of South Africa’s democracy. In Democratic Alliance & another v 
Masondo (“Masondo”)68 Sachs J emphasised the importance of dialogue and 
deliberative democracy. For the decisions of State bodies to be legitimate, deliberative 
procedures must be in place which allow all interested parties to participate in 
discussions. In the view of Sachs J, the deliberative nature of our Constitution requires 
that all parties are heard, that there is meaningful deliberation and that all parties are 
given a dignified role in such deliberation.69 This attaches importance to the “dialogic” 
role of deliberation which presupposes that meaningful debate must take place in 
democratic bodies (such as parliament and executive bodies).70 Sachs J’s sentiments 
were quoted and used in later cases to reinforce the idea that South Africa’s 
Constitution envisages decision-making procedures that are deliberative in nature.71 
Deliberative readings of South Africa’s Constitution are supported by the idea that 
certain provisions in the Bill of Rights require that people should be given the 
opportunity to participate in decision-making processes that have a bearing on their 
rights and interests.72 From this perspective, the Bill of Rights is also a deliberative 
tool to establish a dialogical relationship between the people and the government, as 
                                            
demands. In our constitutional order, the legitimacy of laws made by Parliament comes not from 
awe, but from openness” (emphasis added).  
67The sentiments expressed by Sachs J in Matatiele paras 99-110 indicate that openness and 
transparency promote rationality. In order for the public to measure the rationality of deliberation, it 
requires transparency from the government. Consequently, Sachs J emphasises rationality in 
deliberation, which is a key component in deliberative democracies.  
68 2003 2 SA 413 (CC). 
69 Democratic Alliance & another v Masondo NO & another 2003 2 SA 413 (CC) para 42-43.  
70 Para 42-43. 
71 Oriani-Ambrosini, MP v Sisulu, MP, Speaker of the National Assembly 2012 6 SA 588 (CC) paras 
47-48; Mazibuko v Sisulu 2013 6 SA 249 (CC) para 44; and Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the 
National Assembly 2016 5 BCLR 577 (CC) paras 11-17. 
72 S Liebenberg “Engaging the paradoxes of the universal and particular in human rights adjudication: 
the possibilities and pitfalls of ‘meaningful engagement’” (2012) 12 AHRLJ 1 11-13. 
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well as between institutions and branches of government.73 The Constitutional Court 
specifically used such a deliberative reading of the Constitution in its jurisprudence 
relating to eviction and its formulation of the requirement of “meaningful engagement”.  
 
5 3 2 3 Deliberative democracy and meaningful engagement74 
The deliberative model of democracy has received concrete formulation in the 
Constitutional Court’s development of the adjudicatory strategy of meaningful 
engagement, originally developed within the ambit of section 26(3) of the Constitution 
and evictions cases.75 Chenwi refers to meaningful engagement as a “mandatory 
consultation process between the parties ordered by the courts in the course of 
enforcing socio-economic rights”.76 The court has established it as a requirement for 
reasonable State action in relation to socio-economic rights and as a remedial model.77 
The Constitutional Court first referred to the idea of meaningful participation — in 
relation to disputes regarding the content and ambit of socio economic rights — in the 
case of Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers (“PE Municipality”).78 This 
case dealt with evictions and housing rights, and the difficulty of providing solutions to 
such contentious disputes. The court stated: 
 
                                            
73 W le Roux “Descriptive overview of the South African Constitution and Constitutional Court” in O 
Vilhena, U Baxi and F Viljoen (eds) Transformative constitutionalism: Comparing the apex courts of 
Brazil, India and South Africa (2013) 135 145-146. 
74 Meaningful engagement is also described as being part of the participatory model of democracy. See 
Chenwi “Democratizing the Socio-Economic Rights-Enforcement Process” in Social and Economic 
Rights 184 where she states that “[m]eaningful engagement thus lies at the heart of democracy —  it 
enhances the possibilities for deliberative, participatory democracy”. See also B Ray 
“Proceduralisation’s Triumph and Engagement’s Promise in in Socio-economic Rights Litigation” (2011) 
27 SAJHR 107 109, 114.  
75 Liebenberg (2012) AHRLJ 13-28. See also S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under 
a Transformative Constitution (2010) 293-303 and 418-423.  
76 Chenwi “Democratizing the Socio-Economic Rights-Enforcement Process” in Social and Economic 
Rights 178 179.  
77 The first time the Constitutional Court used meaningful engagement in the remedial process was in 
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC). See also Chenwi 
“Democratizing the Socio-Economic Rights-Enforcement Process” in Social and Economic Rights 185-
188. 
78 2004 12 BCLR 1268 (CC). 
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“one potentially dignified and effective mode of achieving sustainable reconciliations of the 
different interests involved is to encourage and require the parties to engage with each 
other in a pro-active and honest endeavour to find mutually acceptable solutions. Wherever 
possible, respectful face-to-face engagement or mediation through a third party should 
replace arms-length combat by intransigent opponents.”79 
 
Additionally, PE Municipality emphasises that there is a need for “equality of voice 
for all concerned”.80 Sachs J also highlighted that “procedural and substantive aspects 
of justice and equity cannot always be separated”.81 From this perspective, socio-
economic rights necessitate the involvement of the holders of these rights. This 
reinforces the deliberative nature of South African democracy by ensuring that all 
people who are affected by decision-making are given a chance to give their input, 
and thus to participate in the process of giving concrete content to these rights.82  
The Constitutional Court elaborated on this idea in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v 
City of Johannesburg (“Olivia Road”),83 by requiring the parties to the dispute to 
“engage with each other meaningfully… in an effort to resolve the differences and 
difficulties… in the light of the values of the Constitution, the constitutional and 
statutory duties of the municipality and the rights and duties of the citizens 
concerned”.84 Olivia Road also concerned the constitutionality of evictions.85 The 
Court characterised meaningful engagement as a “two-way process” in which all 
                                            
79 Para 39 (emphasis added). 
80 Para 30. 
81 Para 41. 
82 Liebenberg (2012) 12 AHRLJ 1 11. Liebenberg describes how various rights in the Bill of Rights 
contribute to people’s involvement in the process of giving content to these rights. She writes: 
 “Many of the rights in the South African Bill of Rights, ranging from freedom of association, freedom 
of expression, access to information and just administrative action, enable and facilitate people’s 
involvement in a range of decision-making processes which define and affect their rights. The Bill of 
Rights thus protects a set of substantive values and interests as well as people’s right to participate 
in fundamental decisions that affect these values and interests.” 
83 2008 3 SA 208 (CC). 
84 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) para 5. 
85 See para 1-22. 
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parties should “act reasonably and in good faith” and should not make “non-negotiable, 
unreasonable demands”.86 
Meaningful engagement therefore requires a specific type of deliberation between 
the State and those affected by State decisions. Although it dictates the creation of a 
dialogical relationship in which parties are equal, meaningful engagement still places 
considerable decision-making power in the hands of State institutions.87 
 
5 2 4 Protests as a form of deliberative democracy 
Deliberative democracy envisages an inclusive process aimed at ensuring that all 
who are affected by decision-making are included in the deliberative spaces where 
decisions are made. Freedom of assembly has an important role to play in this vision, 
as it enhances the people’s ability to voice their opinions and to influence decision-
making. It can also play an important part in the formation of public opinion and putting 
pressure on institutions which are not inclusive. However, freedom of assembly does 
not fit comfortably into the mould of deliberative democracy in all respects. This is so 
for a number of reasons. First, freedom of assembly includes protection for certain 
types of demonstrations and protests that do not sit easily with deliberative democrats’ 
understanding of rationality and reason. Secondly, proponents of deliberative 
democracy favour a type of democratic engagement that is characterised by 
sensibility, pragmatism and a willingness to listen to the other side. Again, there are 
many demonstrations and protests that do not fit this description. Thirdly, deliberative 
conceptions of democracy tend to focus on institutionalised spaces of participation. 
Fourthly, deliberative understandings of democracy suppress the conflictual power 
relations that are constitutive of many forms of assembly.  
First, deliberative democrats favour forms of communication that are reasoned and 
rational.88 The rationality of deliberations is grounded in the procedures or rules of 
                                            
86 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) paras 14-20. See also G 
Muller “Conceptualising ‘Meaningful Engagement’ as a Deliberative Democratic Partnership” (2011) 22 
Stell LR 742 755-756. 
87 This has been particularly the case in Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v 
Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC). See particularly paras 112-113, 244-247, 301-304, 378-85. 
88 I Young “Activist challenges to deliberative democracy” (2001) 29 Political Theory 670 675-676. 
Young describes how the actions of activists participating in protests may be unreasonable by a 
deliberative democrat’s standards. While protesters and activists engage in activities which are “not 
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engagement. These procedures favour verbal over non-verbal communication, and 
rational argument over other forms of expression. By dictating the measure of reason 
and rationality, these procedures sometimes exclude a large portion of the population 
who cannot or do not wish to partake in this so-called rational manner.89 
Understanding freedom of assembly through the lens of deliberative democracy may 
therefore be problematic for a number of reasons. These include: the importance of 
non-verbal means of communication to freedom of assembly; the fact that many 
assemblies and demonstrations are aimed precisely at disruption and destabilisation; 
and the fact that protests allow a form of communication where the people can dictate 
the method of communication.  
Secondly, but closely related to the first point, deliberative democrats emphasise 
the importance of a certain type of engagement (or discourse ethics) that is 
characterised by a sensible and pragmatic attitude. Within the context of meaningful 
engagement, the court in Olivia Road emphasised that “the people” should “not 
content themselves with an intransigent attitude or nullify the engagement process by 
making non-negotiable, unreasonable demands”.90 The court in PE Municipality also 
noted the need for “parties to relate to each other in pragmatic and sensible ways”.91 
While these characterisations of democratic engagement within certain forums make 
sense from a deliberative point of view, there is a danger in extending this logic to 
demonstrations and protests. Processes like meaningful engagement arguably 
attempt to eliminate the power relations, emotions and frustrations which characterise 
the relationship between the parties. This is an important strategy within certain 
contexts. However, it seems misplaced to extend it to freedom of assembly, which 
provides a channel in which people can vent their frustrations in ways that do not 
necessarily conform to deliberative democrats’ understanding of what is sensible or 
reasonable. Viewing freedom of assembly through the lens of deliberative democracy 
considerably narrows the scope for protests that are aimed, wholly or in part, at the 
disruption or destabilisation of the status quo. It also underestimates the power of 
                                            
deliberative, then, in the sense of engaging in orderly reason giving, most activist political engagements 
aim to communicate specific ideas to a wide public” (emphasis added). 
89 Mouffe The Democratic Paradox 45. 
90 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) para 20. 
91 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 12 BCLR 1268 (CC) para 43 (emphasis added). 
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protests, contentious struggles and spontaneous political action to contribute to the 
content given to rights outside these deliberative processes.92 
Thirdly, deliberative democracy, like participatory democracy, tends to favour 
institutional over extra-institutional spaces of participation. Therefore, similar criticisms 
to those noted in 5 2 2 apply. While deliberative spaces are inclusive, they are also 
mostly invited spaces where the rules of engagement are largely dictated by those 
with power (namely the representatives). Protests seek to challenge these spaces 
outside the norms of these institutions. For protesters, it is difficult to challenge the 
system in these spaces. These invited spaces of deliberation attempt to be inclusive, 
but an invited space does not allow for protesters to create and initiate new spaces 
outside these deliberative institutions.  
 Finally, deliberative democracy is sometimes criticised for failing to recognise the 
importance of power and antagonism.93 That is because it aims to create a space 
within which parties, who are fully equal, can move towards mutual understanding and 
ultimately a rational consensus. The focus is on procedural standards, rather than 
substantive issues.94 Deliberative democrats assume that, while there cannot 
necessarily be consensus on substantive issues in a pluralistic society, consensus on 
the procedures to be followed can ensure a deliberative space of rational discourse 
between equal parties. In their view, procedures that are neutral with regard to 
substantive issues can help to eliminate power relations from deliberative spaces. This 
raises questions over the capacity of deliberative conceptions of democracy to explain 
freedom of assembly. Deliberative democrats highlight rationality at the expense of 
the conflictual dissent and antagonism which are inherent in protest action.95 Because 
it favours rational argument, it excludes communication in the form of demonstrations 
and assemblies which attempt to disrupt the norms of society which dictate what is 
irrational and rational. By trying to create platforms of equal participation through 
                                            
92 See S Liebenberg & K Young “Adjudicating Social and Economic Rights: Can Democratic 
Experimentalism Help?” in GH Alviar, K Klare & LA Williams (eds) Social and Economic Rights in Theory 
and Practice: Critical Inquiries (2014) 237 249.  
93 Mouffe The Democratic Paradox 48, 49 and 100. 
94 Van der Westhuizen “Democratising South Africa” in The End of the Representative State? 
Democracy at the Crossroads 81. 
95 Mouffe The Democratic Paradox 21 and 48. 
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eliminating power relations, it ignores the realities of the inherent power relations and 
biases which are sometimes intrinsic in the norms which form the rules of engagement.     
 
5 2 5 Beyond participation and deliberation 
South African courts recognise the importance of freedom of assembly,96 and 
emphasise that it enables people to express their opinions in an organised manner 
and show their dissent.97 The courts’ reasoning and decision making are nevertheless 
often characterised by a cautious approach. The caution adopted by the courts is 
understandable, given the destabilising effects that dissent and protest action can 
have. However, this approach creates a limitation of the right even prior to exercise of 
the right.98 It also indicates that courts are inclined to limit this right without having to 
delve into the realities and meaning of protest and dissent and how this relates to 
democratic participation.  
The Brokdorf case refers to freedom of assembly as an “early political warning 
sign”.99 As an early warning sign it influences government to prevent even greater 
discontent and the breakdown of the representative model.100 The failure of 
government to respond and create a dialogue with “the people” highlights the need 
that the public feels for another means of dialogue (namely protest), and may also 
indicate the failure of the representative and participatory models, particularly at the 
level of local government.101 This failure is partly demonstrated by the increase and 
regularity of service delivery protests.102 On the surface these protests are aimed 
specifically at service delivery issues, but they also speak to a deeper problem. In the 
                                            
96 South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas 2013 1 SA 83 (CC) para 61.  
97South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 1999 4 SA 469 (CC) para 8.  
98 See 3 2 1. 
99 BVerfGE 69, 315, 347. 
100 BVerfGE 69, 315, 347. 
101 Mbazira “Service delivery protests” (2013) SAJHR 251-275, 252, 264 and 265.  
102 MC Dawson “Resistance and Repression: policing protest in post-apartheid South Africa” in J 
Handmaker & R Berkhout (eds) Mobilising Social Justice in South Africa: Perspectives from 
Researchers and Practitioners (2010) 109-113.  
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view of some commentators, they are evidence of discontent with and distrust of the 
very representative institutions which, for many, symbolise democracy.103 
Attempts to understand protests in participatory and deliberative terms, are reliant 
on the very institutions which protests seem to oppose. Certain types of deliberation 
and participation through protest action can be understood in terms of these models. 
For these types of protests there needs to be some sort of trust in the ability of those 
institutional forms of democracy to represent their interests. However, there are protest 
actions which seem to indicate a fundamental distrust of institutional spaces of 
participation. Furthermore, understanding protests in these spaces underestimate 
their disruptive potential which can be vital for democracy.104 It does not follow from 
the institutionalisation of spaces of participation that there cannot be extra-institutional 
spaces for the people to exert their power.105 Protests are potentially conflictual, 
disruptive and disorderly. But that is what makes them powerful. The people’s power, 
which can sometimes take the form of insurrectional power, plays an important role in 
challenging the law and transforming society by creating new spaces for those who 
are powerless in institutionalised and “fixed”/stable spaces of democracy.106 Through 
conflict and disruption, protests recognise the problems within society and challenge 
the status quo (which is sometimes protected and reinforced by participatory 
spaces).107 Protests do not necessarily undermine the institutions of representative 
democracy. However, by challenging these institutions outside the normal institutional 
participatory and deliberative spaces, protests have the ability to create new spaces 
of democratic contestation and transform existing ones. Protests can then act as an 
                                            
103 Dawson “Resistance and Repression” in Mobilising Social Justice in South Africa 113-119 and 128. 
The examples provided by Dawson show that the level of discontent is directed at the representatives 
of local government and not necessarily democracy itself.  
104 J Brown South Africa’s Insurgent Citizens (2015) 19-25. Brown provides an analysis of the power of 
protests to disrupt. The very power of protest, as opposed to other forms of political expression, is its 
power of a “disruption of the sensible”. 
105 Botha (2017) Law, Democracy and Development 2213-4.  
106 É Balibar Equaliberty: political essays (2014) 18, 31-33 and 37. Balibar emphasises the power of 
insurrection as an important part of creating new spaces. Social movements use this power to create 
new spaces of contestation and to transform existing ones in order to “win rights that do not yet exist or 
expand those that do”. 
107 Young (2001) Political Theory 670 679.  
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“early political warning sign” by pressuring the normal spaces of deliberation and 
participation and thereby strengthening them.  
By understanding protests in terms of participatory and deliberative processes, and 
by attempting to minimise or eliminate the conflict involved, we risk diminishing the 
very power and potential of protest action. At the same time, it is problematic to 
understand protests simply as undermining or extinguishing representative democratic 
institutions. Although protest movements work outside institutions, it is not always 
helpful to understand protests as a form of democracy which challenges the very 
legitimacy of the state and representative institutions.108 What is needed is a better 
understanding of the capacity of protest action both to engage with and enrich the 
institutions of representative democracy, and to provide spaces of disruption, 
contestation and antagonism. 
While deliberative and participatory democracy can explain certain protest actions, 
it is not possible to understand disruptive protests in terms of these models. The idea 
of agonistic democracy, as developed by Chantal Mouffe, may be more useful in this 
respect. 
  
5 3 Agonistic democracy 
5 3 1 Agonistic pluralism and an adversarial model of democracy 
Mouffe develops a model of democracy from a critique of deliberative democracy 
and its shortcomings. As stated above, deliberative democracy seeks to establish a 
“rational consensus”. Deliberative democrats accept the inevitability of substantive 
disagreement in modern societies because of a pluralism of values, but emphasise 
that these disagreements do not have to affect the possibility of a rational consensus 
in the public or political sphere.109 By shifting these questions — which may result in 
substantive disagreement — to outside the deliberative space in order to establish 
such a rational consensus, a type of deliberative democracy emerges which limits 
                                            
108 S Newman “Occupy and Autonomous Political Life” in A Kioupkiolis & G Katsambekis (eds) Radical 
Democracy and Collective Movements Today (2014) 93 100-101.  
109 Rawls attempts to shift these questions of disagreement (on controversial issues) to the private 
sphere of life. See Mouffe The Democratic Paradox 28-29; C Mouffe The Return of the Political (1993) 
50-51. Habermas shifts disagreements over different conceptions of the “good life”, which are the 
domain of ethics, from this space of an ideal discourse. According to Mouffe, he thus attempts to 
eliminate the very idea of the political which is constitutive of power relations and tensions. 
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antagonism by reducing spaces of contestation. As Mouffe states, “[p]rovided that the 
procedures of the deliberation secure impartiality, equality, openness and lack of 
coercion, they will guide the deliberation towards generalizable interests which can be 
agreed by all participants, thereby producing legitimate outcomes”.110 Therefore the 
legitimacy of decisions is ensured through the procedure of participation and 
deliberation. However, Mouffe argues that this type of rational consensus is an 
impossibility, because procedures already have predetermined ethical 
commitments.111 Furthermore, in order to establish this “ideal discourse” within the 
deliberative model there needs to be an elimination of power and contestation.112  
Mouffe contends that it is impossible to extinguish antagonism and relations of power 
in a democratic society. Mouffe states: 
 
 “…according to the deliberative approach, the more democratic a society is, the less power 
would be constitutive of social relations. But if we accept that relations of power are 
constitutive of the social, then the main question for democratic politics is not how to 
eliminate power but how to constitute forms of power more compatible with democratic 
values”.113  
 
For Mouffe, democratic politics must validate and recognise the inherent conflict 
and aim to create what she refers to as “agonistic pluralism”. Politics and political 
spaces are constructed by distinguishing between “us” and “them”.114 In various 
spaces of contestation and antagonism, the “them” is construed as an enemy. 
                                            
110 Mouffe The Democratic Paradox 89 and 48.  
111 Mouffe The Democratic Paradox 68 and 97. As Mouffe puts it, “…a strict separation between 
‘procedural’ and ‘substantial’ or between ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’, separations which are central to the 
Habermasian approach, cannot be maintained. Procedures always involve substantial ethical 
commitments, and there can never be such a thing as purely neutral procedures”.  
112 S Benhabib “Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy” in S Benhabib (ed) Democracy 
and Difference (1996) 68. As stated by Benhabib, “legitimacy in complex democratic societies must be 
thought to result from the free and unconstrained public deliberation of all on matters of common 
concern”. “Free and unconstrained” and impartiality emphasise that relations of power need to be 
eliminated in order to establish equality and lack of coercion.  
113 Mouffe The Democratic Paradox 100.  
114  Mouffe The Democratic Paradox 101. It is important to note how Mouffe defines “politics” and the 
“political”. For Mouffe the political is “the dimension of antagonism which is inherent in human relations”. 
Mouffe defines politics as indicating “the ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions which seek 
to establish a certain order and organize human coexistence in conditions that are always potentially 
conflictual because they are affected by the dimension of ‘the political’’’. 
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Agonistic pluralism should aim to transform the enemies “to be destroyed” into 
adversaries.115 Mouffe thus distinguishes between antagonism and agonism. While 
antagonism refers to a struggle between enemies, agonism is the struggle between 
adversaries.116  An adversary is acknowledged as a legitimate enemy.117  
Mouffe accepts that there must be a consensus on specific values which underpin 
a democratic society, but this must be a “conflictual consensus”.118 This conflict should 
be played on the terrain of different conceptions of citizenship. There should be 
confrontations between diverse interpretations of the values underpinning the 
democratic society, which give rise to these spaces of contestations and clashes of 
adversaries.119 Key to this model of democracy is that it places the very spaces of 
contestation and antagonism at its centre. For Mouffe, the key proposition of agonistic 
pluralism is that “far from jeopardising democracy, agonistic confrontation is in fact its 
very condition of  existence”.120 
 
5 3 2 From the sensible and rational to a ‘conflictual consensus’ in South Africa 
In the deliberative conception of democracy, forms of democratic participation 
which do not fit the mould of the sensible and reasonable are not considered 
legitimate. 
Deliberative democrats are of the view that once a consensus is established which 
is reasonable and rational, there cannot be a challenge to this legitimate space. Any 
challenge to this consensus would be from persons who are irrational and 
unreasonable.121 In legislative bodies, which are deliberative forums, a specific type 
of dialogue is expected. The problem is that the procedural means of interaction and 
dialogue that are relied on in an attempt to eliminate power, are in themselves 
constitutive of power. As shown by Mouffe: 
 
                                            
115 Mouffe The Democratic Paradox 101-103. 
116 101-103. 
117 An adversary is “somebody whose ideas we combat but whose right to defend those ideas we do 
not put into question”.  Mouffe The Democratic Paradox 102. 
118 103. 
119 103-104. 
120 103. 
121  Mouffe The Return of the Political 28-29 and 24-25. 
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“…who decides what is reasonable and what is not reasonable? In politics the very 
distinction between ‘reasonable’ and ‘unreasonable’ is already the drawing of a frontier; it 
has a political character and is always the expression of a given hegemony.”122 
 
As demonstrated by Christi Van der Westhuizen, deliberative democratic 
understandings in South Africa are exclusionary. Van der Westhuizen uses the activist 
politics employed by the Economic Freedom Fighters (“EFF”) to show how 
parliamentary institutions, as deliberative forums, result in an exclusion of certain 
voices. The EFF’s parliamentary activism is a form of radical democratic contestation 
which brings about Mouffe’s “conflictual consensus”.123 Van der Westhuizen describes 
the activism of the EFF as bringing “a previously excluded voice that is socio-politically 
marginalised into the parliamentary discourse”.124 While the EFF uses non-
conventional modes of participation in these forums, the African National Congress 
(“ANC”) uses the concepts of rational deliberation and reasonableness to legitimise 
the exclusion and suppression of dissenting voices.125 They exclude these voices by 
insisting that the manner of participation has to be in accordance with what they regard 
as reasonable and rational. Van der Westhuizen also demonstrates how ideological 
enemies, like the Democratic Alliance (“DA”) and the EFF have collaborated to 
challenge the majority party.126 This shift highlights how parties with competing 
ideologies can transform into adversaries in agonistic pluralistic understandings of 
democracy.  Understanding South Africa’s democracy as shifting to a new paradigm 
where enemies are transformed into adversaries also allows for different types of 
contestation and activist politics within traditional deliberative settings.  
Similarly, the deliberative adjudicatory model of meaningful engagement highlights 
a dialogue which allows parties to engage in sensible ways and not be “unreasonable”. 
This normally results in the State determining what qualifies as reasonable and 
                                            
122 148. 
123 Botha (2017) Law, Democracy and Development 221; Van der Westhuizen “Democratising South 
Africa” in The End of the Representative State? Democracy at the Crossroads 75 95-101.  
124 Van der Westhuizen “Democratising South Africa” in /The End of the Representative State? 
Democracy at the Crossroads 100. 
125 98. 
126 97-100. 
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sensible,127 and participation outside the sensible is deemed illegitimate. Meaningful 
engagement has been advanced as a form of democratic experimentalism.128 
Democratic experimentalism has been described as a “new paradigm of institutional 
thinking about democracy and law”.129 It is an inclusive approach which seeks to 
include various parties in rethinking the implementation and content of rights. It 
specifically seeks to establish a more pragmatic, deliberative approach to bring state 
institutions and various other stakeholders together in order to coordinate and 
negotiate solutions to diverse solutions.130 It also specifically highlights the 
adjudicatory role of the courts in this inclusive process. A critique of democratic 
experimentalism — and consequently meaningful engagement — is that it minimises 
the role of contentious political and cultural processes through which rights can acquire 
meaning. As stated by Liebenberg and Young, “democratic experimentalism seems to 
ignore the potential contributions of spontaneous, not fully deliberative and possibly 
confrontational political action and expression”.131 This reveals how a deliberative 
conception such as experimentalism also possibly excludes voices that participate in 
confrontational and contentious ways. It is possible however in a conflictual 
consensus, to allow these contentious forms of participation into democratic 
institutions and remedial strategies. 
 
5 3 3 Protests in an adversarial model of democracy 
The restrictive and marginal position of freedom of assembly within South Africa’s 
constitutional discourse132 can be attributed to the emphasis on a deliberative, 
participatory reading of the Constitution within an established model of representative 
                                            
127 Given the State’s decision making power, it has a large degree of power in these deliberative spaces. 
See footnote 97 above. 
128 Liebenberg & Young “Adjudicating Social and Economic Rights” in Social and Economic Rights in 
Theory and Practice: Critical Inquiries 243. 
129 237. 
130 239. Democratic experimentalism is not confined to remedial strategies but is labelled as “an entirely 
new architecture for governing”.  
131 249.  
132 As discussed in chapter 3. 
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democracy.133 This institutional and procedural focus of participation and deliberation 
has shifted the ‘politics of the street’ — in the form of disruptive protests — to the 
periphery of constitutional thought. As highlighted above, these conceptions focus on 
processes which privilege ideal discourse and rational deliberation above the 
contentious and conflictual.  
As indicated in chapter two, protests can be violent, destabilising and spaces of 
antagonism. Agonistic democracy may remedy the shortcomings of deliberative and 
participatory conceptions of democracy within South Africa which exclude these 
important voices of activism in protests. The emphasis should not be on replacing the 
deliberative and participatory conceptions, but to allow for an agonistic theory to inform 
ideas on protests which are better served to understand power, conflict and disruption. 
The agnostic model may re-establish the centrality of protests to democratic politics. 
This is because agonistic pluralism places conflict and power as its focal point.  
 Deliberative and participatory institutions regard an established consensus on 
specific liberal ideals as necessary before participation can occur in an ideal manner. 
By contrast, agonistic pluralism seeks to create spaces of contestation in which the 
rules of participation and the content of those political ideals can be challenged. It 
allows protesters to contest the meaning and content of rights. It acknowledges that 
these political ideals are indeterminate and indefinite. Protests, within agnostic 
pluralism, constantly seek to contest the meaning of the reasonable and rational by 
bringing new challenges to political ideals such as equality, freedom and dignity.  
Protests typically stand outside the spaces of institutional participation. Agnostic 
pluralism assists in understanding the disruptive potential of protest action in disrupting 
existing power relations. As pointed out by Mouffe, interaction in democracies between 
various parties in existing institutions and through established practices articulates its 
own hegemony. The identities and positions of these parties in this democratic 
interaction are shaped by these dominant relations of power.134 Agonistic pluralism 
recognises these power relations. Rather than attempting to eliminate these power 
relations prior to interaction, it recognises that deliberative and participatory institutions 
                                            
133 The mention of freedom of assembly as a form of direct democracy has further moved academic 
writings on freedom of assembly to the periphery of constitutional thought. Therefore, this adds to the 
marginal and restrictive role it plays in modern representative democracy.  See chapter 4 part 4 3.  
134 Mouffe The Democratic Paradox 99-100.  
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are constitutive of these relations. This allows for forms of participation which 
challenge the norms of existing powers.  
In an adversarial model of democracy, there is a transformation from enemies to 
adversaries. This allows the state to view protesters as adversaries rather than 
enemies to be destroyed (as in Marikana) or as irrational or unreasonable. Rather than 
excluding these voices as irrational, unreasonable, criminal or unlawful, this 
adversarial mode allows the State to disagree with protesters, yet to see their 
disruptive demonstrations as legitimate in a democracy which seeks to be inclusive. 
The shift from enemy to adversary may assist in allowing the relationship to be 
characterised not by violence and the silencing of voices, but by forms of contestation 
and antagonism which recognise the worth of disruptive participation.  Such a shift on 
the part of the State will allow protesters to change their conception of the State as an 
enemy to be destroyed, and to see it rather as a legitimate holder of public power and 
simultaneously as an adversary who they vehemently disagree with.135 This also 
explains the manner in which protesters direct their grievances towards the 
government and other institutions holding power. Protesters view these representative 
— deliberative and participatory — institutions as legitimate, however the innate lack 
of trust of these institutions by protesters indicate an inherent conflict between the 
people and their representatives.  
The potential of activist politics in parliament is also indicative of the potential of 
agonistic pluralism with regard to protest action. In Van der Westhuizen’s analysis of 
the democratic politics of the EFF, she also points out that the EFF “with its activism, 
multiplies the discourses that form democratic citizens”.136 This is similar to ideas 
mentioned above of protest playing an important role in challenging the law and 
                                            
135 This is an important consideration. There are certain radical movements which seem to undermine 
the very legitimacy of the government/democratic system. These movements do not necessarily accept 
the legitimacy of the public power.  The Marikana protests, as discussed in 2 4 4 3 are an example of 
these. The reason certain protests — such as the Marikana protests — at times worked outside the 
system is because within that specific deliberative and participatory paradigm there was no space for 
contestation. Mouffe’s agonistic democracy would be informative in this regard as it provides a space 
for this type of contestation. While in deliberative and participatory systems, animosity or friction are 
seen as illegitimate forms of participation, agonistic democracy requires all role players (such as the 
State and trade unions in Marikana), to view each other as legitimate opponents, rather than enemies. 
136 Van der Westhuizen “Democratising South Africa” in The End of the Representative State? 
Democracy at the Crossroads 100. 
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transforming society by creating new spaces for those who are powerless in 
institutionalised and “fixed”/stable spaces of democracy.137 Protests, in an agonistic 
model, can be viewed as constantly changing the idea of what it means to be a 
democratic citizen, and as giving power to those who are disadvantaged or socially 
and economically disenfranchised. On this understanding, protests challenge 
deliberative and participatory institutions to constantly rethink who is excluded from 
their processes. This thought process could allow these established spaces to become 
more inclusive.   
 
5 4 Conclusion  
This chapter investigated the possibility of including protest action within the models 
of participatory and deliberative democracy. It did so by providing a brief exposition of 
each model’s characteristics and indicating how these models are evident within South 
Africa’s democracy, with reference to case law and legislation.  The chapter argued 
that these conceptions are unable to adequately address and explain protest actions 
which are characteristically disruptive, conflictual and contentious (as established in 
chapter two). Although participatory and deliberative democracy are important 
democratic models in South African, the emphasis on these conceptions possibly 
contribute to the marginal and restrictive role of freedom of assembly within the 
legislative and constitutional framework (as indicated in chapter three).  This chapter 
showed how a model of agonistic pluralism may assist in reinforcing the importance 
of protest action with South Africa. The distinguishing characteristic of this model is 
that it places conflict at its centre, rather than attempting to limit or eliminate such 
antagonism. The nature of the dissent and conflict inherent in the protests in South 
Africa, as elaborated in chapter two, is more easily explained by such a model. If this 
model is used to explain and inform our ideas about protest action, it will allow for a 
more inclusive idea of democracy in South Africa which once again places dissent 
through protest as central to our democracy. 
                                            
137 See footnote 117 above.  
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Chapter 6 
6 Conclusion 
The main aim of this thesis was to determine whether and to what extent different 
understandings of democracy in South Africa allow us to make sense of the nature 
and importance of the right to freedom of assembly. This chapter will draw on the 
conclusions drawn in the previous chapters, and attempt to link them together.  
     
6 1 South Africa: the protest capital of the world 
Chapter two of this study examined the right to assemble from an historical 
perspective. This historical analysis focused both on the history of the regulation of 
assemblies and demonstrations in South Africa, and on the historical importance of 
protest action as a mechanism through which the dispossessed and marginalised can 
challenge their exclusion. This can help to shed light both on official attitudes relating 
to freedom of assembly, and on the continued importance and prevalence of protests 
in post-apartheid South Africa. The second point is stated powerfully by Mogoeng CJ: 
  
“So the lessons of our history, which inform the right to peaceful assembly and 
demonstration in the Constitution… tell us something about the inherent power and value 
of freedom of assembly and demonstration, as a tool of democracy often used by people 
who do not necessarily have other means of making their democratic rights count.”1 
 
Protests not only played a vital role as a tool of resistance against the injustices of 
apartheid, but continue to be central to democratic participation in post-apartheid 
South Africa. Chapter two analysed the increase in protest action in South Africa and 
highlighted some of its causes. It found that so-called service delivery protests are 
used to challenge both socio-economic disparities and failures on the part of the state 
to facilitate democratic participation. Although these protests are typically directed at 
local government, they highlight issues that transcend the confines of local 
communities. Protests are also used in labour disputes. Here, the boundaries 
sometimes become fuzzy, as some labour disputes also involve challenges to state 
                                            
1 South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas 2013 1 SA 83 (CC) para 63.  
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institutions and trade unions. Moreover, protests are part of the varied repertoire used 
by political parties to challenge one another and gain support.2  
Protests are an essential part of day to day democracy in South Africa. They are 
used by a diversity of social actors to challenge the status quo, and are volatile, 
antagonistic and conflictual spaces often characterised by violence.3  
 
6 2 Section 17 of the Constitution and the Regulation of Gatherings Act 
Chapter three examined the nature and scope of section 17 of the Constitution. It 
argued that this section, read through the lens of the democratic values of freedom, 
equality and dignity, should be an important vehicle for democratic participation and 
contestation.4 Chapter three also investigated the Regulation of Gatherings Act 
(“RGA”) and the problematic implementation of this piece of legislation which partly 
contributes to the unrealised potential of freedom of assembly in South Africa. The 
chapter focussed on the notice requirements, in section 3 of the RGA, which are 
particularly burdensome on the organisers of protest action. The notice requirements 
also provide a wide discretion to the local municipality in controlling these spaces by 
preventing the organisers from continuing under the wide umbrella of preventing 
potential harm. Moreover, the powers of police to control these gatherings and 
possibly target participants and organisers, as discussed in chapter three, are 
constitutionally suspect. Some of the more problematic elements are the criminal 
sanctions in section 12 of the RGA which are detrimental to the exercise of the right. 
In this regard, chapter three analysed the recent High Court case of S v Mlungwana 
(“Mlungwana”).5  
Mlungwana concerned a challenge to the constitutionality of section 12(1)(a) of the 
RGA. This section provides for a criminal sanction for a convenor of a gathering who 
has failed to fulfil the section 3 notice requirement. Even though the High Court’s 
judgment is encouraging, the arguments advanced on behalf of the State in this case 
demonstrate the State’s restrictive views towards protests. On the State’s view, 
criminalisation is a necessary deterrent to ensure compliance with the notification 
                                            
2 See chapter 2 part 2 4 4 4. 
3 See chapter 2 part 2 4 4 2. 
4 See chapter 3 part 3 1 2. 
5 S v Mlungwana and Others 2018 1 SACR 538 (WCC). 
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requirements. The State sees protests and protest organisers in a negative light, and 
is more concerned with the capacity of local authorities and the police to control 
protests, than with the capacity of the people to exercise their democratic right of 
freedom of assembly.  
 Additionally, the chapter analysed and critiqued the various judgments in the 
litigation involving South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas 
(“SATAWU”).6 It was shown that the courts, beyond their rhetoric about the centrality 
and importance of freedom of assembly to democracy, have given a restrictive 
interpretation to freedom of assembly. The finding that section 11 of the Regulation of 
Gatherings Act, which imposes a stringent form of liability on the organisers of 
gatherings, is constitutional, has a potentially chilling effect on protest action. The 
SATAWU court emphasised that the RGA is “deliberately tight” because protests call 
for “extraordinary measures to curb potential harm”.7 The judiciary recognises that 
protests are, by nature, places of potential discord and contention. However, it appears 
to view such contestation and disruption as something to be contained as far as 
possible, rather than as something that can contribute to democracy. It therefore 
considers the antagonism that is inherent in many protests as irrational and 
unreasonable, and thus outside of the bounds of an open and democratic society.  
 
6 3 Direct and representative democracy 
Chapter four asked whether and to what extent representative and direct models of 
democracy can shed light on the nature, content and importance of freedom of 
assembly. It examined the political theory underlying representative and direct 
democracy, and sought to relate their specific characteristics to South Africa’s 
democracy.  
It was argued that the assumption made by a number of academics that freedom of 
assembly is a form of direct democracy is problematic. This is so particularly because 
exercises of this right do not amount to decision making. Protests involve democratic 
contestation, but the decision ultimately rests with representatives.8 At the same time, 
however, the chapter established that a restrictive understanding of representative 
                                            
6 2013 1 SA 83 (CC). 
7 South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas 2013 1 SA 83 (CC) para 38.  
8 See chapter 4 part 4 3 2. 
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democracy contributes to an impoverished and constrained understanding of the role 
of protest action within a democracy. This restrictive understanding assumes that the 
will of the people is identical to the decisions of representatives, and minimises the 
role of participation beyond and between elections.9 This conception of democracy 
places freedom of assembly at the periphery of democracy, and may result in a 
restrictive interpretation of freedom of assembly as indicated in chapter three and the 
analysis of SATAWU.   
 
6 4 From participation and deliberation to an agonistic form of democracy 
Chapter five investigated the possibility of viewing freedom of assembly through the 
lens of participatory and deliberative democracy.10 It examined the characteristics of 
these models of democracy and determined that both operate within an existing 
representative democracy and are reliant on an established institutional framework for 
participation and deliberation. This chapter found that certain types of protest action 
can adequately fit within the model of participatory democracy. It is also accepted by 
the judiciary that protests form part of the participatory model of democracy.11 
However, participatory democracy relies on representatives to initiate spaces for 
participation. By contrast, protests presuppose the ability of the people to create their 
own spaces of participation. Moreover, protests which are antagonistic and 
contentious do not fit within the participatory paradigm, as it allows representatives to 
exclude and control spaces of participation which inevitably may lead to taking the 
potential power of protests away.  
Deliberative conceptions of democracy similarly stress the value of participation, 
and are subject to the same criticisms as those levelled against participatory 
democracy. Furthermore, in the deliberative conception of democracy, emphasis is 
placed on the manner of participation, which should be rational and reasonable. This 
study argued that the deliberative model is unable to account for the inherent 
antagonisms and conflict which are inherent in protest action. Participatory and 
                                            
9 See chapter 4 part 4 4 2.  
10 See chapter 5 part 5 2 for a discussion on the difference between deliberative and participatory 
conceptions of democracy.  
11 See chapter 5 part  5 5 2. 
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deliberative models of democracy attempt to eliminate tensions and conflict by 
creating a platform for a possible rational consensus.  
Protest action provides people with “an outlet for their frustrations”.12 Deliberative 
and participatory models of democracy are largely unable to make sense of this 
function, which inevitably results in a clash of positions. As stated by Mouffe, “[a] well-
functioning democracy calls for a vibrant clash of political positions”.13 This study 
argued for a model of agonistic pluralism as advocated by Mouffe. Rather than 
attempting to eliminate and exclude conflict from democratic thought, agonistic 
pluralism recognises that these conflicts are not only impossible to eliminate, but are 
fundamental to democracy. This model will more suitably allow for an understanding 
of protest action which reinforces the potential power of protest action in South Africa. 
While the judiciary accepts that protests are by their nature conflictual and disruptive, 
their understanding of democracy makes them view this as detrimental to an open and 
democratic society. As argued by this study, agonistic pluralism will not attempt to 
eliminate the frustrations and passions evident in protests but attempt to 
reconceptualise them within the already existing representative framework. 
 
6 5 Concluding remarks  
This study asked whether and to what extent different models of democracy enable 
an adequate understanding of the nature, meaning and importance of the fundamental 
democratic right to freedom of assembly in South Africa. Section 17, like all other 
provisions in the Bill of Rights, must be interpreted in view of the values that underlie 
an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.14 
Protest action is fundamental in our democracy. As stated by Mogoeng CJ: “Indeed, it 
is one of the principal means by which ordinary people can meaningfully contribute to 
the constitutional objective of advancing human rights and freedoms”.15 Section 17 
allows people to participate and contribute to their idea of what an open and 
democratic society should be. Different conceptions of democracy either tend to 
minimise the role of these contributions or shift these contributions to the outside of 
                                            
12 South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas 2013 1 SA 83 (CC) para 61. 
13 C Mouffe The Democratic Paradox (2005) 105. 
14 S 39(1) of the Constitution. 
15 South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas 2013 1 SA 83 (CC) para 61.  
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what is considered legitimate in a democracy. This is done by dictating how, when and 
who can and should participate in democracy. This stifles the potential of a more 
progressive inclusive vision of a democratic society where different voices are given 
the power to create and contribute to the society within which they live. Even more so 
in South Africa, where the marginalised voices need an avenue which is not stifled by 
the red tape and authoritative control exercised by the State. The exercise of political 
will through protests outside the bounds of State control is not necessarily the exercise 
of political power outside the bounds of a democracy. Our constitutional democracy is 
one where “We, the people” is not an empty slogan. “We, the people” is evidenced in 
the lively and boisterous protests. What is clear is that freedom of assembly must be 
interpreted and understood in the context of a democratic culture where social dissent 
is seen as a social good rather than as illegitimate.  
South Africa is a country defined by the right of all to participate and challenge 
authority in order to create a more inclusive society, informed by the values of freedom 
and equality. Section 17 allows people to participate and create a space which 
unequivocally says that they matter. Allowing people to participate in such a conflictual 
manner will allow us to “[b]elieve that South Africa belongs to all who live in it”.16  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
16 The preamble to the Constitution.  
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